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Between 1975-1976 South Africa intervened in the Angolan civil war. The invasion of a 
black African country was then an unprecedented event in South Africa's history. This 
dissertation explores the motivations behind, and implications of, South Africa's 
involvement in Angola. It firstly scrutinises the rationalisations given by the government 
of the day, specifically the four key objectives that the Defence Force claimed it had been 
pursuing. These were: the protection of South Africa's investment in the Cunene 
hydroelectric scheme; the 'hot pursuit' of Namibian guerrillas; the response to appeals 
from two of the liberation movements in Angola; and finally, the need to counter 
communist, specifically Cuban, intervention in Angola. 
Consideration is then given to the key motivation behind South Africa's invasion of 
Angola, one which the South African government initially tried to conceal. Operation 
Savannah, as South Africa's intervention in Angola was officially known, was a response 
to actual and perceived encouragement from both black African states and the West. 
Intervention in Angola was seen as an opportunity to act in concert with moderate black 
Africa and to prove that South Africa was a reliable ally against communist expansion. It 
was also an effort to establish South Africa's credibility as a loyal ally of the 'Free 
World'. This exploration is revealing as to both Pretoria's worldview and its perception 
of its own international standing. 
Although there is extensive scholarship of the Angolan civil war and South Africa's 
intervention therein, little has been written about the domestic context of the war for 
South Africa itself. This dissertation examines the implications of the South African 
intervention in Angola from the South African perspective. The ramifications for South 
Africa, both in the domestic sphere and the international arena, are outlined. South 
Africa's intervention in Angola led to international recriminations and increased isolation 
for South Africa. Within South Africa itself there was a stark contrast in the reaction of 
the white and black communities to events in Angola. In the regional context, South 
Africa's actions led to deterioration in its security situation, as a consequence of the 
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Figure 2: In 1975, the Defence Force covertly invaded Angola and Prime 
Minister Vorster tried to keep the fact secret from South Africa. 
[A Berry, Act by Act: 40 Years of Nationalist Rule in South Africa, 











'In all history there cannot be many instances of a country going into a 
foreign war without the knowledge of its people'. 
(Allister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, 1990)1 
In 1975, South Africa covertly invaded Angola and its troops advanced to within two hundred kilometres of 
Luanda? Although evidence of South African intervention in the Angolan civil war was published in the 
international press, Prime Minister B.I. Vorster tried to keep the fact secret from South Africa. 'Operation 
Savannah', as the intervention was officially known, was the first occasion since the Second World War 
that South African soldiers were sent to fight and died outside their country's borders? Also, for the first 
time in modern South African history, white soldiers found themselves as prisoners of war in black African 
hands. As the' Angolan' origins of the civil war became subsumed by its Cold War context, the escalation 
of Cuban and Soviet intervention and the end of American involvement led the South African Defence 
Force to retreat in early 1976. 
The Angolan civil war has been examined as a Cold War case study, and the chronology of super-power 
escalation has been endlessly revised. However, little has been written about the domestic context of the 
war within South Africa itself. This dissertation seeks to examine the South African intervention in Angola . 
from the South African perspective. It aims to place the military episode within its broader context of both ' 
domestic developments within South Africa and the country's position on the world stage. It outlines 
'what' happened and 'when', but also seeks to examine 'why' and 'with what implications.' 
South Africa's military intervention on foreign soil, although a regular event by the 1980s, was 
extraordinary in 1975. It appeared that Pretoria had leamt to live with the FRELlMO government in 
Mozambique and come to accept the inevitability of majority rule in Rhodesia. Why then, in Angola, did 
Vorster abandon his government's oft-quoted principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other 
states? 
When writing about South Africa during the apartheid era it is necessary to employ the racial terminology 
commonly used at the time. Although classification of this kind is found objectionable by many, including 
this author, in the interests of accuracy terms such as 'black', 'white' and 'coloured' cannot be avoided. 
In this dissertation South West Africa is referred to as Namibia (a name recognised by the United Nations 
from 1966) but 'Rhodesia' is retained for Zimbabwe during the period before 1980. The Democratic 
Republic of Congo, formerly known as Zaire and previously the Belgian Congo, is referred to here as 
Zaire. 'Congo' refers to Congo-Brazzaville, formerly the French Congo. 
1 A. Sparks, The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Heinemann, London, 
1990), p. 305. ' 
2 A small number of South African instructors/advisers got within 25 kilometres of Luanda. 
3 Volunteers from the South African Air Force had participated in the Berlin Airbridge and with the United 











Consideration will be given to the ramifications for South Africa, both in the domestic sphere and the 
international arena. In South Africa the defenders of apartheid had three major fears: the advance of 
communist powers to positions of influence in countries neighbouring South Africa, the further decline of 
Western support for South Africa and the growth of international black unrest in support of a liberation 












The official archives of the South Mrican Defence Force (SADF) relating to this period are theoretically 
declassified, the 20-year restriction on them having lapsed. However, as the files on Operation Savannah 
were originally classified as 'secret', research applications are still subject to approval by the National 
Defence Force's Intelligence Division.4 Even the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was unable to gain 
access to them.5 According to a SADF researcher. due to the secret nature of the operation itself, there is 
not as much documentation in the archives as would be expected.6 
Two official sources are readily available. The first is a Defence Force press release entitled 'Nature and 
Extent of the SADF's Involvement in the Angolan Conflict', which was issued by Defence Headquarters in 
Pretoria on 3 February 1977.7 Prior to this rather sketchy account, the South African public had been given 
very little information about the government's activities in Angola. The second official source is Operasie 
Savannah, Angola 1975-1976 by Prof. FJ. du Toit Spies and Commandant Sophia J. Du Preez.s This is a 
more comprehensive narrative, which resulted from a Defence Force Archives project to document several 
major SADF operations. Spies, a retired history professor, was commissioned to write the official account 
of Operation Savannah in 1978. He was provided with access to classified archives and the assistance of 
Du Preez and other researchers from the SADF' s Documentation Service.9 
The South African government's continued reticence on the nature and extent of its involvement in the 
Angolan civil war meant Spies' manuscript was not published until 1989, almost a decade after its 
completion. During this time it was not even available to other historians commissioned by the Defence 
Force lO and the version that was finally published by the SADF's Department of Public Relations was 
heavily edited. 11 It is a rather clinical description of the sequence of battles in Angola, and deals only 
superficially with the political and diplomatic intrigues surrounding the campaign and the way in which the 
South African public was misled. An English version was not made available. 
4 Correspondence with the South African National Defence Force archives, Pretoria. 
5 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Vol.2, Chapter 2: The State Outside South Africa 
between 1960-1990 (internet published), section 15. 
6 S. du Preez, Avontuur in Angola: Die Verhaal van Suid-Afrika se Soldate in Angola, 1975-76 (J.L. van 
Schaik, Pretoria, 1989), foreword. 
7 The press release was reproduced in several South African newspapers including Rand Daily Mail, 4 
February 1977. 
8 F.J. du Toit Spies & S. du Preez, Operasie Savannah, Angola 1975-1976 (S.A. Weermag Direktoraat 
Openbare Betrekinge, Pretoria, 1989). 
9 Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, inside front cover; K. Meiring, 'Operasie Savannah 1975-1976, 
FJ. du Toit Spies en S.l. du Preez, boekresensie', (Historia, Vol. 37, No.2, 1992), p. 110. 
10 A. Van Wyk, The Birth of a New Afrikaner (Human & Rousseau, Cape Town, Johannesburg, 1991). p. 
94. Van Wyk wrote two books on the recipients of the Honoris Crux, South Africa's highest military 
decoration for bravery, (published in 1982 and 1985). Despite having the 'cooperation' of the SADF he 











Du Preez's own book, Avontuur in Angola: Die Verhaal van Suid-Afrika se Soldate in Angola, 1975-76 
(Adventure in Angola: The Story of South Africa's Soldiers in Angola) also appeared in 1989. She drew on 
the same documentation as that used by Spies but sought 'to strongly place the soldiers' experience of 
events in Operation Savannah under the spotlight', a facet lacking from Spies' account. 12 The following 
year, Du Preez prepared an operational diary from the war for publication in Militaria, the SADF's 
'professional' publication.13 Peter Stiff, whose book The Silent War: South African Reece Operations 1969-
94 includes a chapter on Operation Savannah, was assisted by Du Preez who he claims was the foremost 
expert on the operation but 'for reasons of gender was prevented from writing the SADF's official 
history' . 14 
Following the outbreak of the Angolan civil war in 1974-1975 a number of commentators sought to unearth 
the complexities of the conflict, particularly the intrigues of its Cold War context and internationalisation. 
Among the most prolific of these were Tony Hodges, who reported from Angola during the war, and the 
veteran Africa observer Colin Legum, who sought to unravel the complexities of South Africa's 
intervention, which he described as 'possibly the most traumatic event in South Africa's history since the 
Anglo-Boer war' .15 
The first personal recollection of the Angolan war was Adeus Angola published by Wi\lem Steenkamp in 
late 1976.16 Steenkamp, the Cape Times' military correspondent, served in Angola between January and 
March 1976 as a Citizen Force17 intelligence officer with the Cape Town Highlanders. Steenkamp fully 
supported South African intervention in Angola to counter what he described as 'a simple, straight-forward 
communist land-grab' .18 Adeus Angola was a highly personalised series of vignettes with no place names, 
dates or details of campaign movements. It was cleared for publication by the SADF with very little edited 
OUt.
19 At the time the South African public's knowledge of Operation Savannah was restricted to rumours, 
11 Correspondence with Ian van der Waag, Department of Military History, University of Stellenbosch. 
12 Du Preez, Avontuur in Angola, foreword; Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, p. 305. 
13 J. Laubscher & S. du Preez, 'Operasie Savannah Dagboek van Kapt J.A. Laubscher, annotated and edited 
bl Commandant Sophia du Preez', (Militaria, 1990, Vol. 20, No.2). 
I P. Stiff, The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969-94 (Galago, Alberton, South Africa, 
1999), acknowledgements page. 
IS Quote from C. Legum & T. Hodges, After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa (Rex Collings, 
London, 1976), p. 35. See also Legum (ed.): African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and 
Documents, 1975-76 (Rex Collings, London, Vol. 8, 1976); African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey 
and Documents, 1976-77 (Rex Collings, London, Vol. 9,1977); T. Hodges, 'The Struggle for Angola: How 
the World Powers Entered a War in Africa', (The Round Table, No. 262, April 1976). 
16 W. Steenkamp, Adeus Angola (Howard Timmins, Cape Town, 1976). 
17 The SADF was made up of the 'full time' Permanent Force of career soldiers, National Servicemen 
doing military service, and the 'part time' Citizen Force units called up for varying periods each year. 
18 Steenkamp, Adeus Angola, p. 137. 
19 Interview with Willem Steenkamp. Steenkamp claimed he knew of two other manuscripts that the 











vague official statements and one television film. Consequently Adeus Angola sold very well. Steenkarnp 
was on good terms with the Defence Force and published two further pro-SADF books on the border war, 
Borderstrike!: South Africa into Angola20 and South Africa's Border War, 1966-] 989. 21 
Another South African defence reporter, A.J. Venter, produced a book early in 1977. Vorster's Africa: 
Friendship and Frustration included a chapter on the Angolan war?2 Although Venter had travelled in 
Angola during the war and had reported from the front23 , his book does not describe any actual 
engagements. Despite being vetted by the military authorities, his Angolan chapter angered General 
Hendrik van den Bergh, of the Bureau of State Security, who claimed Venter had disclosed 'privileged' 
information?4 
It is likely that the SADF released their February 1977 account to coincide with a series of four articles 
published in the London Sunday Telegraph.25 They were the result of an investigation by Robert Moss, an 
Australian journalist based in London. Moss was the spokesman for the right-wing National Association for 
Freedom and author of Margaret Thatcher's 'Iron Maiden' speech. Moss was unremitting in his praise of 
South Africa's involvement in Angola and critical of 'the failure of nerve in Washington', which allowed 
the communists a 'victory by default' .26 Despite, or perhaps because of his alleged intelligence contacts27, 
Moss was far from convincing on the nature of the American involvement in Angola and the diplomatic 
complexities of the crisis. His articles were syndicated in South African newspapers beginning on 4 
February, the day after the official SADF press release on Operation Savannah. The two accounts were 
very similar and the fact that the Defence Force allowed Moss' to be published in South Africa implies a 
certain level of cooperation?S 
Moss' articles were themselves an attempt to counter claims about the Cuban engagement in Angola, made 
by the Colombian novelist, Gabriel Garcia Marquez. Marquez's authorised and somewhat sensationalised 
account of the Cuban 'Operation Carlota' was first published in the Mexican weekly magazine, Proceso, in 
20 W. Steenkamp, Borderstrike!: South Africa into Angola (Butterworths Publishers, Durban, 1983). 
21 W. Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, 1966-1989 (Ashanti, Gibraltar, 1989). 
22 A.J. Venter, Vorster's Africa: Friendship and Frustration (Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg, 
1977). 
23 After Venter's South African nationality was disclosed to the MPLA he moved out of the MPLA sphere 
of influence to Nova Lisboa and covered the war from the UNlTA side: Venter, Vorster's Africa, p. 201. 
24 G. Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa during the Angolan War: A Case Study of News 
Manipulation and Suppression (MA Thesis, Journalism, Rhodes University, 1980), p. 252 fn.52. 
25 R. Moss, 'Castro's Secret War Exposed', Sunday Telegraph, 30 January, 6 February, 13 February and 20 
February 1977. 
26 Moss, 'How Washington Lost its Nerve and how the Cubans Subdued Angola', Sunday Telegraph, 30 
January 1977. 
27 J. Sanders, South Africa and the International Media, 1972-79: A Struggle for Representation (Frank 
Cass, London, 2000), pp. 136, 153-154 fn.8. 
28 It has been claimed that Moss' account was written with the assistance of the SADF: Addison, 











January 1977 and then in translation by American newspapers?9 RW. Johnson's How Long Will South 
Africa Survive?30 appeared soon after Marquez's account, which it closely followed. It was a highly 
readable examination of South Africa's international standing which devoted considerable, though 
necessarily speculative, attention to the Angolan civil war. The following year, Robin Hallett, a lecturer at 
the University of Cape Town attempted the first academic study of South Africa's participation in the 
Angolan war. It was an attempt to dispel what he described as 'an official smoke screen, a deliberately 
created miasma, the product partly of stringent censorship, partly of government denials - or, to put the 
matter more bluntly and starkly, simple lies' .31 
The most important published memoir of the Angolan war was that of John Stockwell, who headed the 
United States' Central Intelligence Agency's Angolan task force. Rumours of CIA involvement in Angola 
had appeared repeatedly in the Western media but were not confirmed until 10 April 1977, when an open 
letter from Stockwell was published in the Washington Post. Stockwell had resigned from the CIA deeply 
disillusioned and in May 1978 published his expose In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story.32 Over the last 
quarter-century other memoirs have been published which are pertinent to the study of Operation 
Savannah. Accounts of the United States involvement in Angola are included in the memoirs of: President 
Gerald Ford33, Secretary of State Henry Kissinge?4, Director of Central Intelligence William Colb15, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis36 Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs under Ronald Reagan37 and William Hyland, Ford's deputy assistant for national 
security affairs38 . 
South African memoirs include volumes by military men: Jan Breytenbach39 and Johannes (Jannie) 
Geldenhuys4o, and Opposition politicians Sir De Villiers Gr~l and Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert42• Neither 
29 G.O. Marquez, 'Operation Carlota', (Proceso, January 1977). Translated extracts were serialised as 
'Cuba in Africa: Seed Che Guevara Planted', (Washington Post, 10-12 January 1977). The New Left 
Review (No. 101-102, February-April 1977) published the translated article in full. 
30 RW. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive? (Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1977). 
31 R Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-76', (African Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 308, July 
1978), p. 347. 
32 J. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (W.W. Norton, New York, 1978). 
33 G. Ford, A Time to Heal (W.H. Allen, London, 1979). 
34 H. Kissinger, Years of Renewal (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1999). 
35 W. Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1978). 
36 N. Davis, 'The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir', (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No.1, Fall 
1978). 
37 C. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood (W.W. Norton, 
New York, 1992). 
38 W. Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Random House, New York, 
1987). 
39 J. Breytenbach, Forged in Battle (Saayman & Weber, Cape Town, 1986); They Live by the Sword: 32 
'Buffalo' Battalion - South Africa'S Foreign Legion (Lemur Books, Alberton, South Africa, 1990). 











Prime Minister Vorster nor Minister of Defence (and later prime minister) P.W. Botha wrote 
autobiographies. However, Botha does have two 'official' biographies, which were written at his request.43 
As perhaps would be expected, the most prolific writers of memoirs are journalists from the period. 
Important accounts, by foreign correspondents who covered the war in Angola, are by Ryszard . 
KapuscifIski44 and Fred Bridgland.45 Those which give insights into the domestic context of South Africa's 
Angolan episode include: Allister Sparks46, Benjamin Pogrund47 , Donald Woods48 , Anthony Heard49, 
Harvey TysonSO and Gerald Shaw51 • Apart from Steenkamp's Adeus Angola, only two other accounts of 
Operation Savannah by ordinary soldiers have been published: a narrative by 'Cobus' a Citizen Force 
soldier called up to serve in Angola included in a compilation of memoirs by South African veterans52, and 
a chapter in Parabat: Personal Accounts of Paratroopers in Combat Situations in South Africa's History 
which describes the experiences of Sergeant-Major Erwin.53 
Two recent South African books are of particular note. The first is The Silent War: South African Recce 
Operations 1969-94 by Peter Stiff. In 1987 the SADF agreed to give Stiff unprecedented access to 
documents covering the activities of the Reconnaissance Commandoes (Recces). However, this ended in 
1989 as a result, Stiff believes, of opposition from the National Intelligence Service, and he did not resume 
his research into apartheid's covert military operations until after 1994.54 In response to submissions to the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission about the activities of the former SADF, Hilton Hamann produced a 
41 D.V. Graaff, Div Looks Back: The Memoirs of Sir De Villiers Graaff(Human & Rousseau, Cape Town, 
1993). 
42 F. Van Zyl Slabbert, Tough Choices: Reflections of an Afrikaner African (Tafel berg, Cape Town, 2000). 
43 D. & J. De Villiers, PW (Tafelberg, Cape Town, 1984); D. Prinsloo, Stem utt die Wilderness; 'n 
Biografie oor oud-pres. PW Botha (Voice from the Wilderness: A Biography of ex-president PW Botha 
(V AANDEL-Uitgewers, Mossel Bay, 1997). 
44 R. Kapuscinski, Another Day of Life (Pan Books, London, 1987) is the English translation of the Polish 
account Jeszcze dzien iyGia originally published in 1976. Kapuscinski, a Polish press agency 
correspondent, gives a vivid description of the mood in Luanda during the lead-up to independence. 
45 F. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1986); The War for 
Africa: Twelve Months That Transformed a Continent (Ashanti, Gibraltar, 1990). Bridgland was a British 
journalist who covered the Angolan war and became Savimbi's official biographer. Jonas Savimbi remains 
the key biography although it is noted for its unashamedly pro-UNITA slant. 
46 A. Sparks, The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Heinemann, London, 
1990). 
47 B. Pogrund, War of Words: Memoir of a South African Journalist (Seven Stories Press, New York, 
2000). 
48 D. Woods, Asking for Trouble: The Education of a White African (Beacon Press, Boston, 1980). 
49 A. Heard, The Cape of Storms: A Personal History of the Crisis in South Africa (Ravan Press, 
Johannesburg, 1991). 
50 H. Tyson, Editors Under Fire (Random House, Sandton, 1993). 
51 G. Shaw, The Cape Times: An Informal History (David Philip, Cape Town, 1999). 
52 B. Fowler, Pro Patria (Sentinel Projects, Halifax, 1995). 
53 M. Paul, Parabat: Personal Accounts of Paratroopers in Combat Situations in South Africa's History 
(Covos Day, Johannesburg, 2001). 











book based on interviews with Defence Force generals of the apartheid era.55 They were keen to correct 
what they felt was the Commission's one-sided portrayal of the Defence Force. Hamann had served in 
Operation Savannah as a 17-year-old conscript and devotes a chapter of his book to it. Unfortunately, he 
gives no references to the sources for some of his most interesting findings.56 
In 2002, as the research for this dissertation was nearing completion, Piero Gleijeses published Conflicting 
Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976, a study of Cuban activities in Mrica.57 Gleijeses, an 
American academic, was the first researcher to gain access to the Cuban archives on activities in Zaire 
(1964-65) and Angola (1975-76). He uses these archives together with recently declassified American 
documents, to establish an alternative chronology of American and Cuban escalation in Angola to that 
traditionally propounded at the time by American policy-makers, most notably then-Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger. Gleijeses' work also sheds new light on Soviet-Cuban relations and, most importantly for 
this dissertation, on the nature of American-South African relations in 1975-76. A comprehensive 
chronology of the early stages of the Angolan civil war will only be written once the archives of Moscow, 
Lisbon, Pretoria, Paris, Luanda, Lusaka and Kinshasa receive the same attentions as Gleijeses has devoted 
to those in Havana. 
55 H. Hamann, Days of the Generals: The Untold Story of South Africa's Apartheid-Era Military Generals 
(Zebra, Stroik Publishers, Cape Town, 2001), p. xi. 
56 Hamann, Days of the Generals, p. xi. 
S? P. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976 (University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2002). Gleijeses is Professor of U.S. Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins 











THE LISBON COUP AND THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR 
On the morning of 25 April 1974, white South Africans listened to the results of their general election, 
which rewarded Vorster's National Party for its firm grip on internal black nationalism and continued 
economic growth. But other breaking headlines that day, of events five thousand miles away, were to set in 
train developments that would shatter their era of confidence. A military coup in Lisbon, the suddenness of 
which completely surprised Pretoria, set in motion developments that were to change the face of southern 
Africa.58 The Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique and Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia formed 
a buffer of white-ruled territories shielding South Africa from 'black Africa' to the north. The dissolution 
of Lisbon's empire would break this cordon sanitaire, leaving Rhodesia indefensible and creating 
independent black states on South Africa's borders. 
By 1974, Portugal had fought fourteen years' of simultaneous insurgencies in her far-flung African 
colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. Portugal spent half its national budget 
each year trying to cling to the world's last old-style, colonial empire and consequently, was on the brink of 
financial collapse.59 Mounting military casualties meant draft-dodging and anti-war sabotage had become a 
way of life.6o Increasing disillusionment and radicalisation within the army itself was spearheaded by the 
Armed Forces Movement (MFA), a clandestine group of young army officers inspired by a variety of 
social-democratic political convictions, which overthrew the regime of Prime Minister Marcello Caetano in 
their coup of 25 April 1974.61 
The subsequent presidency of General Antonio de Spinola, head of a Junta of National Salvation, was 
dominated by the question of the future of the colonies. Spinola, a former governor of Guinea-Bissau, had 
laid out his plans for a 'Lusitanian federation' of Portugal and the colonies in his book Portugal and the 
Future.62 However, the MFA was pressing for full independence for all Portugal's overseas territories. The 
dispute led to the fall of the first provisional government in July 1974 and its replacement by a new MF A-
dominated government63 On 27 July 1974, Spinola reluctantly announced that Portugal's colonies would 
58 1. Barber & J. Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945-88 
(Cambridge University Press and the South African Institute of International Affairs, Cambridge, 1990), p. 
175. 
59 Stiff, The Silent War, pp. 97-98. 
60 Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, p. 32. 
61 A. Callinicos & J. Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto (pluto Press, London, 1978), p. 139. 
62 A. de Spinola. Portugal e 0 Futuro (Arcadia, Lisbon, 1974). Under the provisions of the plan, each 
territory would vote whether or not to remain in a federation that would guarantee the rights of Portuguese 
settlers and give Portugal certain powers in the economic and military fields: D. Wheeler, 'Portuguese 
Withdrawal from Africa, 1974-1975: The Angolan Case', in L Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the 
Portuguese Coup (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980), p. 5. 











be granted independence.64 Within a year, the African Party for the Independence of Guineau Bissau and 
Cape Verde (p AlGC) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) had been officially recognised by 
Portugal as rulers of fully independent states.65 
However, in Angola there was no heir apparent to political power but rather three rival liberation 
movements. The nature of the three movements, their social composition, base and leadership, has been the 
subject of extensive literature, of which John Marcum's two-volume history remains the authoritative 
account66, and a brief summary will suffice here. 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 
The Movimento Popular de Liberariio de Angola was formed in 1956. It had some tribal foundations 
amongst the Mbundu of central Angola, but its support base lay primarily with Luanda's students and 
intellectuals, including mixed-race mesticos and assimilados, who had been granted the same rights as 
whites.67 The MPLA began its armed struggle on 4 February 1961, when its supporters attacked the Sao 
Paolo prison in Luanda in an attempt to free its members held in custody. The insurrection was bloodily 
suppressed and most of the MPLA's leadership were killed or captured. Those that did escape fled into 
exile in the Congo and established training bases there.68 The following year, Agostinho Neto, having 
escaped from house arrest in Portugal, became President of the movement. 69 
The Soviet Union embraced Neto following his first visit to Moscow in 1964 and began providing the 
MPLA with limited aid.70 Relations were coloured by Sino-Soviet rivalry, with the Soviets suspecting that 
the MPLA leadership was pro-Chinese, whilst the Chinese, who had given the MPLA some assistance in 
the early 1960s, feared the MPLA was pro-Soviet.71 The MPLA established contact with Cuba in 1965 
64 Stiff, The Silent War, p. 99. 
65 M. Wolfers & J. Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line (Zed Press, London, 1983), p. 1. 
66 J. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950-1962 (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969); The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II: Exile Politics 
and Guerrilla Waifare, 1962-1976 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1978). 
In the early 1960s Marcum, an American scholar, walked 800 miles through Angola into the FNLA 
~uerrilla camps. 
7 A. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (LB. Tauris, London & New York, 
1996), p. 136; CaIlinicos & Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto, p. 141. Assimilados had formally 
renounced their 'Africanism' and become 'civilised' in the terminology of the Portuguese: W. Burchett, 
Southern Africa Stands Up: The Revolutions in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South 
Africa (Urizen Books, New York, 1978), p. 47. 
68 Stiff, The Silent War, p. 96; J. Barratt, The Angolan Conflict: Internal and International Aspects (South 
African Institute of International Affairs (Braamfontein, April 1976), p. 7. 
69 Barratt, The Angolan Conflict, p. 6. 
70 New York Times, 17 December 1964; c. Stevens, 'The Soviet Role in Southern Africa', in J. Seiler (ed.), 
Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, p. 47. 











with Roberto as its President and Jonas Savimbi as its Foreign Minister.82 Between 1964 and 1971, the 
OAU (except Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Congo) recognised the FNLA as the only legitimate nationalist 
movement in Angola.83 Following the MPLA leadership struggle between Neto and Chipenda, in March 
1975 Chipenda threw in his lot with Roberto.84 The FNLA, of which he was appointed secretary-general, 
thereby gained a military presence in south-eastern Angola.85 
The FNLA's greatest asset was the support of Zaire.86 The Bakongo tribe straddled the border areas of 
Angola and Zaire and the 1961 revolt in Angola had received support from across the border.87 The link 
was further cemented when Roberto (who had spent most of his life in Zaire) married a sister of General 
Mobutu Sese Seko, later President of Zaire.8s Through their attempts to court Mobutu, the Chinese came to 
favour the FNLA, which they also considered a counterbalance to the Soviet-supported MPLA.s9 In 
December 1973, Roberto visited Beijing90 and in mid-1974 200 Chinese instructors arrived in Zaire to train 
FNLA troopS.91 The Soviet Union had ended its limited assistance to the FNLA in 1964, claiming that 
Roberto had curtailed his own guerrilla operations in Angola under pressure from Washington.92 Mobutu 
was widely viewed as an American protege93 and there were accusations that Roberto had been on the CIA 
payroll from 1961 or 1962.94 This token American support, begun during the Kennedy administration, 
appears to have dwindled as the Nixon administration reverted to wholesale support for the Portuguese in 
82 Barratt, The Angolan Conflict, p. 6. 
83 Stiff, The Silent War, p. 97. 
84 Chipenda's 'Eastern Revolt' was a direct challenge to Neto and motivated by personal rather that 
political reasons: F. Guimariies, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic 
Political Conflict (Macmillan, London, 2001), p. 98. 
85 Callinicos & Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto, p. 147; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 467 fn.30. 
As an Ovimbundu, Chipenda possessed the right ethnic affiliations to gain support in southern Angola: 
Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola' , p. 360. 
86 One analyst went so far as to say that the FNLA was no more than an instrument of Zairean foreign 
folicy: Ebinger, 'External Intervention in Internal War', p. 674. 
7 Callinicos & Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto, p. 143. 
88 Moss, Sunday Telegraph, 30 January 1977. Mobutu denied this relationship in an interview with Jeune 
Afrique (No. 790, 27 February 1976) and it may be that the two women only came from the same village: 
C. Young, 'The Portuguese Coup and Zaire's Southern Africa Policy', in J. Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa 
Since the Portuguese Coup, pp. 203, 211 fn.17. 
89 Young, 'The Portuguese Coup and Zaire's Southern Africa Policy', p. 199; James, A Political History of 
the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990 (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1992), p. 59; Gleijeses, 
Conflicting Missions, p. 238. 
90 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, p. 59. 
91 Le Monde, 5 June 1974. By August 1974, the FNLA had received 450 tons of weapons from China: 
Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 246; Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 191. 
92 New York Times, 17 December 1964. 
93 Young, 'The Portuguese Coup and Zaire's Southern Africa Policy', p. 197. The CIA first intervened in 
1960 to topple Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and connived in his assassination. 
94 New York Times, 25 September 1975, 19 December 1975. Gordon Winter, a defector from the South 
African Bureau of State Security, claimed that the FNLA was 'formed, funded and run by the CIA' , which 
is undoubtedly an overstatement: G. Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police (Penguin, 











southern Africa.95 In July 1974, the CIA reactivated its old relationship with Roberto and began sending 
small sums of money to the FNLA.96 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
The Un ida Nacianal para a Independendia Total de Angola began as a breakaway faction from the FNLA 
led by Jonas Savimbi.97 In July 1964, Savimbi had resigned from the FNLA during a meeting of the OAU 
claiming that Holden Roberto was 'flagrantly tribalistic' .98 He had first discussed joining the MPLA but 
was unable to reach an agreement on the position he would hold. UNITA's support came from the south 
and east of Angola, mainly from the Ovimbundu tribe. After attacking the Benguela railroad in 1967, 
UNIT A lost the support of Zambia.99 The following year Savimbi visited Beijing and secured token 
assistance. 100 
Savimbi was accused of cooperating with the Portuguese. In July 1974, the Paris weekly Afrique-Asie, 
published four letters allegedly exchanged between Savimbi and Portuguese military officials prior to an 
attempted merger of the MPLA and FNLA in December 1972. The letters appeared to indicate substantial 
Portuguese-UNITA collaboration, including plans for joint attacks against the MPLA and FNLA and 
requests for ammunition by UNIT A. 101 They were dismissed as forgeries by UNIT A. but many Portuguese 
officials attested to Savimbi' s links with Lis bon. 102 UNIT A also faced unsubstantiated accusations of CIA-
funding. According to one CIA source, UNITA consisted of 'twelve guys with knives' before American 
backing turned it into 'a well-financed, heavily armed guerrilla force' .103 Discounting allegations against 
UNITA, the OAU gave the movement official recognition and an initial grant of $32,000 in June 1974.104 
All three Angolan liberation movements had received assistance from communist benefactors at one time 
or another. Although the MPLA may have been somewhat more genuine in its leftist convictions, there was 
really very little to distinguish the three groups ideologically. The Director of the CIA, William Colby, later 
described the three Angolan movements: 'They are all independents. They are all for black Africa. They 
are all for some fuzzy kind of social system ... without really much articulation, but some sort of "Let's not 
95 Legum, 'A Letter on Angola to American Liberals', p. 17; R. Morris, 'The Proxy War in Angola: 
Pathology of a Blunder', (The New Republic, VoL 174, No.5, 31 January 1976), p. 20. 
96 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 67. 
97 Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, pp. 63-65. 
98 Burchett, Southern Africa Stands Up, p. 27. 
99 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 239. 
100 Barratt, The Angolan Conflict, p. 7. According to Gordon Winter, Savimbi's 'friendship' with Beijing 
was merely a bluff to distance UNIT A from the CIA: Winter, Inside BOSS, pp. 540-541. 
101 'Angola: La longue trahison de l'U.N.I.T.A.', (Afrique-Asie, Paris, Vol. 61, 8 July 1974). See also: W. 
Minter (ed.), Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier (Africa World Press, New Jersey, 1988). 
102 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 239. 
!O3 The Guardian, 22 December 1975. 











when Che Guevara took part in the struggle against Moise Tshombe in Zaire.72 Between 1966-1967, 
Cubans provided military training for MPLA troops in Congo, after which relations became distant with 
Cuban support limited to training a handful of MPLA fighters in Cuba.73 Although recognised as a 
legitimate liberation movement by the Organisation of African Unity (OAD) in 197t14 , the MPLA was 
beset by leadership wrangles.?5 As a result, in 1972, the Soviets stopped all aid to Neto and only 
Yugoslavia continued its limited assistance?6 Soviet interest in the MPLA resumed shortly after the Lisbon 
coup. Following a brief flirtation with Daniel Chipenda, one of Neto's challengers, Moscow recommenced 
support of Neto.77 In August 1974, the Soviet Union announced that it considered Neto's MPLA to be the 
true voice of the Angolan people78 and in late 1974 it decided to begin weapons shipments to the 
movement.79 However, during early 1975 Yugoslavia remained the main supplier ofweapons.8o 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 
The Frente Nacional de Liberar;iio de Angola began as a Bakongo tribal separatist movement, the Union of 
the Peoples of North Angola, in 1954. Four years later it reinvented itself as the Union of Peoples of 
Angola (UPA) , nominally committed to national independence. During March 1961 the UPA, under 
Holden Roberto, led a bloody revolt by Bakongo peasants and contract workers in northern Angola whose 
fellow tribesmen had recently won independence in the neighbouring French and Belgian Congos. The 
revolt was put down and the UPA leadership fled into exile in Zaire (Belgian Congo). In 1962 the UPA 
changed its name to the FNLA and formed the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE)81 
72 Marquez, 'Operation Carlota', reproduced in English in D. Deutschmann, Angola and Namibia: 
Changing the History of Africa (Ocean Press, Melboume, 1989), p. 41. See M. Halperin, 'The Cuban Role 
in Southern Africa', in J. Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, pp. 25-43. 
73 Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 225; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 244. 
74 D. Herbstein, White Man, We Want to Talk to You (Andre Deutsch, London, 1979), p. 122. 
?5 Three factions were contesting power: Neto's 'True MPLA', Daniel Chipenda's 'Eastern Revolt' and the 
'Active Revolt' led by fonner MPLA president Mario de Andrade. 
76 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 243. 
77 Ibid, p. 243; C. Legum, 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa', (Foreign Affairs, 
New York, Vol. 54, No.4, October 1976), p. 749. Moscow managed to retrieve their shaken relationship 
with Neto by warning him that their intelligence had uncovered a plot by Chipenda to assassinate him: C. 
Legum, 'A Letter on Angola to American Liberals', (The New RepUblic, Vol. 174, No.5, 31 January 1976), 
p.17. 
78 F. Bridgland, 'Angola and the West', in A. Venter (ed.), Challenge: Southern Africa Within the African 
Revolutionary Context, An Overview (Ashanti Publishing, Gibraltar, 1989), p. 119. 
79 O. Westad, 'Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976: A New Pattern of Intervention', (Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin, Nos. 8-9, Winter 199617), pp. 23-24; Gleijeses, Conflicting 
Missions, p. 347. According to one source, it was the leader of the Portuguese Communist Party who 
personally recommended that Moscow resume its arms deliveries to the MPLA: C. Ebinger, 'External 
Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War', (Orbis, Vol. 20, No. 
3, Fall 1976), p. 688. 
80 The Gennan Democratic Republic also sent weapons to the MPLA prior to independence: Gleijeses, 
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be exploited by the capitalist nations."'lOs Each of the movements spoke of socialism and employed 
Marxist rhetoric when the occasion called for it. Before April 1974, the foreign aid given to the three 
Angolan movements was sporadic and insignificant, essentially a matter of their various patrons keeping 
their hands in the game. The Lisbon coup, however, raised the stakes. 
UNITA apparently signed a cease-fire with the Portuguese in June 1974106 and the FNLA and IvIPLA 
followed suit in October 1974. 107 Despite skirmishes between the IvIPLA and FNLA forces in late 1974, all 
three movements were persuaded under pressure from the OAU to participate in negotiations with Portugal. 
Against a backdrop of bitter rivalry between the three parties, a transitional government was established by 
the Alvor agreement of January 1975. Three representatives from each of the movements, presided over by 
the Portuguese High Commissioner, would run Angola until elections to a constituent assembly were held, 
prior to independence on 11 November 1975. Each of the three Angolan movements was to contribute 
8,000 troops to form a joint defence force together with 24,000 Portuguese troops. The phased withdrawal 
of these Portuguese troops would be completed by 29 February 1976.108 The transitional government was 
inaugurated in Luanda on 31 January 1975. However, the power-sharing agreement collapsed under 
increasing animosity and mutual recriminations between the three movements. 
In March FNLA troops, accompanied by detachments of the Zairean army, moved into Angola and 
occupied key towns in the northern areas. I09 Fighting soon erupted between the MPLA and FNLA in 
Luanda and on 15 May 1975 the Portuguese government declared virtual martial law in Angola. l1O By June 
1975 about 5,000 people had been killed in the fighting. 1I1 OAU-sponsored meetings in June and July 
between Roberto, Savimbi and Neto failed to stem the escalating conflict. In July, the MPLA drove the 
FNLA from Luandall2 and Roberto entered Angola to take charge of his troopS.113 On 21 August, Savimbi 
issued a formal declaration of war against the IvIPLA.114 As the fighting spread throughout Angola a 
massive airlift of Portuguese refugees was undertaken. On 29 August, Portugal formally annulled the Alvor 
agreement and dissolved the deflIDct transitional government. lIS Each of the three movements scrambled 
105 Colby's testimony to the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence: o. 
Pike, CIA: The Pike Report (Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1977), p. 218. 
106 Stiff, The Silent War, p. 100. There is some controversy about the timing: Marcum, The Angolan 
Revolution, Vol. II, p. 218; Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, pp. 105-106. 
107 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 241. In order to sign the agreement on 21 October, Neto returned to 
Angola for the first time in nearly 30 years: Bridgland, 'Angola and the West', p. 119. 
108 For the full text of the Alvor Agreement see: Portuguese Ministry of Mass Communication, Angola: The 
Independence Agreement (Ministry of Mass Communication, Lisbon, 1975). 
109 Burchett, Southern Africa Stands Up, pp. 76-77. 
110 Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, pp. 207-208. 
111 Financial Times, 14 June 1975. 
lI2 Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola', p. 355. 
113 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 257. 
114 The Times, 22 August 1975. 
115 G. Wright, The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy Toward Angola since 1945 (Pluto Press, 











for financial and military support in order to bolster its own internal leverage before independence. This 
search led inevitably to the superpowers. Previously, the FNLA and UNITA had both asked for help to 
fight colonialism, now they wanted support to counter the 'communist threat' posed by the MPLA. The 
MPLA had called for assistance to fight colonialism, now it appealed for solidarity to defeat the 'neo-
colonialist challenge' from its rivals. 116 Although Lisbon lacked the political will and physical means to 
impose elections and an orderly transfer of power, Angolan independence remained fixed for 11 November 
1975.117 
116 Guimaraes, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, p. 97. 
117 Furthermore, Lisbon announced that its troops would leave Angola by 11 November, not February as 
stated in the Alvor agreement. Given the situation in Portugal itself, the Portuguese had been unable to keep 
their forces at full strength and only 2,000 remained to embark from Luanda on 11 November: Wheeler, 











WHY DID SOUTH AFRICA INTERVENE IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR? 
As the Portuguese scrambled out of Africa, Pretoria resigned itself to accommodation with a FRELIMO 
administration in Mozambique. Vorster resisted appeals to support an attempted putsch by white 
Portuguese settlers in Louren<;:o Marques (Maputo) in September 1974, and rejected out of hand the right-
wing Herstigte N asionale Party's calls for a South African invasion of Mozambique. 1 The Defence 
Minister, P.W. Botha stated: 'We do not believe it is in the interests of the Republic to interfere in the 
affairs of the other countries, because we do not want other countries to poke their noses into our affairs.'2 
The Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, saw FRELIMO's rise to power, 'as a challenge and not as a disaster 
or a threat. It should rather be seen as an opportunity for us to prove further that we, as is the position in the 
case of our other neighbouring states, are prepared to and can live and work together with these neighbours 
in peace and friendship, irrespective of who is in power.'3 In response to Mozambique's formal 
independence on 25 June 1975, Vorster promptly declared that he had no objection to the government of 
Samora Machel. He claimed to have received assurances that Mozambique would not be used as a launch 
pad for guerrilla activity against South Africa.4 If Vorster could accept developments in Mozambique and 
indeed nudge Ian Smith towards a 'moderate' compromise in Rhodesia5, why then did he decide on armed 
intervelltion in Angola? 
Writing in late 1976, a South African political commentator noted, 'It is perhaps still too early to know 
exactly why Vorster temporarily abandoned his role as the de Gaulle of Southern Africa, when the 
consequences of South Africa's involvement could be anticipated by any rational, pragmatically calculating 
analyst'.6 At that stage the South African public had still been told very little about recent events in Angola. 
South Africa's opponents were levelling charges of neo-colonialist expansion at Pretoria. Cuba's 
representative to the United Nations claimed in a speech to the General Assembly that South Africa had 
1 T. Hanf, H. Weiland, G. Vierdag, L. Sclemmer, R. Hampel & B. Krupp, South Africa: The Prospects of 
Peaceful Change: An Empirical Enquiry into the Possibility of Democratic Conflict Regulation (Rex 
Collings, David Philip, London, Cape Town, 1981), p. 72. 
2 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 9 September 1974, col. 2537. 
3 Ibid, 10 September 1974, col. 2590. Mozambique's heavy economic dependence on South Africa was 
seen as an important factor in securing the 'friendly cooperation' of her new leaders: R. Jaster, South 
Africa's Narrowing Security Options (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 159, 
London 1980), p. 2l. 
4 J. De St. Jorre, A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, New York, 1977), p. 68. However, Pretoria's continued ill-disguised hostility toward 
the FRELIMO government betrayed a certain lack of confidence in any such assurances: E. Harsch, South 
Africa: White Rule, Black Revolt (Monad Press, New York, 1980), p. 156. 
5 Vorster recognised the inevitability of African independence in Rhodesia and wanted to avoid further 
involvement in the country's drawn-out guerrilla war. He realised that South Africa's best interests would 
not be served by continuing to back the Smith regime but by ensuring that a conservative black government 
would succeed: P. O'Meara, 'South Africa's Contradictory Regional Goals', in R. Davis (ed.), Apartheid 











entered Angola 'with the clear intention of preventing the independence of that country and of occupying 
the entire territory.'7 South Africa stressed that the occupation of Angola had never been their aim. So why 
did South Africa send troops into Angola? 
"[he Defence Force's official statement released in February 1977 gave four reasons for South African 
involvement in southern Angola. 1) The failure of the Portuguese government to ensure the safety of 
workers on the Cunene hydroelectric scheme had led the SADF to move in. 2) The chaotic situation in 
Angola had allowed SWAPO terrorists easy access into South West Africa and necessitated 'hot pursuits' 
across the border by the SADF. 3) UNITA and the FNLA had appealed to South Africa for support against 
communist infiltration in Angola, and it was decided to help Savimbi re-conquer and hold his traditional 
sphere of influence in southern Angola, thus forcing the MPLA to accept a government in which all three 
A.ngolan movements would be represented. 4) Angolan refugees fleeing into South West Africahad alerted 
the Defence Force to Cuban support for the MPLA, a suspicion that was confirmed when Cuban 
ammunition and weapon dumps were found on a hot pursuit operation.s These four factors deserve close 
consideration. 
THE CUNENE RIVER HYDROELECTRIC SCHEME 
'In the first place it was necessary for the RSA to intervene on a limited 
scale in Angola to safeguard her security interests. South Africa responded 
to a call from the workers on the Calueque-Ruacana scheme to protect them 
in the situation which had resulted from the Portuguese withdrawal and the 
absence of any form of governmental authority in that area' . 
(Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence, 1977)9 
In 1969, South Africa and Portugal had agreed to a joint hydro-electricity and irrigation scheme on the 
Cunene (Kunene) River, which would help foster white settlement in southern Angola and provide water 
and power for northern Namibia. The scheme, still under construction in 1975, straddled the border 
between Angola and Namibia. The turbines, which harnessed the Cunene, were south of the border at 
Ruacana but the scheme also involved building dams further up the river including one at Calueque, about 
20 kilometres inside Angola. 10 
6 H. Adam, 'Ideologies of Dedication vs Blueprints of Expedience', (Social Dynamics, Vol. 2, No.2, 
December 1976), pp. 89-90. 
7 Hamann, Days of the Generals, p. 14. 
8 South African Defence Force, Nature and Extent of the SADF's Involvement in the Angolan Conflict 
(Defence Headquarters, Pretoria, 3 February 1977), referred to hereafter as SADF Statement, 1977. 
9 Republic of South Africa Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Production, 











In June 1975, it was reported that South African troops had taken up positions at the Ruacana Falls on the 
Namibian side of the border.1l On 8 August 1975, the Windhoek Advertiser reported clashes between the 
MPLA and UNITA at Ruacana and the intimidation of workers on the scheme. 12 The following day a South 
African infantry platoon, supported by two armoured cars, crossed the border and headed for Calueque. 
They intended 'to hold talks to ensure that order was restored', but instead they were fired upon, 'The result 
was that they fired back, and in the proeess occupied Calueque.' 13 The presence of South Mrican troops in 
occupation of the Calueque dam was first reported in the Lisbon left-wing daily Diario de Not{cias on 11 
August 1975.14 The Economist's response was to suggest that South Africa might intend to annexe the 
Ruacana dam. IS The Financial Times reported fears in Angola that South Africa might use the civil war to 
encourage a 'balkanisation' of the country: a "'Katanga-type" solution' in which Angola would be 
dismembered between the three rival liberation movements. 16 The news was not reported in South Mrica. 
On 11 August Defence Minister Botha banned 'reports or speculation concerning South African military 
movements and activities on the South West Africa/Angola border or at any border posts, in particular at 
Ruacana' .17 
Botha later claimed that South African troops had been sent to the area with the prior knowledge and 
approval of the Portuguese government.18 However, it was nearly a month before the Portuguese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs commented on the South African action, in a communique which appeared in the Lisbon 
press on 5 September 1975: 'A squadron of some 30 soldiers removed to the dam site as necessary 
protection of South African workers. This was necessary to guarantee in conformity with the agreements 
in force between Portugal and South Africa - the maintenance of water supplies vital to the subsistence of 
the Ovambo population in the area' .19 This coincided with a public statement the same day by the South 
10 South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1976 (South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, January 1977), p. 41l. 
11 Fran\iois Campredon, Agence France Presse, 10 June 1975 quoted in Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, 
Vol. IJ, p. 268. 
12 Quoted in Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola' , p. 357. 
13 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976, col. 47. See also: Spies & du 
Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 44-48. 
14 Sanders, South Africa and the 1ntematipnai Media, p. 140. 
15 'Flight from Angola', The Economist, 16 August 1975, p. 36. 
16 'South African Sends Troops into Angola to Protect River Project', Financial Times, 23 August 1975. 
17 He repeated this ban on 16 August: Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, p. 209. On 13 
August Harvey Tyson, the editor of The Star wrote that there was news of national and international 
importance which could not be published and suggested that his readers listen to the BBC: Tyson, Editors 
Under Fire, pp. 177-178. 
18 The Star, 22 November 1975; Botha's Press Statement, 17 December 1975 quoted in D. Van Vuuren, 
'South Africa's Foreign Policy and International Practice, 1975', (South African Yearbook of International 
Law, Vol. 1, 1975), p. 206. 
19 Quoted in Wolfers & Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line, p. 13. The numbers of troops involved in this 
initial action have been disputed. In the same account Wolfers and Bergerol, writing from the MPLA 
perspective, claimed a thousand troops entered Angola, whilst Christopher Coker put the number at 500: C. 











Africa Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie, that South Africa had sent a 30-man patrol some 36 
kilometres into Angola to protect the Ruacana project.20 A brief flurry of attention in the overseas press 
accompanied the South African admission, which Botha allowed the South African press to carry.21 
During the following months and the escalating conflict Vorster's government used the acknowledged 
presence of troops at Calueque and Ruacana to dismiss overseas reports of SADF troops deep inside 
Angola?2 As late as 17 December 1975, when four South African prisoners of war captured deep within 
Angola were being held by the MPLA, Botha reiterated the claim that South African intervention only 
involved securing the border and the Cunene scheme and stressed: 'We endorse the view that no foreign 
troops should be in Angola and that the Angolan people alone, must decide their future in an orderly 
manner.'23 This was a clever manipulation of the facts by Vorster and Botha. Even the most critical 
opponent of the government would not suggest that it was unreasonable for South Africa to protect its 
economic interests just across the border. In the subsequent parliamentary debate on the Angolan 
intervention, the defence spokesman of the official Opposition referred to Calueque and Ruacana: 
'Obviously we must take action to protect our interests .. .1 am convinced that throughout the country 
nobody but a fool or a traitor would oppose the action that was taken there.'24 The Cape Times, which was 
the most vocal critic of intervention in the Angolan war, admitted that protection of the Cunene scheme 
was justifiable on a temporary basis?S 
However, defence of the scheme was clearly not sufficient to explain the subsequent deeper South African 
penetration of Angola. After the war Colin Eglin of the Progressive Reform Party told Parliament: '1 
believe that this Government has made a serious error in using its protection of these schemes [Ruacana 
and Calueque] as the cover-up for its major involvement in the civil war.'26 General Constand Viljoen, 
SADF Director General of Operations at the time, has since stated: 
Regional Security Problems and Prospects (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1985), p. 
143. 
20 Quoted in The Star, 6 September 1975. 
21 On 9 September Botha sent a message to South African newspaper editors explaining that he had not 
permitted news of South Africa's incursion into Angola to be publicised until 6 September as negotiations 
had been underway with the Portuguese since 12 August: Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, 
g.21O. 
2 For example: 'Watch on the Cunene', South African Digest, 16 January 1976, pp. 8-11; 'Ruacana en 
Calueque: so beskerm die SA Weermag ons belange' (The SA Army protects our interests), Paratus, 27 
January 1976, pp. 10-14. Paratus was the official publication of the SADF. The article stressed the 
importance of the scheme and claimed: 'There are just enough soldiers to ensure peace and quiet' . 
23 Die Volksblad, 17 December 1975 translated in Van Vuuren, 'South Africa's Foreign Policy and 
International Practice, 1975', p. 191. 
24 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976, col. 61. 
25 Cape Times, 5 December 1975. 











'Let me put that straight. That [the Cunene scheme] was used in order 
to explain the presence of South Mricans in Angola. It is true South 
African involvement in the scheme was big and it's true Ovamboland 
was very dependent on the water, and South West Africa on the 
electricity, but I must be honest, I always got the impression it was a 
handy way of explaining an operation that didn't have the intention of 
protecting Calueque and Ruacana. It was a handy explanation to use to 
the rest of the world.':?7 
After its reference to the Calueque-Ruacana scheme, the 1977 White Paper on Defence continued: 'This_ 
military intervention was then extended in order to deflect the effects of the Angolan civil war from the 
northern border of South-West Africa and to inhibit SW APO efforts to capitalise on the unstable situation 
in the southern region of Angola' .zs 
THE BORDER WARANDSWAPO 
Q: 'Why did South Africa intervene in Angola?' 
A: 'Originally I thought it was to get rid of SW APO. After Portugal 
withdrew southern Angola was clear for SW APO to operate ... [T]he 
guys on the ground thought the goal was the end of SW APO.' 
(Interview with Colonel Jan Breytenbach) 
Having been seized from Germany by South Mrica at the request of the Western Allies during the First 
World War, South West Africa became a South Mrican mandate under the League of Nations. In 1946, the 
United Nations assumed trusteeship but South Mrica did not accept that the United Nations was the 
automatic heir to the League mandate and refused to hand over the territory. In 1969, the United Nations 
Security Council endorsed the termination of the mandate by the General Assembly and called on South 
Africa to withdraw from 'Namibia'. Two years later the International Court of Justice ruled that South 
Africa's continued presence was indeed illegal, and ordered it to withdraw immediately.29 In December 
1974, the United Nations Security Council again condemned South Africa's 'continued illegal occupation' 
of Namibia?O Confronted with the threat of sanctions if the Namibia issue remained unresolved, Vorster 
convened a constitutional conference in Windhoek in September 1975. The Turnhalle Conference's 
mandate was to draft a constitution, after which an interim administration would be established to lead 
27 Hamann, Days of the Generals, pp. 22-23. 
28 Republic of South Mrica Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 1977, p. 6. 
29 D. Warren, United States South African Foreign Relations: South Africa'S Response to the Kissinger 
Initiative in Southern Africa, 1976 (BA Thesis in History, University of Cape Town, 1983), p. 6. 
30 V, Brittain, Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths: South Africa's Crippling of a Continent (Faber & Faber, 











Namibia to independence. However, the main Namibian liberation movement, the South West Africa 
People's Organisation (SW APO) was not invited to participate and the talks were doomed to failure. 31 
The United Nations General Assembly recognised SW APO led by Sam Nujoma as the 'sole and authentic' 
representative of the Namibian people. SW APO's Dar es Salaam Declaration in 1966 had launched their 
armed struggle against South African occupation. Vorster branded SW APO as having been 'conceived and 
born in communist sin' .32 SW APO' s military offensive was seen in Pretoria as a manifestation of the 
communist threat directed at South Africa. Vorster warned that 'the ultimate aim of the communist and 
leftist powers is not Rhodesia, Mozambique or Angola their ultimate aim is South Africa. The ultimate 
aim is what can be taken from South Mrican soil. But what perhaps is even more important to them is the 
control over the Cape sea route in the event of another conventional war.'33 That SW APO enjoyed United 
Nations' support only rendered it more suspect in Pretoria's eyes. 
The first clash between SW APO's armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and the 
SADF took place on 26 August 1966 when South African helicopter-borne troops attacked a PLAN 
training camp in northern Namibia?4 It heralded the beginning of a protracted low-intensity war on the 
border between northern Namibia and southern Angola. SW APO guerrillas infiltrated into Namibia from 
their bases in Zambia by two routes: either through the Caprivi Strip or through south-eastern Angola. 
From its bases in Namibia the SADF began helicopter reconnaissance patrols of the southern border 
regions of Angola. South African forces operated against PLAN guerrillas with Portuguese knowledge and 
acquiescence and there was limited covert military cooperation with the Portuguese army in counter-
insurgency operations?5 In 1968, a secret agreement with Portugal established a joint South African-
Portuguese air base and command centre at Cuito Cuanavale, in south-east Angola, from where the SADF 
carried out reconnaissance and operations against both PLAN and the Angolan liberation movements.36 
As Lisbon fought its nationalist opponents in Mrica, it was natural that there should be frequent 
consultation between the Portuguese and South African governments. South Mrica assigned intelligence 
officers to its consulates-general in Luanda and Louren~o Marques with instructions to work with the 
3] R. Jaster, The Defense of White Power: South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure (St. Martin's 
Press, New York, 1989), pp. 60-61. South Africa preferred and sought to impose a multiple-tier ethnically-
grouped electoral system in Namibia. The Conference was designed to create an ethnic alternative to the 
United Nations' demands for unitary independence. Having been rejected by SW APO, it failed to gain 
international recognition as a genuine constitutional conference. 
32 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1976, col. 36l. 
33 Ibid, 4 February 1974 quoted in O. Geyser (ed.), Rl. Vorster: Selected Speeches (Institute for 
Contemporary History, University of the Orange Free State, Bloemfontein, 1977), p. 214. 
34 T. Weaver, 'The South African Defence Force in Namibia', in J. Cock & L. Nathan (eds), War and 
Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (David Philip, Cape Town, 1989), p. 91. 
35 H.-R. Heitman, War in Angola: The Final South African Phase (Ashanti, Gibraltar, 1990), p. 10. 











Portuguese military.37 Although there were no formal defence agreements, representatives of the 
Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian security services met at regular intervals to discuss military and 
security affairs of common interest.38 Since at least the early 1970s, South Mrica had been covertly 
supplying arms and manned helicopters to the Portuguese?9 Border security remained largely the preserve 
of the South Mrican Police until 1973 when the SADF assumed responsibility for counter-insurgency 
operations against SW APO. By July 1973, the SADF was in command of the 'operational area,4Q and in 
June of the following year South Africa suffered its first casualty of the border war.41 
By mid-I975 a state of extreme tension existed along Namibia's northern border with Angola.42 In a speech 
inLoIldonol1 June 1975, Nujoma announced that the armed struggle was to be stepped Up.43 The following 
~month the commander of the South African forces in Namibia warned that SW APO was taking advantage 
of the collapse of Portuguese authority to consolidate its position in southern Angola.44 It was reported that 
only a few months after the Lisbon coup more than 2,000 Namibians had fled through Angola for guerrilla 
training in exile.45 The SADF feared that after the withdrawal of the Portuguese, SW APO would be able to 
use southern Angola as a sanctuary from which to launch infiltrations into northern Namibia.46 As fighting 
among the rival Angolan movements spread southwards, thousands of refugees fled into Namibia.47 The 
SADF's 1977 account claimed the stream of Angolan refugees into Namibia provided an open avenue for 
'SWAPO terrorists to freely cross the border to commit murder and robbery in Ovambo and to disappear 
again into the chaos of southern Angola' .48 The murder on 17 August 1975 of Philemon Elifas, the Chief 
Minister of Ovambo was interpreted as evidence of heightened SW APO activity.49 Elifas was an important 
37 Ibid. 
38 C. Dalcanton, 'Vorster and the Politics of Confidence, 1966-1974', (African Affairs, London, Vol. 75, 
No. 299, April 1976), p. 171; Herbstein, White Man, p. 52. 
39 D. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Macmillan for the 
South African Institute ofInternational Affairs, Braamfontein, 1984), p. 75. 
40 Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, p. 210. 
41 AJ. Venter, The Chopper Boys: Helicopter Waifare in Africa (Southern Book Publishers, Johannesburg, 
1994), p. 134. 
42 Botha later claimed that on 9 April 1975, the Owamboland Cabinet had asked the South African 
government 'to safeguard the Angolan border and to take action against terrorists threatening that country': 
Republic of South Mrica, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976, col. 45. 
43 Morning Star, 14 June 1975. 
44 Jaster, The Defense of White Power, p. 69. 
45 Benjamin Pogrund, 'Pastor Tells Why Blacks Are Fleeing', Daily Telegraph, 3 November 1974 quoted 
in C. Chimutengwende, South Africa: The Press and the Politics of Liberation (Barbican Books, London, 
1978), p. 97. Nujoma had issued a call from Botswana for Namibians to leave the country and join the 
struggle: J. Putz, H. Von Egidy & P. Caplan, Namibia Handbook and Political Who's Who (The Magus 
Company, Windhoek, 1989), p. 256. 
46 Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, p. 60. 
47 Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, p. 23. 
48 SADF Statement, 1977. 
49 Barber & Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 190. Elifas' traditionalist Ovamboland Independence 
Party had opted for separate independence along the lines of South Africa's Bantustan policy, and so he 











mover in the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, which was scheduled to begin in Windhoek on 2 
September, and his death was a severe propaganda loss to the South Africans.5o 
The SADF continued with its low-level anti-insurgency campaign of hot-pursuits and raids against 
SW APO.5! These activities have led some accounts to date the SADF's entrance into the Angolan war as 
early as June 1975.52 Indeed, when Botha later listed South African casualties in Angola in Parliament he 
spoke of them as being 'from 14 July 1975 to 23 January 1976' .53 There appears to have been more than a 
small degree of confusion during these cross-border pursuits with the SADF attacking SW APO, MPLA and 
UNITA forces before withdrawing to Namibia.54 Both the MPLA and UNITA were regarded as 
sympathetic to SW APO. At times it was difficult for the South African forces operating in the bush of 
southern Angola to distinguish one group of guerrillas from another. Colonel Jan Breytenbach explained: 
'The situation in southern Angola became quite chaotic with towns changing hands frequently between any 
of the three movements. It became difficult for the South Africans, on the southern banks of the Okavango 
and Cunene rivers to determine which troops from which movement they were facing across the border, 
whether they were actively hostile or not or whether they were perhaps SW APO supporters, passively or 
otherwise' .55 
Towards the end of August the South Africans' permanent presence in Angola moved beyond the defence 
of the Cunene scheme as the SADF staged their first offensive thruSt.56 On 22 August, according to MPLA 
sources, a force of between 800 and 1,000 SADF troops 'accompanied by a dozen armed helicopters and 
several armoured cars', advanced along the main road leading from Namibia towards the district capital of 
Pereira d'Er;a (Ngiva). The force then withdrew to a position between the town and the border.57 
Portuguese reconnaissance planes confirmed damage to the town but their spokesmen stated that the 
invading force was 'certainly smaller' than the figure of 800 given by the MPLA.58 This action was 
justified as retaliation for an earlier SW APO attack on an SADF camp on the Namibian side of the 
border.59 Du Preez described the operation on 22 August as 'a major raid on SW APO camps in southern 
Rule', in H. Kitchen (ed.), Africa: From Mystery to Maze (Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1976), p. 
89,® 
50 S. Brown, 'Diplomacy by Other Means - SW APO's Liberation War', in C. Leys & J. Saul (eds), 
Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword (James Currey, London, 1995), p. 25. 
5! Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola', p. 353. 
52 Davis, 'The Angola Decision of 1975', p. 121. 
53 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976, col. 50. 
54 Sanders, South Africa and the Intemational.Media, p. 153 fnA. 
55 Breytenbach, Forged in Battle, p. 4. 
56 Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 43-44. 
57 The Guardian, 4 September 1975. 
58 Financial Times, 5 September 1975. 











Angola' .60 The SADF statement makes no mention of this episode but it does refer, without specifying date 
or place to a 'hot pursuit operation' in which the 'Defence Force came across Cuban ammunition dumps'. 
Pereira d'E~a was 100 miles east of the Ruacana dam and this move by the SADF was clearly motivated by 
something other than the need to defend the Cunene scheme. The MPLA had established an office in 
Pereira d'Eya, which was only 30 miles north of the Namibian border, and the SADF feared this would lead 
to the spread of radical political ideas among the Ovambo people, and to growing support for SW APO.61 
Although news of the incursion was reported in the overseas press62 and carried on the BBC World Service, 
publication of any news of the troop movement was prohibited in South Africa. Botha declined to comment 
at all on these reports, which some South Africans had in any case heard on their radios.63 South African 
newspapers were only allowed to carry speCUlative reports suggesting that South African troops 'may' have 
been using hot pursuit tactics across an unspecified border.64 
So by the end of August, the SADF was firmly in control of the Cunene scheme and had established a 
presence in or near Pereira d'E~a. Throughout September, the SADF continued with raids against SW APO 
across the border. UNITA and the FNLA, 'both now allies of the Republic of South Africa', helped locate 
the SW APO camps.65 
UNITA AND FNLA APPEALS FOR ASSISTANCE 
According to the Defence Force's official 1977 statement, UNIT A and the FNLA appealed to South Africa 
for support against communist infiltration in Angola. As a consequence it was decided to help Savimbi re-
conquer and hold his traditional sphere of influence in southern Angola, thus forcing the MPLA to accept a 
government in which all three Angolan movements would be represented. Presumably the statement 
intended the same reasoning be applied to the extension of assistance to Roberto's FNLA, although this 
",as not explicitly stated.66 The official press release gave no further details as to the nature of the contacts 
South Africa had established with Savimbi of UNIT A, or Roberto and Chipenda of the FNLA. 
60 Du Preez, Avontuur in Angola, pp. 28-29. 
61 Jaster, The Defense of White Power, p. 69. 
62 The first report was'S. African Troops in Angola,' Standard (Nairobi), 1 September 1975. 
63 Shaw, The Cape Times, p. 263. 
64 Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, p. 209. The Cape Times condemned what was 
happening as 'news management' rather than protection of national security. It told its readers that defence 
legislation had been invoked to prohibit publication of news that had already been broadcast to the four 
comers of the earth: Cape Times, 5 September 1975. 
65 Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, p. 43. 











During the war it was not in the interests of any of the parties involved to disclose details of their secret 
diplomacy. On 9 December 1975, Savimbi emphatically told a Lusaka press conference that South Africa 
was not assisting UNITA.67 However, on 29 January 1976, Henry Kissinger claimed that South Africa had 
entered the civil war in early September 1975 after 'the poorly equipped UNITA forces turned in 
desperation to South Africa for assistance against the MPLA, which was overrunning UNITA's ethnic 
areas in the south.'68 In 1977, RW. Johnson revealed some details of the covert diplomacy between South 
Africa and the Angolan nationalist leaders, in his book How Long Will South Africa Survive? Spies' and Du 
Preez's subsequent accounts, whilst both discreet about Pretoria's dealings with the United States and other 
friendly governments, were more candid about UNITA and the FNLA's relations with Pretoria.69 
Consequently, a general, albeit tentative, chronology can be constructed. 
According to Spies' account the first contact between South Africa and UNIT A personnel took place in 
July 1974. UNITA requested weapons from the South Africans and a small amount of weaponry and 6,000 
rounds of ammunition were delivered on 9 October 1974.70 Savimbi himself met with 'a senior South 
African intelligence officer' in Europe in March 1975.71 At a second meeting in Lusaka on 14 April, 
Savimbi requested cash and small arms. In return, '[h]e promised to do everything in his power to prevent 
armed units of SW APO from entering South West Africa'.72 However, when Savimbi refused to establish a 
formal alliance with Roberto as the South Africans were urging, his request was rejected.73 Savimbi was 
careful to retain South Africa's attention and made ingratiating declarations to the press that he considered 
Vorster 'a responsible leader' and man of 'realism', and that UNIT A 'favoured dialogue and a policy of 
detente' .74 A few weeks later Savimbi was quoted as saying that Angola's own problems would prevent 
UNITA from extending further assistance to SW APO, a long-time ally.75 
The first contact with the FNLA was made, according to Spies' account, on 28 February 1975 when a 
FNLA representative arrived at the South African embassy in London with a request for weapons from 
Roberto. Although the Department of Foreign Affairs investigated the appeal no action was taken?6 Then 
67 The Times, 10 December 1975. 
68 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
on U.S. Involvement in Civil War in Angola, January 29, February 3,4, and 6, 1976 (US Government 
Printing Offtce, Washington, 1976), p. 10. 
69 See: Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 60-65; Du Preez, Avontuur in Angola, pp. 13-23. 
70 Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 60-62. 
71 This meeting was possibly held in Paris, as Savimbi was known to be developing contacts with the 
French at the same time: Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola' , p. 358. 
72 Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, p. 62. 
73 Moss, 'How South Africa Took on Castro's Invaders', Sunday Telegraph, 6 February 1977. 
74 The Star (weekly edition), 3 May 1975; Afrique-Asie, 19 May 1975. 
75 Windhoek Advertiser, 12 June 1975. UNITA and SW APO had been closely linked by tribal affiliations 
and often dual membership: W. Steenkamp, 'Politics of Power: The Border War', in A.J. Venter (ed.), 
Challenge, p. 193. 











at the end of May, the Windhoek Advertiser reported 'Black Guerrilla Leader in Windhoek'.77 Daniel 
Chipenda had flown in with an FNLA 'political commissar' , ostensibly for 'medical treatment' .78 However, 
the precise nature of his visit remains unclear. Around the same time a delegation of Portuguese 
businessmen, purporting to be FNLA supporters, sought an interview with Vorster in Cape Town and 
begged him to send troops to Luanda to restore order.79 In July Chipenda was back in Namibia and this 
time had three days of talks with General van den Bergh of the South African Bureau for State Security 
(BOSS).80 The first meeting between South African representatives and Roberto himself was organised by 
Portuguese intermediaries and took place in Kinshasa in July. According to Robert Moss, on the strength of 
Roberto's undertaking to join forces with Savimbi, the South Africans agreed to give the FNLA a shipment 
of mostly second-hand light machine guns, rifles and mortars. These arrived in August.sl On 6 August, 
Neto in Luanda claimed that the FNLA had South African backing and that Chipenda, as the FNLA's 
military commander, had held talks with 'highly placed South Africans' who had promised military and 
economic aid. This was widely reported in the international press.82 
In late May 1975 Vorster asked for a fuJI report outlining the alternative courses of action available to 
South Africa in relation to Angola and the implications of each. The Defence Department presented him 
with an options paper in June 1975.83 Soon after the Lisbon coup, Military Intelligence had put out feelers 
to the three Angolan movements and concluded that, whilst UNITA and the FNLA were quite well-
disposed towards South Mrica, should the MPLA come to power South Africa's interests in Namibia might 
be seriously jeopardised.s4 At Vorster's request General Viljoen, SADF Director General of Operations, 
and General van den Bergh prepared a list of weapons for Savimbi and Roberto, with a total price tag of 
R2Omillion. On 14 July Vorster approved the list when Van den Bergh visited him on his game ranch.as 
Van den Bergh personally travelled abroad to purchase weapons, upsetting ARMSCOR in the procesS.86 On 
17 July he sent a telegram from Paris that he had managed to purchase all the weapons needed.S7 
According to Spies, it was decided in August 1975 to assist the FNLA and UNITA until independence on 
11 November in order to prevent the MPLA from gaining control of Angola. Consequently on 28 August 
Army Headquarters issued Operations Order 8175, which authorised the supply of arms and training to 
77 Windhoek Advertiser, 30 May 1975. 
78 Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 268. 
79 Stiff, The Silent War, p. 104. 
80 Callinicos & Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto, p. 150; Winter, Inside BOSS, p. 537. The Times, 8 
December 1975 had reported Chipenda's visit but gave no details of negotiations. 
81 Moss, Sunday Telegraph, 6 February 1977. 
82 Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, p. 208. 
83 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp. 78-80; Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 63-64. 
84 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 78. 
85 Hamann, Days of the Generals, pp. 23-24. 
86 De Villiers, PW, p. 247. According to Botha's official biography, Botha, who was visiting the border 
with Admiral Hugo Biermann, Chief of the SADF, was only informed of the decision three days later. 











UNITA and the FNLA.88 At the end of August, Savimbi and FNLA representatives were informed at a 
meeting in UNITA-held territory, that the SADF would provide instructors for the two movements. Two 
training camps were established: one for UNITA at Calombo, south of Silva Porto (Bie), and another for 
FNLAlChipenda forces at Mapupa, 75 kilometres north-east of Rundu in southern Angola.89 Commandant 
Jan Breytenbach was tasked with training the FNLA troops and flew to Mapupa in late August.90 In late 
September 1975, Commandant 'Kaas' van der Waals of the SADF arrived in Silva Porto as a liaison officer 
to Savimbi and was followed by a team of 19 instructors. Their orders were to provide training in 
conventional warfare for UNITA troops, and to help UNITA establish its position militarily in central 
Angoia.91 
By mid-September the MPLA had gained control of twelve out of Angola's sixteen districts. The only areas 
out of its control were Roberto's stronghold in the two northern districts bordering Zaire, the two central 
districts around Silva Porto (Bie) and Nova Lisboa (Huambo); and a few scattered points in the far south.92 
However, at that time Savimbi was promising: 'within thirty days very great changes will take place in 
Angola as far as the military situation is concerned' .93 South Africa's provision of instructors and arms to 
the FNLA and UNIT A was a significant escalation in its intervention in the Angolan war. However, SADF 
troops were not yet involved in active combat. 
CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA 
'[O]ur involvement in Angola was not the cause of Russian and Cuban 
intervention. Our involvement was the effect of Russian and Cuban 
intervention. If they did not enter Angola, if they did not take part in this 
affair, if they did not try to subvert the whole of Angola and to suppress its 
people, South Africa would never have entered Angola at all ... We went in 
to chase Cuba and the MPLA away from the dam.' 
(Speech by Vorster, 30 January 1976)94 
'[T]he fascist and racist troops of South Africa criminally invaded Angolan 
territory long before Cuba sent any regular units of soldiers there.' 
(Speech by Fidel Castro, 19 April 1976)95 
88 Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, p. 144. 
89 Moss, Sunday Telegraph, 6 February 1977. 
90 When he commenced training in mid-September, Breytenbach thought his task was to take on UNITA 
who were on friendly terms with SWAPO: Breytenbach, They Live by the Sword, pp. 12-16; Forged in 
Battle, pp. 4-12. 
91 SADF Statement, 1977; Moss, Sunday Telegraph, 6 February 1977; 1. Uys, Cross of Honour (Uys 
Publishers, Germiston, 1992), p. 18. 
92 West Africa, 19 September 1975. 
93 Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola' , p. 361. 











The question of 'who did what first' in the internationalisation and escalation of the Angolan civil war is 
one which a quarter-century of scholarship has failed to answer definitively. Did the presence of Soviet-
supported Cubans in Angola propel Pretoria to invade, as Vorster claimed, or was it South Africa's 
intervention that brought the Cubans to Angola? Dming the conflict both the MPLA and FNLA-UNITA 
made concerted efforts to hide the extent of intervention by their foreign allies whilst trying to expose the 
assistance being received by their opponents. Then, after the event, both South Africa and Cuba justified its 
own intervention on the grounds of the other's involvement. 
Although the war was extensively reported in the world media it possessed a certain 'Alice in Wonderland' 
quality.96 Few correspondents saw both sides of the conflict, there was little front line coverage, and only a 
few seconds of film of the South Africans ever appeared. In December 1975, the New York Times 
explained: 'One of the more bizarre aspects of the war in Angola is that hardly anyone has seen it. 
Journalists have been kept away from all fronts by the three warring factions,.97 The following month, Tom 
Lambert of the Los Angeles Times complained: 'A mixture of secrecy, propaganda, outright lies and 
obstruction from both sides has made coverage of the war a nightmare of frustration' .98 Similarly Francois 
Campredon, of Agence France Presse claimed: 'Seldom has a war been kept so secret and journalists kept 
so far from the front as in the present Angolan civil war' .99 This surreal quality was exaggerated by western 
journalists' dependence on sources in Lusaka, Kinshasa and Pretoria, which were consistently manipulated 
by false statements from the CIA- IOO Although the efforts of a few enterprising journalists gradually 
exposed the external intervention in Angola, the absence of reliable reports from the fighting fronts, of who 
was where and doing what, made it difficult to establish the precise chronology of Cuban and South Africa 
activity. 
During the war itself South African leaders portrayed the Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola as 
communist 'imperialism' that had to be combated. In November 1975, Botha replied to accusations in the 
Soviet newspaper Pravda: 'The Republic of South Africa is not bringing in Cubans to fight against the 
rights of two movements like the FNLA and UNIT A in their own country. Russia itself has started, in 
conflict with the principle of peaceful coexistence, to employ militaristic imperialism towards Angola.'lOl 
A week later Botha spoke of 'confusing propaganda' emanating from abroad which was designed to cloud 
the 'Russian-Cuban interference in the affairs of Angola' .102 Vorster claimed the Communists were aiming 
to create a string of Marxist states from Angola to Dar es Salaam, which endangered Zaire, Zambia, South 
95 Speech by Castro, 19 April 1976 quoted in Deutschmann, Angola and Namibia, p. 72. 
96 Sanders, South Africa and the International Media, p. 139. 
97 New York Times, 31 December 1975. 
98 'Angola War: Secrecy and Propaganda', Los Angeles Times, 16 January 1976 
99 Francois Campredon, Agence France Presse, 21 January 1976. 
100 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, pp. 191-202. 
101 Rand Daily Mail, 22 November 1975. 











Africa and the Western World. 103 He stressed: 'It is very clear to one that the communist strategy for South 
Africa is to cause South Africa to fight simultaneously or as much as possible on three fronts, namely on 
the Mozambique, Rhodesian and Angolan front.,J04 The Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, accused Russia 
and Cuba of 'Red neo-colonialism in its most aggressive form' .105 Vorster stressed that, 'There is no doubt 
at all that the strategy of the communists is world domination.' 106 Furthermore, 'As far as South Africa is 
concerned it is, as a result of its strategic situation and its industrial and mineral potential, a key factor in 
the conventional war which Russia is planning.' 107 
The 'rooi gevaar', or red peril, was not a new refrain in South African politics. During the debate that 
followed South Africa's decision to participate in the Korean War, the Prime Minister, Dr. D.F. Malan, had 
proclaimed that it was South Africa's duty to side with the anti-Communist countries to combat 'aggressive 
communism' wherever necessary. As early as 1970 Vorster had declared that South Africa would not 
tolerate 'terrorism' or 'communist domination' (the former being seen as an instrument of the latter) in 
southern Africa and would fight it even beyond the country's border. 108 Five years later the government's 
White Paper on Defence warned: 'The threat to the R.S.A. within the ambit of the communist international 
battle for world domination is also related to the increase and establishment of communist influence and 
presence in Southern Africa' .109 
To what extent were Vorster and senior Nationalists justified in their fear of the 'communist menace'? The 
Soviet Union and its allies did indeed have close links with the African National Congress, which included 
communists in its ranks.[l0 Moscow provided military training and arms to South African guerrillas, and in 
Angola the Soviet Union and Cuba aided the MPLA. However, southern Africa was not a high priority on 
the Soviet agenda and the level of its aid was low. Moscow was more concerned with preserving its 
hegemony in Eastern Europe and increasing its influence in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. 
Furthermore, black South Africans needed no foreign indoctrination in order to oppose apartheid. [[ 1 In 
contrast to Pretoria's sweeping generalisations of Soviet policy, it could be argued that Moscow had a 
number of motives for its modest support to the MPLA: the need to impress other Communist nations, the 
103 Quoted in The Star, 10 December 1975. The Soviet's goal of 'a communist belt from the Atlantic 
Ocean, from Luanda across to Dar-es-Salaam on the Indian Ocean' is a claim Vorster repeated in 
Parliament: Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1976, col. 366. 
104 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1976, col. 357. 
105 The Star, 20 December 1975. 
106 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1976, col. 356. 
107 Ibid, 30 January 1976, col. 357. 
to8 Ibid, 15 September 1970, col. 4208. 
[09 Republic of South Africa Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence and Annaments Production, 
1975 (Department of Defence, Pretoria, 1975), pp. 6-7. 
Ito The ANC sent a delegation to Moscow for talks in December 1974, the first time that an official meeting 
was publicised: C. Legum, Vorster's Gamble for Africa: How the Search for Peace Failed (Rex Collings, 
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urge to compensate for recent reverses in the Middle East and, perhaps most, importantly, the opportunity 
to score a point in their contest with the Chinese.112 
Whether justified or not, by 1975 'communism' or 'Marxism' was the enemy in the minds of most white 
South Africans. They believed that the dangers that confronted them were imported from abroad1l3; the 
ANC was a communist organisation directed from Moscow and communists were responsible for internal 
black discontent.1l4 In February 1975 it was reported that since Portuguese authority had ended in 
Mozambique the number of firearm licences taken out in South Africa had increased by 57 percent. I IS On 7 
January 1976, special religious services were held in South Africa during which community prayers 
opposing commtmism were offered. White South Africans attended these services in large numbers. I 16 The 
threat of 'Soviet imperialism' looming over Africa was a constant feature in the news reports and editorial 
comment of South African newspapers. A series of political cartoons in Die Burger demonised Soviet 
military adventures in Africa. On the 22 October 1975, a watchdog was portrayed chasing a skunk back 
into Angola. The following day, Leonid Brezhnev was shown distributing guns to a row of Castro look-
alikes with a caption reading: 'Africa for the African, but these expensive weapons are preferably only for 
you Cubans' .117 Although the South African press was prevented from publishing any news about South 
African involvement in Angola, news of the Soviet and Cuban menace did not require clearance from the 
military authorities. This resulted in an impression of a one-sided intervention, a picture of communist 
aggression, which accorded precisely with the government view. Where newspapers voiced objection to 
rumours of South African intervention, they did not dispute the communist menace but rather the 
appropriate response for South Africa.ll8 When Pretoria finally admitted limited involvement in Angola, it 
sought to present this as a justifiable reaction to communist intervention. 
It was in January 1976, that Defence Minister Botha first publicly admitted that South Africa had played a 
role in the fighting in Angola. He told Parliament that during the pursuit of certain 'gangs' into Angola 
(presumably SW APO), engagements had been fought with others: 'On various occasions the South African 
112 J. Marcum, 'Lessons of Angola', (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No.3, April 1976), p. 413. Colin Legum 
was one of the first scholars to focus on the impact of Soviet concern over China's successes in Africa. He 
claimed that 'What happened in Angola suggest,; that in the Third World the Sino-Soviet rivalry with each 
other has become more important to them than either's rivalry with the West': Legum, 'The Soviet Union, 
China and the West', pp. 751-752. Legum also stressed the Sino/Soviet rather than SovietlUS rivalry in 
Angola in 'A Letter on Angola to American Liberals' . 
113 M. Arnheim, South Africa after Vorster (Howard Timmins, Cape Town, 1979), p. 111. 
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Fred Mouton, Die Burger, 22 October 1975 
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• Africa for the African, but these expensive weapons are preferably only for you Cubans_' 
Fred Mouton, Die Burger, 23 October 1975 .. 
Figure 3: Political cartoons from Die Burger 
[Illustrations taken from K. Vernon, Pen pricks: The Drawing of South Africa's Political Battlelines 










Defence Force had to pursue such gangs and clear away their camps. We did this with success. On occasion 
we were also involved in other engagements ... We did this to protect White and Black Angolans from 
extermination by Russian-Cuban forces.'119 Soon after Vorster referred to 'the MPLA and the Cubans', 
whom the SADF had chased 'a very long way' from the Calueque dam. 120 Vorster and Botha still insisted 
that this did not amount to participation in the civil war. In an interview with the Sunday Telegraph in 
London Vorster stressed: 'I want to state very clearly that South Mrica's involvement was not the cause of 
Russian and Cuban intervention but the effect of it.' 121 
After the war the South Mrican press continued to carry vague reports of engagements fought between the 
SADF and Cubans. On 29 April 1976, SABC-TV (the state television service) screened a 'documentary' 
recreation of the 'Battle of Bridge 14'. Gordon Winter, a defector from the Bureau of State Security, 
claimed the film had been compiled by South Mrican Military Intelligence. 122 The hour-long 'Die Slag van 
Brug 14' was shot on location in Namibia with SADF troops playing all the roles. It portrayed a small 
SADF armoured car group, routing a numerically far superior force of Cubans at a strategic bridge 
somewhere in the Angolan heartland. Robert Moss later revealed that Bridge 14 was in the Catofe area, 
north of Santa Comba, and that the battle had been fought from 9-12 December 1975.123 The film gave 
hero-status to one wounded white lieutenant who, after killing eleven black Angolans declared: 'I am not 
fighting for South Africa, but for Jesus Christ, against the anti-Christ forces of communism: 124 
Although the 'Battle of Bridge 14' was an inept propaganda re-enactment, television had only been 
introduced to South Africa at the start of the year and still had novelty value.125 The press, starved of 
information, gave it sensational treatment and headlines were emblazoned with choice quotes from the 
heroes. 126 The film was shown in the week before the Parliamentary vote on the portfolio of the Minister of 
Defence and may have been calculated to restore public and press support for the Minister and his 
119 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976, col. 49. 
120 Ibid, 30 January 1976, cols. 368-369. 
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Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 203-218. 
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kaffirs a thing or two, didn't they, man? Pity we had to leave. We could have killed them all off if we'd had 











Figure 4: Artist's depiction of the 'Battle of Bridge 14'. 
[So Stander, Like the Wind: The Story of the· South African Army 










department. 127 To coincide with the programme the SADF released details of the battle, claiming South 
Africa had dealt a demoralising blow to the Cuban troops, killing 400 MPLA and Cubans for only four 
South African deaths.128 This was the first official admission of an active South African role in the Angolan 
civil war. 129 The film was originally made for overseas distribution, a decision questioned even by the pro-
government newspaper, Die Vaderland, which pointed out that 'it would make it increasingly difficult to 
sell the story that we were only in the operational area to defend the Kunene water projects' .130 
Botha made his first definite statement about Cuban involvement in Angola to Parliament on 6 May 1976, 
in response to charges that South Africa's intervention had prompted that of the Soviets and Cubans. He 
stated: 'It is a well-known fact...that the Cubans, under Russian direction, began their infiltration there 
early last year. The Russians had begun a gradual build-up of the MPLA in Angola as far back as 1956. 
Since the beginning of 1975, armaments and ammunition were conveyed on a large scale to Angola. Large 
depots were also erected in Angola. This gentleman alleges that the Russian-Cuban intervention took place 
as a result of our participation there. But this is a lie. ,131 In 1977, fronts for the Department of Information 
funded two books on the 'communist threat'. F. Metrowich's South Africa's New Frontiers included a 
chapter on Angola which described, 'The blatant and overt Communist intervention in an independent 
African state' and how 'South African forces were sent into Angola to protect South African interests 
there' .132 In The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban 
Policies, Ian Greig claimed that Soviet and Cuban assistance to the MPLA 'posed the most serious 
questions for the future peace, not only of Africa, but of the whole world'. The introduction of South 
African forces in October was 'a bid to redress the balance now tilting so sharply in favour of a Communist 
victory' . 133 
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The outline of the long-running debate over the chronology of South African and Cuban escalation was 
first sketched by the conflicting accounts released in early 1977 by Robert Moss and Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez. With the absence of concrete archival material in either South Africa or Cuba, subsequent 
scholars were forced to rehash existing accounts and, given the nature of the debate, many analyses were 
coloured by the writers' own political persuasions. 
Marquez's account, published a few weeks before Moss', claimed that Cuban intervention occurred in 
response to the presence of South Mrica and other Western interventionists. The chronology Marquez 
presented is as follows. In May 1975, Neto had talks in Brazzaville with a Cuban representative. He 
requested Cuban assistance in shipping arms into Angola and broached the possibility of wider aid. Three 
months later a Cuban delegation visited Luanda and Neto specifically requested military instructors. In 
early August, the Cubans decided to send 480 military advisers to the MPLA. The decision was made in 
light of Zaire's support for the FNLA, Zambia's support for UNITA and the fact that South African troops 
had crossed into Angola.134 The Cuban instructors began arriving in Angola on 4 October and opened four 
training schools.135 It was a South Mrican attack on one of these training centres, at Benguela, on 3 
November, which convinced the MPLA leaders that they were facing a full-scale war and would need 
outside help.136 On 5 November the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba decided to provide troops 
and equipment, the first contingent of which flew to Congo on 7 November.137 Larger numbers of troops 
were sent on three ships and began arriving in Angola on 27 November.138 Marquez stressed that the 
provision of combat troops, known as 'Operation Carlota', was 'a sovereign and independent act by Cuba' 
and that the Soviet Union was only informed afterwards.139 Castro himself claimed that: 'On November 5, 
1975, at the request of the MPLA, the leadership of our party decided to send with great urgency a battalion 
of regular troops with antitank weapons to help the Angolan patriots resist the invasion of the South 
African racists. This was the first Cuban troop unit sent to Angola ... Cuba alone bears the responsibility for 
taking that decision. The USSR. .. never requested that a single Cuban be sent to that country.'140 
Robert Moss' account (which largely accords with the official SADF 1977 press release) stressed that 
South Mrica had gone to the assistance of UNITA and the FNLA only after it became apparent that Cuban 
soldiers were entering the territory. Moss described Angola as 'one of the most brazen land-grabs that the 
Russians and their satellites have attempted,141 and portrayed Cuba as a Soviet proxy: 'The Cubans are 
1977), pp. 246-247, 256. The Foreign Affairs Association was another front for the Department of 
Information: Rees & Day, Muldergate, p. 196. 
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Moscow's all-purpose mercenaries' .142 He stated that 'The Communist invasion of Angola was a step 
towards the fulfilment of Russia's grand design: the domination of the whole of southern Africa' .143 Moss 
claimed that during the second half of 1974, the Russians shipped $6million of arms to the :MPLA and 
suggested, in August 1975, that the MPLA approach Cuba for troops. The Soviets agreed to bankroll the 
operation and to directly enter the conflict if the Americans did. 144 According to Moss western intelligence 
sources believed that Castro had already decided on a full-scale invasion before August 1975 when he was 
made aware of the possibility of South African intervention. Moss dated the first 200 Cuban instructors 
arriving in Angola 'two months in advance ofthe South Africans' and claimed that they were soon joined 
by combat troops. He stressed that Cuban troops were on the battlefield months before 5 November 1975, 
when Marquez dated the decision to commit Cuban troopS.145 Moss claimed that by 11 November there 
were at least 4,000 Cuban troops based in Luanda and so concluded that 'it is nonsense to make out that 
Cuba's decision to send in major combat units was taken only in early November, after South Africa's 
intervention' .146 
The SADF's official 1977 account mentioned the 'presence of Cubans supporting the MPLA' at the time of 
the mass refugee exodus across the border in August-September 1975. It claimed that the Defence Force 
first encountered evidence of a Cuban presence in Angola on early hot-pursuits when they 'came across 
Cuban ammunition and weapon dumps' .147 The account did not mention where or when this find was made. 
According to both Moss and the SADF account, the first clash between South Africans and Cubans took 
place on 6 October when the SADF infantry instructors training UNIT A troops at Silva Porto clashed with 
an MPLAICuban force, which was advancing on Nova Lisboa.148 Botha's official biography claimed that it 
had been decided that the Defence Force personnel would man UNITA's armoured vehicles 'just this 
once' .149 
According to the SADF, after this encounter 'it became obvious that the struggle, with strong Cuban 
support, began to take on a conventional colour' .150 Spies' account and Botha's biography also claim that it 
was this battle that made it clear that UNIT A would not be able to resist the MPLA without help.l5l The 
imminent victory of the MPLA forced South Africa to make a decision. The choice lay between active 
South African military participation on the one hand and, in effect, acceptance of an MPLA victory on the 
142 Moss, 'Moscow's Next Target in Africa', Sunday Telegraph, 20 February 1977. 
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other.152 Pretoria decided to escalate,153 The instructors with UNIT A requested reinforcements, prompting 
Pretoria to send a squadron of armoured cars with crews to join them at Silva PortO.154 By late October, 
Commandant van der Waals had assembled the armoured cars and UNITA troops into a battle group, eode-
named 'Foxbat', which struck north and took up defensive positions in the Cela area. The political directive 
was that Foxbat should not go beyond traditional UNITA territory, and should be ready to withdraw on 11 
November. lss Meanwhile, on 14 October, a South Mrican armoured column (named ZUIU)156, crossed into 
Angola from north-eastern Namibia and headed north-west deep into Angola. Tasked with gaining as much 
ground as possible in south-western Angola before 11 November, the South Africans advanced at full 
speed, sixty or seventy kilometres a day.157 
These were the two conflicting chronologies of escalation. The nature of international intervention in the 
Angolan civil war has been a fertile area of study, with scholars divided ever since. There is not space in 
this dissertation to delineate the full course of the debate, but two quotes from respected scholars of 
Angolan history are instructive. Colin Legum writing in late 1976 observed: 'The scale of the Soviet/Cuban 
intervention increased sharply in early October, three weeks before the South African forces entered 
Angola in any size ... The Russian and Cuban contention that their military intervention was the result of 
the South African invasion is clearly an ex post facto rationalisation' .158 John Marcum however stated: 
'There can be quarrels over time sequences, but there is no question that Cuba's intervention was partly an 
improvised response to South Africa's' ,159 
Closed official archives have hampered the furtherance of the debate about South African and Cuban 
escalation in Angola. Piero Gleijeses' recently published Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and 
152 H.-R. Heitman, The South African War Machine (presidio, Novato, California, 1985), p. 170. 
153 The SADF devised a four-phase operational plan for a military offensive, each stage was progressively 
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(Fortress Publishers, Germiston, South Africa, 1993), pp. 28-31. Zulu made rapid progress through Pereira 
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before capturing Mo~amedes on 28 October 1975. Mter a fierce battle Benguela was taken and Zulu 
advanced to Lobito, where it remained until 11 November 1975 anticipating possible orders to retreat. 
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Africa, 1959-1976 is the first work to have been able to use Cuban archival material to trace the evolution 
of Cuban involvement in Angola. Gleijeses strongly challenges common perceptions of Cuban activity in 
Africa and claims that far from being the foot soldier of Soviet imperialism, Cuba intervened in Angola 
without seeking Soviet permission. More pertinent to this study, he insists that Cuban troops did not arrive 
in Angola until November. 16o He claims that 'the real power grab' occurred in mid-October when South 
Africa invaded Angola; Cuba then responded by sending troops.161 
Gleijeses claims that in response to l\1PLA requests for economic aid, weapons and trainingl62, Castro sent 
representatives in December 1974 to meet with Neto and to assess the situation in Angola. 163 However, 
Cuba was slow to get involved and it was only after further requests from the l\1PLA that Castro sent 
$100,000 in July 1975.164 Furthermore, it was not until August 1975 that Castro offered 480 Cuban 
instructors, these began arriving in Angola in late August and commenced training operations in mid-
October. 165 On 23 October, the FNLA attacked one of the l\1PLA training camps166 and 40 Cuban 
instructors with the l\1PLA helped resist the attack. According to Gleijeses, this was the first time that 
Cubans participated in actual fighting. 167 Gleijeses claims that Castro also considered sending troops to 
Angola in August 1975 but, when asked, Leonid Brezhnev refused to endorse the operation. It was only 
three months later, at the news of the South African invasion, that Castro made the difficult choice and sent 
Cuban troops to Angola, without consulting Brezhnev. 168 Gleijeses is adamant that the only foreign troops 
operating in Angola before the South African offensive began in mid-October were the Zaireans; the 
Cubans only followed in early November. Gleijeses concludes: 'The record is clear: it was the South 
African invasion that triggered the dispatch of Cuban troops' .169 The fact that Gleijeses based his research 
on previously unseen material in the Cuban archives lends his work a certain credence lacking from 
previous accounts. 
General Constand Viljoen, SADF Director of Operations at the time of Savannah, has claimed: 'It was 
clear to me the l\1PLA and Cubans were gradually occupying the whole of Angola.' General Hein du Toit, 
however, denies that South Africa even knew Cuba was sending troops to Angola at the stage when 
160 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 271-272. According to Gleijeses, Robert Hultslander, the CIA 
station chief in Luanda from early August to 3 November 1975 confirmed this. 
161 Ibid, p. 389. 
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training was being discussed. 170 If Cuban involvement had been the paramount concern facing South 
Africa, it seems strange that du Toit, the director general of Military Intelligence, was unaware of it. 
Furthermore, it would appear that even the United States, which operated a far more sophisticated 
intelligence machine than South Africa, did not anticipate Cuban intervention. The United States Secretary 
of State, ReillY Kissinger, recalled in his memoirs that '[t]he intervention of Cuban combat forces came as 
a complete surprise' .171 
So it is far from clear that South Africa's intervention was a reaction to the introduction of Cuban combat 
troops into Angola. Conversely, if Vorster did indeed believe that Angola was in the throes of a communist 
land-grab, would he have risked taking on the full might of 'the communists' without support? This brings 
us to a factor which the SADF omitted from their official account. South Africa invaded Angola in the 
belief that she had the support of both several moderate black African countries and, more importantly, the 
United States. 
INTERNA TIONAL ENCOURAGEMENT 
'[T]he Angolan matter. . .is an exceptionally delicate matter. Even on 
this occasion there are certain things which I simply dare not say. South 
Africa's involvement was not an isolated involvement; others were also 
involved. I am not going to mention their names. It is not for me to do 
so. Everyone must speak for himself on this matter. .. 1 am prepared to 
stand up and be counted in regard to this matter. It goes without saying 
that, on the question of their involvement, those people should come 
forward themselves.' 
(Vorster, speech to the House of Assembly, 30 January 1976)172 
Pretoria was discreet about its foreign partners in the Angolan venture. Speaking in Parliament on 26 
January 1976 Botha claimed one of the reasons for South Africa's presence in Angola was diplomatic and 
could not be divulged.173 The following day the Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, claimed, 'Wherever'it 
was in any way possible we acted only after consultation with others, but in view of political and military 
aspects which not only affect us ... but also affect many others, it is not in the general interest to say very 
much about this.'174 In an interview published in Newsweek on 27 January 1976 Vorster first alluded to the 
fact that South Africa had not acted unilaterally in Angola. In a similar vein, quotes from Botha in the 
Washington Post on 3 February 1976, hinted at the encouragement Pretoria had received from unnamed 
African and other nations. 
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Robert Moss was less restrained in his account, which was nevertheless cleared for publication in South 
African newspapers: '[TJhe key fact about South Africa's intervention was one that neither Mr Botha nor 
any other senior official in Pretoria has ever been prepared to discuss. It is that when South Africans went 
into Angola, they went in with the private blessing of many Western and black African Governments ... ' .175 
VORSTER'S SEARCH FOR DETENTE WITH BLACK AFRICA 
'If there had been no detente, it is safe to say there would have been no 
South African penetration of Angola beyond the border zone' . 
(John De S1. Jorre, A House Divided, p. 76). 
In May 1976, the South African Broadcasting Corporation's semi-official commentary Current Affairs, 
stated: 'South Africa had the capacity to make its intervention [in Angola] effective to the extent of 
taking Luanda ... Following urgent representations by black leaders, a column of our troops moved rapidly 
northwards' . In his book Adeus Angola, published later that year, Steenkamp claimed these black leaders 
were probably Mobutu of Zaire, Kaunda of Zambia, Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Senghor of 
Senegal, and possibly Seretse Khama of Botswana and Banda of Malawi. Steenkamp's book was passed for 
publication by the military authorities despite Pretoria's professed reticence on declaring who its supporters 
in Angola were. Steenkamp's description of how these black leaders 'saw the white states of the south as 
brothers - heartily disliked brothers, perhaps, but brothers all the same with whom to fight shoulder to 
shoulder against a new imperialism and an utterly alien ideology' was clearly acceptable.176 
It soon became received wisdom that Vorster's Angolan adventure had been part and parcel of his detente 
endeavours.177 Detente was the end product of his 'outward policy' (described variously as 'outward 
movement' or 'outward-looking policy' and later as 'friendly co-existence', then 'dialogue', and at last 
'detente'). In the late 19608, whilst basking in confidence in its economic power and military strength, 
white South Africa was nevertheless facing growing international hostility, especially from independent 
black African states. Vorster's pragmatic response was his outward policy. Ostensibly based on economic 
assistance to moderate black states, it attempted to convey an image of South African non-interventionist, 
good-neighbourly benevolence.178 Vorster wanted other African countries to soften their criticism of So~th 
Africa on the international stage and to reduce their hospitality to South African guerrillas in exile. The 
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reasoning behind the outward policy was that a rapprochement with black Africa was the key to an 
improvement in South Africa's foreign relations generally.179 
Despite a right-wing backlash in National Party circles the new initiative produced some promising early 
results. Botswana and Lesotho achieved independence in 1966, followed by Swaziland two years later. 
Their new moderate governments seemed to bode well for South Africa, if not for the normalisation of 
relations then, at least for the establishment of a modus vivendi with black Africa.180 In 1967, Vorster met 
with Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho and, in 1970, with President Hastings Banda of Malawi. l8l In 
August 1971, Banda made a much-publicised state visit to South Africa, the first of its kind by a black head 
of state.182 Further successes followed in the form of trade and economic agreements with the Malagasy 
Republic and an official visit by representatives from the Ivory Coast in 1971.183 In 1974 Vorster met with 
President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Senegal's President Leopold Senghor, and early 
the following year he held secret talks with President William Tolbert in Liberia.184 
However, the Organisation of African Unity vigorously opposed Vorster's initiative. Ending colonialism 
and racial oppression had been an important impetus in the formation of the Organisation185, and its Lusaka 
Manifesto of 1969 committed independent Africa to supporting the armed struggle against the white 
minority regimes in the south.186 Consequently Vorster' s brainchild never achieved as much as he'd hoped. 
Despite his painstaking preparation of his followers for the shock of black diplomats in Pretoria, in the 
event, only Malawi established diplomatic relations.187 Although a number of black states accepted aid, 
none would be drawn into non-aggression pacts with South Africa and most insisted on confidentiality in 
their relations with the Republic. 188 An attempt to woo President Kaunda of Zambia, the lynchpin of central 
Africa, ended in failure in 1971 when Vorster, stung by Kaunda's public criticisms, published a series of 
confidential letters between them.189 
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The disintegration of Portugal's African empire, and the concomitant collapse of South Africa's protective 
buffer to the north, radically changed the regional context and provided new impetus to Vorster's flagging 
'outward' initiative. The instability in Rhodesia and Namibia assumed more ominous and urgent 
implications as Pretoria's buffers became liabilities. To secure South Africa's borders in the futme and to 
move regional developments in a direction favourable to its interests, the Vorster goverurnent decided that 
it must intervene more directly in regional affairs. 'Detente', a term borrowed from the super-power 
context, was to be a more narrowly focused effort to consolidate South Mrica's position in the region. 
Vorster began talking in more limited terms of a power bloc of independent states in southern Africa 
finding solutions to the area's conflicts. The essential objective of detente was to consolidate the regime's 
strategic position and to prevent it becoming still more isolated. Detente aimed to resolve the problems of 
Namibia and Rhodesia in South Mrica's favour and re-establish some kind of Pax Pretoriana over the 
region.190 In June 1974, Vorster publicly reversed Pretoria's long-standing position on Namibia, professing 
that South Mrica had no wish to dictate the territory's future and that this might be best left to 'the peoples' 
concerned.191 
The new phase began with a series of secret meetings with Zambian officials early in October 1974, in a 
joint effort to break the deadlock over Rhodesia.192 These resulted in dramatic conciliatory speeches. In a 
speech to the South African Senate on 23 October 1974, Vorster announced: 'Africa has been good to us 
and we are prepared, as far as it is within our capabilities, to give back to Africa. If asked, South Africa is 
prepared to play its part in contributing to order, development, and financial assistance to countries in 
Africa, particularly those that are prepared to stand closer to South Africa in a spirit of give and take.'193 
Two days later, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in a speech at the University of Zambia, responded: 
'This, I daresay, is the voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world has waited.' 194 
This was to mark the start of steadily improving relations between Lusaka and Pretoria. However, despite 
South Africa's efforts to broaden the basis of detente, the essence of their mutual understanding remained 
confined to the search for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.195 On 9 February 1975, Pretoria's foreign 
minister flew to Lusaka and met openly with Kaunda, the foreign ministers of Zambia, Botswana and 
Tanzania, and representatives of the Rhodesian guerrilla movements.196 Vorster had to demonstrate his 
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willingness in helping to bring peace to Rhodesia. 197 Soon afterwards he put pressure on Ian Smith by 
confining the South African police in Rhodesia to barracks. 198 In return Zambia was to restrain guerrilla 
attacks in Rhodesia. 199 The high point of detente was the Victoria Falls conference of August 1975 when 
Vorster and Kaunda brought together members of the Rhodesian Front government and black nationalist 
leaders.2OO Although heralded as something of a public relations coup in Pretoria and Vorster's finest hoW" 
in his guise as 'Africa's peacemaker,201, with regard to the future of Rhodesia the conference was a failure. 
Vorster's meeting with Kaunda was a considered a success simply because it had taken place.202 Measuring 
by such a yardstick revealed the extent of South Africa's isolation. 
Ian Smith's encounter with his black challengers at the Victoria Falls served only to strengthen his 
intransigence and his determination to resist Vorster's pressures to compromise. He tried to encourage the 
emergence of a pro-white Rhodesian backlash inside South Africa and urged Vorster's opponents to draw 
comparisons between the rivalries in the Angolan movements with events in Rhodesia. The Transvaal 
National Party Congress at the end of August showed Vorster still in a dominant position within his party. 
However, the feeling among the rank-and-file delegates reflected 'a vague uneasiness about the whole 
detente operation and about the ultra-conservative allegation that South Africa was "selling Rhodesia down 
the river" ... Nationalists recognise that the situation is not an easy one and that their supporters must be 
delicately handled' .203 
The OAU remained opposed to Vorster's appeals. At the OAU summit of April 1975, Zambia, Tanzania, 
Mozambique and Botswana were criticised for supporting South Africa's detente polices. The Dar es 
Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa called for the establishment of majority governments in Rhodesia 
and Namibia and the dismantling of apartheid: 'Africans cannot and will never acquiesce in the 
perpetuation of colonial andlor racist oppression in their continent. That is why any talk of detente with the 
apartheid regime is such nonsense that it should be treated with the contempt it deserves. For if the spirit of 
detente is to have any meaning at all, it must first and foremost be from within South Africa' .z04 
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Vorster saw in Angola an opportunity to redeem his flagging detente initiative in the face of domestic right-
wing opposition and doubts within black Africa. Both Zambia and Zaire. as neighbours to Angola. had 
already expressed their alarm at the prospect of an NIPLA victory and Soviet influence in Angola?05 
Zambia actively supported tTt';'ITA and Zaire the FNLA.206 Both were motivated to a certain degree by 
ideology, a desire to see a moderate in power in Angola and to limit Soviet influence in Africa. In 
an interview in 1976, Kaunda described the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola as 'a plundering tiger 
and its deadly cubs coming in through the back door'. He continued: 'We are a non-aligned nation and we 
spoke out plainly against the United States on Vietnam. Now we must be morally and politically 
courageous and tell the Soviets: "You are wrong" ... And much as we condemn South Africa's presence in 
Angola, we cheat ourselves if we think by condemning South Africa we are settling things. The South 
African presence, too, is an effect of the problem, not the cause.'207 Although Zambia and Zaire paid lip 
service to a government of national unity in Angola, economic exigencies meant they were primarily 
interested in seeing a friendly regime in power in Luanda. Both Zambia and Zaire were landlocked 
countries reliant on the Benguela railroad, which cut from east to west across Angola to the Atlantic port of 
Lobito, as an outlet to the sea for their vital copper exports.20S 
It seems unlikely that Kaunda and Vorster would have failed to discuss the situation in Angola during their 
meetings at the Victoria Falls Conference.209 Writing in early 1976, Colin Legum stated: 'I am assured on 
the highest authority that President Kaunda, so far from encouraging South African intervention, did 
everything possible to discourage Mr. Vorster from the enterprise,?10 Similarly Douglas Anglin and 
Timothy Shaw, in their study of Zambian foreign policy, asserted that 'there is no evidence of any direct 
Zambia-South Africa collusion over Angola' ,211 However, this is contradicted by a host of other writers all 
of whom claim that Kaunda urged Pretoria to intervene.212 
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Kaunda had been one of the earliest supporters of UNIT A, but had expelled the movement from Zambia in 
1969 following its acts of sabotage against tbe Benguela railway. Without the Benguela line, Zambia's 
P1fT1P111<:Hrp alternative was through Rhodesia and South Africa. Kaunda then supported the MPLA for a 
while and the movement established bases in Zambia.213 His brief dalliance with the MPLA ended with the 
factional fighting between Neto and Chipenda, some of which had taken place inside Zambia?14 Kaunda 
then switched his favour back to UNITA.215 It was suggested at the time that perhaps Tiny Rowland, a 
British financier with a large economic stake in Zambia and a strong supporter of Savimbi, might have 
been of influence?16 In April 1975, on a state visit to Washington, Kaunda appealed for American military 
aid on Savimbi's behalf.217 According to John Stockwell (who headed the CIA's Angolan task force), in 
September 1975 Kaunda promised Savimbi that if UNITA could control the entire length of the Benguela 
Railroad by independence, it would receive Zambia's official support.218 Savimbi later claimed that Kaunda 
arranged for him to meet Vorster for the first time on 10 November 1975, in order that he might personally 
request that the SADF remain in Angola after 11 November.219 Officially, Kaunda denied doing SO.220 
The FNLA also had a leading African patron in Mobutu, who had long been its most committed backer.221 
In addition to his personal relations with Roberto and the tribal links between the Bakongo people in 
Angola and Zaire, Mobutu was motivated by Zaire's competition with Congo over the fortunes of Cabinda, 
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an oil-rich enclave separated from the rest of Angola by a strip of Zaire?22 Mobutu desired an Angolan 
government he could sway; if Roberto prevailed in Angola, Mobutu would have an opportunity to extend 
his influence over Angola and Cabinda, whilst if~eto won, Cabinda would be lost. Mobutu also feared that 
Angola, under the MPLA, might become a springboard for his archenemies, the Zairean rebels from 
Katanga province.223 After Moise Tshombe's failed secession attempt in 1963, many of his gendarmes had 
been given refuge by the Portuguese in Angola. When these Katangese rebels joined the 11PLA following 
the Lisbon eoup, Mobutu increased his support and direct military assistance to the FNLA.224 
Zaire was the first foreign country to send troops to Angola. They crossed the border into northwestern 
Angola in March 1975 and were fighting by the middle ofthe year.225 Zairean involvement in Angola was 
sporadically reported throughout the war and by August 1975 the Washington Post was claiming that 'Zaire 
is practically a party to the struggle' .226 According to Moss, at one stage Mobutu actually implored the 
South Africans to bomb northern MPLA positions.z27 As previously noted Chinese instructors had been 
training FNLA troops in Zaire since 1974. It was also reported that Mobutu supplied the FNLA with North 
Korean instructors that had been attached to the Zairean army.228 It has been claimed that by the eve of 
independence, when three battalions of Zairean troops helped Roberto in his disastrous attempt to seize 
Luanda229, Zaire had 11,200 troops in Angola?30 In Jnne 1975 Mobutu requested that the United States 
assist UNITA and the FNLA in their struggle against the MPLA.23! Kinshasa then became the thoroughfare 
through which the CIA infiltrated arms and equipment to the two movements. In early 1976, Zaire became 
222 Both Congo and Zaire coveted Cabinda and supported rival separatist groups, which claimed to be the 
true Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEe). Cuban troops and Soviet equipment were 
shipped to the MPLA through Brazzaville. Originally President Marien Ngouabi of Congo resented the 
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the launch-pad for the ill-fated escapades of British and American mercenaries supporting the FNLA.232 It 
has been alleged that, in order to convince Vorster to maintain his troops in Angola, Mobutu promised that 
Zaire would enter into a military cooperation agreement with South Africa and would seek support from 
the United States for such an arrangement.233 
According to some writers the leaders of Senegal and the Ivory Coast also encouraged South Aflican 
intervention in Angola, however, the evidence is less convincing than for Zambia and Zaire. Stockwell 
mentioned only that Savimbi had invited the South Africans into Angola after conferring with Mobutu, 
Kaunda, Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor?34 Eschel Rhoodie, Secretary for Information at the time, later 
claimed that Prime Minister James Mancham of the Seychelles had told him that both Senghor and 
Houphouet-Boigny had sent urgent messages to Vorster urging him to act swiftly and strongly and take 
Luanda.235 After the crisis was over, Zambia and Zaire each piously and very publicly denied that they had 
ever encouraged South African intervention in Angola. However, in February 1976, Savimbi declared that 
South Africa had received prior approval from Zambia, Zaire and the Ivory Coast. He also claimed that the 
South African government had acted 'painfully' correctly.236 
Vorster believed that Angola was an opportunity to prove that South Africa was a reliable ally of black 
states opposed to communist intervention.237 It was a chance to demonstrate that South Aflica was willing 
to expend lives and money for a common cause with fellow African nations. To Vorster the appeals from 
these black leaders 'were more than pleas for greater South African involvement, they were the siren song 
inviting him across the African colour bar'. 238 In November 1975, a South African newspaper predicted: 
'Our involvement will be utterly defensible in the Western world. We 
will be fighting alongside Africa, for Africa. We will be paying in 
blood our membership dues to join the community of African nations. 
In this sense, there is no easy validity in some overseas comment that 
our role in Angola, present or future, will prejudice detente. If anything 
it should strengthen the new and fragile links that hold the detente 
policy together,.239 
The aim of the intervention, to see a government in power which would adopt an accommodating approach 
towards South Africa, was in keeping with the basic tenets of Vorster's detente policy. A senior 
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government official told the political commentator John De St Jorre in November 1976 that, 'If Savimbi 
had won South Africa would now be a member of the Organisation of African Unity:240 The Defence 
Force was not unaware of Vorster's political and diplomatic goals.24! Colonel Jan Breytenbach recognised: 
'Several African states asked South Africa for help. We werc the polecat of the world, especially with 
regards to the African countries. So it was a way to get friends.'242 When General Constand Viljoen gave a 
confidential briefing to South African newspaper editors during the war the mood was 'euph0l1c': 'This 
was not only a military success, we were told, but a foreign-relations breakthrough, and a breakthrough in 
Africa as well. Some of those involved with South Africa were African leaders. New relationships were 
being established. It was a wonderful opportunity' .243 General Viljoen has subsequently elaborated: 
'I got the impression from P.W. Botha and Vorster that they saw the 
request from black Africa as a sign of a breakthrough. It was a very 
important development because, ever since we'd been involved with 
the Rhodesian situation, and because of the assistance we gave to the 
Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola, it had become clear to us in 
the military that the real issue for us would be to become part of Africa. 
The opinion-makers regarded this as a breakthrough. South Africa was 
starting to side with black Africa instead of the colonial powers. This 
was perhaps the most impOltant reason for participating in the whole 
effort, apart from the idea of combating communism.' 244 
UNITED STATES AND 'THE WEST' 
'Against which neighbouring states have we ever taken aggressive 
steps? I know of only one occasion in recent years when we crossed a 
border and that was in the case of Angola when we did so with the 
approval and knowledge of the Americans but they left us in the lurch. 
We are going to retell that story. The story must be told of how we, 
with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their 
knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly 
reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch by an 
undertaking that was broken.' 
(P.W. Botha, House of Assembly Debates, 17 April 1978)245 
At an off-the-record press briefing during the war, Botha hinted that South Africa's intervention in Angola 
was supported by the United States. 'We're not in it alone: he told the gathered reporters, 'You'd be 
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surprised to know who's in it with US.'246 By late February 1976, the tone had changed. The United Party in 
Parliament referred to 'the prevailing acidness which has become evident on the Government side over 
what the role of the United States was supposed to have been or should have been in Angola.'247 Asked by 
Newsweek magazine in May 1976, whether Washington had 'solicited' South Africa's help in Angola, 
Vorster replied, ' .. .if you are making the statement, I won't call you a liar.,248 In 1977, Robert Moss stated 
that South Africa 'went in with the encouragement of Dr Kissinger, who offered American guarantees that, 
in the event, he was unable to fulfi1'.249 Botha's official biography claimed: 'As American covett 
involvement in the Angolan conflict increased, South African involvement also increased ... America was 
involved on a large scale in South Africa's intervention in Angola' ?50 Roelof (Pik) Botha, who was 
Pretoria's Ambassador to the United States at the time was more explicit in a 1999 television interview: 
'The United States, at the highest level, requested assistance, or rather requested South Africa to go in and 
assist UNITA.'251 General Hein du Toit has claimed that, 'American senators gave us promises. They told 
Pik Botha that they were behind us. General [Brent] Scowcroft, the security advisor to the President, was 
the name that was mentioned.'252 
As might be expected, Cuba and the Soviet Union professed the view that there had been an American-
South African conspiracy with regards to Angola.253 Castro claimed that South Africa's invasion in October 
had been 'instigated by the United States' ?54 The extent to which South Africa was an American proxy 
became a persistent theme of Soviet propaganda. For example, a statement by the Tass new agency in 
January 1984 compared South Africa's intervention in Angola with Israel's in the Lebanon and insisted that 
both were part of a wider imperialist conspiracy. It claimed that neither would have intervened so 
decisively 'without the support and encouragement of Washington,.255 
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246 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, p. 306. Sparks was the editor of the Sunday Express and attended the 
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252 Telephone interview with General Rein du Toit. Pik Botha was indeed sent to the White House to 
request 'firm assurances ... that they [the South Africans] would be assisted' if the fighting escalated: 
Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 146. Ryland was the deputy to head of the National Security Council. Scowcroft. 
It appears that, following his meetings with Kissinger and Scow croft, Pik Botha relayed somewhat mixed 
messages to Pretoria about the way the wind was blowing in the United States: Hamann, Days of the 
Generals, p. 40. 
253 Neto's oftlcial biographer later wrote: 'The FNLA and UNITA attack on the MPLA, and foreign 
military intervention in Angola were part of a long-term plan on the part of reaction, in which the main 
roles belonged to the USA, Western Europe, Zaire and South Africa': A. Khazanov, Agostinho Neto 
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During the war American official spokesmen specifically denied that there was any coordination with, or 
undcrtakings to, South Africa over Angola, or even any approval of South African actions there. At the 
start of December 1975 the State Depattment stressed that the United States was in no way implicated in 
the South African intervention: 'We have seen press reports alleging South African activities in support of 
the non-11PLA forces in Angola, but we have not initiated any discussions or consultations with the South 
African Government on Angola and we have no plans to do so. We continue to believe that the Angolan 
people should be left free to resolve their own differences without outside interference' ?56 
Following the war, the Ford administration stoutly maintained that there had been absolutely no 
cooperation between the United States and South Africa. On 29 January 1976, Kissinger claimed that South 
Africa had sent military equipment and personnel to UNITA in September 1975 'without consultation with 
the United States'. 257 He continued: 'Some charge that we have acted in collusion with South Africa. That 
is not true. We had no foreknowledge of South Africa's intentions, and in no way cooperated with it 
militarily. Nor do we view South Mrican intervention more benevolently than we do the intervention of 
other outside powers.'258 On 3 February 1976, Robert Ellsworth, the new Deputy Secretary of Defence, 
claimed that the eleven American representatives at the Defence Attache's Office in South Africa had not 
even shared information or analysis on Angola with the South African military.259 In response to 
questioning about American and South African coordination over their Angolan policies, Ellsworth replied: 
'There has been no coordination that I am aware of, certainly none on the military level.,26O 
There were, however, some renegade voices in Washington. Called before the Senate as an expert on 
Angola, the historian John Marcum commented: 'One of the points I found curious was a public statement 
by the State Department that it did not consult with the South Africans, that it was not informed of the 
intervention. And I presume it did not suggest to the South Mricans that intervention would not be a good 
thing; it saw no evil, heard no evil, stayed away from it, which is in itself a kind of complicity. ,261 Senator 
John Tunney was more forthright. On 6 February he told the Senate that there had been American 'tacit, if 
not explicit, support of South African intervention.' He commented: 'For Dr Kissinger to tell this 
256 Department of State, 'Press Briefing Paper', 1 December 1975 quoted in Marcum, The Angolan 
Revolution, Vo!' II, pp. 441-442 fn.235. 
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Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 820. William Colby, the director of the CIA, also denied that there was any 
cooperation with South Africa. He maintained that the CIA 'stayed well away from' all South African 
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committee, as he did last week, that the administration had no foreknowledge of South African 
involvement, seems a little bit less than frank. It seems to me that there is semantic juggling of the actual 
facts in his statement: 262 The new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, William Schaufele, displayed 
further juggling when asked whether the United States had approved of South African intervention in 
Angola, he replied: 'It was not approval, so much, as that we could understand South Africa's perception of 
its ro1e: 263 The nature of American-South African cooperation was expressed in equally vaguc tenns by 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, American ambassador to the United Nations. Admitting that there was a 
'convergence in policy' between the two governments but denying any coordination of operations, he 
added, 'We are doing the same thing, sort of: 264 
Due to the revelations of Congressional inquiries in early 1976, the chronology of American involvement 
in Angola is much easier to identify than that of the Cubans or South Africans. The coup in Lisbon had 
been unexpected265 and thrown the whole basis of American policy in southern Africa into disarray. In its 
report to Congress in January 1976 the Pike Committee (the United States House of Representatives Select 
Committee on Intelligence chaired by Congressman Otis Pike) claimed that 'The April 1974 coup in 
Portugal caught the United States by surprise, without graceful policy alternatives and out of contact with 
the African Revolutionaries' .z66 The Nixon administration's desire for a stable status quo in Africa, belief 
in the future of the white regimes and underestimation of black African resolve had led to a 'tilt' toward the 
Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans in their struggle against African nationalism.267 Traditionally 
the United States supported Portugal as a fellow NATO power and as the provider of a vital mid-Atlantic 
refuelling stop in the Azores?68 Following the transition from Nixon to Ford, America had been 
preoccupied with Watergate and the war in the Middle East. When the Ford administration did begin to 
focus on the impact of the Lisbon coup, its attention concentrated on the drift to the left in Portugal itself. 
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When Kissinger finally turned his attention to Angola he saw the conflict there solely in teons of global 
politics. in terms of East and West.269 Most American commentators interpreted the Soviet intervention in 
Angola as an extension of Soviet competition with the West into Africa. and saw the MPLA solely as an 
instrument of Soviet ambition and Cuba as a Soviet proxy.270 It is unclear whether Kissinger sincerely 
believed that a Soviet power grab was occuning. but either way, in the wake of Vietnam. he seized on 
Angola as an opportunity to regain credibility on the global stage.271 Kissinger professed that Leonid 
Brezhnev, heady with the recent communist military victories over American clients in Indochina, saw 
Angola as a chance to strike an economic and strategic blow to the West. Pretoria's version of events 
coincided with the American stance that depicted the war in Angola as a challenge by an expansionist 
Moscow. Botha's official biography states: 'Reacting to Soviet aid to the MPLA and later Cuban military 
involvement. the USA started clandestine aid to the MPLA's opponents in 1975,.272 
Angola was to become the CIA's largest military intervention in Africa since the Belgian Congo crisis of 
the early 1960s. On 22 January 1975, the 40 Committee (the top-level intelligence review board, a 
subsidiary of the National Security Council, that approved all covert action programmes) authorized an ad 
hoc payment of $300,000 to the FNLA, to be used for non-military activities. A proposal to give Savimbi 
$100,000 was rejected.273 On 18 Apri11975 Kaunda arrived in Washington for a two-day state visit during 
which he appealed for aid on Savimbi's behalf.274 At Kissinger's request a National Security Council 
interagency task force on Angola was established. It was chaired by Nathaniel Davis, the Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs at the State Department, and proposed three possible American policies 
towards Angola: neutrality, diplomatic/political measures to promote a peaceful solntion, or active support 
of one or more of the liberation movements.275 The African specialists in the State Department favoured a 
diplomatic offensive to support the OAU in its quest for an African solution and to build support for an all-
269 Davis, 'The Angola Decision of 1975', p. 124; Wright, The Destruction of a Nation, p. 57. 
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party coalition governrnent.276 However, Kissinger overruled all opposition to covert action and won the 
approval of the president.277 On 18 July Ford authorised the disbursement of $6million to Roberto and 
Savimbi (followed by another $8million on 27 July and $1O.7million on 20 August)?78 The following 
month Nathaniel Davis resigned in protest from his post as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs?79 But the CIA covert operation in Angola, dubbed IAFeature, had begun. On 29 July the first 
planeload of arms for UNITA and the FNLA left the United States for Kinshasa?SO As chief of the CIA 
Angola task force, Stockwell was instructed to 'prevent an easy victory' by the MPLA.28! However, 
Stockwell believed that IAFeature would prove too small to be effective but too large to be kept secret.282 
Following Angolan independence, on 14 November the 40 Committee instructed the CIA to design a 
programme capable of overthrowing the MPLA regime in Luanda. In the meantime, it recommended that 
the last $7 million in the agency's contingency reserve fund be spent in Angola, thus bringing the total 
budget for Operation IAFeature to almost $32 million.283 However, when the CIA presented the 40 
Committee with programmes costing up to an additional $100 million, it hesitated to recommend massive 
new expenditure.284 Senator Dick Clark, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
African Affairs, had travelled to southern African in August 1975. He returned from the trip sceptical of his 
CIA briefings and of the Angolan programme. He was concerned that the CIA was secretly dragging the 
United States into a broad conflict with global implications. He was specifically concerned that arms were 
being sent directly into Angola, that American citizens were involved in the conflict and that the CIA was 
illegally collaborating with South Africa.285 On 5 December 1975, Clark recommended to the Foreign 
Relations Committee that it vote to terminate United States involvement in Angola.286 On 19 December the 
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Senate voted 54-22 to cut off further covert assistance to the FNLA and UNITA.287 Ford and Kissinger 
were furious that Congress had 'pulled the plug' on American involvement in Angola. Ford said Congress 
had 'lost their guts' ?88 For the first time in American history, a president had been forced by Congress to 
stop a covert operation abroad to which he was personally committed?89 The House of Representatives 
endorsed the ban on aid to Angolan combatants by a 323-99 vote on 27 January?90 The ban on CIA 
operations in Angola became law on 9 February 1976.291 
Some writers have assumed that South Africa and America cooperated in Angola. In 1980, Donald Woods, 
who had been the editor of the Daily Dispatch, wrote: 'On the advice of America's Central Intelligence 
Agency and, it was rumoured, with the encouragement of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Botha 
became convinced that of the three liberation movements contending for power in Angola ... the least 
desirable and the most socialist, from South Africa's point of view, was Agostinho Neto's :MPLA. So he 
sent the South African army in to help Holden Roberto's FNLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces,?92 
Allister Sparks claimed: 'secret negotiations were held with South Africa, which was persuaded to 
intervene in support of Savimbi in the south' .193 More recently, Chris Alden referred to 'the joint 
American-South African campaign to thwart the :MPLA's ambitions' .294 Victoria Brittain commented on 
'US promises to the South Africans that Washington was committed to backing their invasion with 
continued military support for the anti-:MPLA forces,295 and in a subsequent book claimed: '[T]he 
Americans gave the nod to Pretoria to mount an ambitious military adventure over the Namibian border in 
support of its two Angolan proxies' .296 However, few of these writers gave evidence to back up their 
claims. 
Top-level military contacts between the United States and South Africa followed close on the tail of the 
Lisbon coup. Within weeks of Caetano's overthrow, Chief of the SADF Admiral Hugo Biermann visited 
Washington and met both the Secretary of the Navy and the chainnan of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.297 A 
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year later, a memorandum from Nathaniel Davis to Kissinger on 1 May 1975 described Savimbi's 
background (at this stage the CIA was only supporting Roberto) and stated that 'The South Africans have 
expressed interest in providing financial assistance [the rest of the document remains classified], .298 The 
original report prepared for Kissinger by the Davis task force, submitted on 13 June, asserted that 'Pretoria 
is concerned that a communist or otherwise unfriendly regime in Luanda might support guerrilla activity in 
Namibia and foster serious problems along that border. However, South Mrica does not seem to be 
planning action to counter this threat and, in fact, gives little indication that it sees any need to formulate an 
Angolan policy at all' ?99 However, by 16 July Davis reported to Kissinger that 'South Africa is reported to 
be giving Roberto some support' .300 
According to the American writer James Roherty (who reconstructed the events leading up to the Angolan 
invasion from interviews with key South African participants), 'the rush of the East bloc to fill the Angolan 
vacuum' by June 1975 led Vorster to sound out the Ford administration 'as to a collaborative response'. 
Roherty claims this was 'an auspicious moment from the South African standpoint - the beginnings of a 
joint undertaking with the United States' .301 However, he does not reveal his source for this information?02 
Gleijeses has claimed that even if Vorster did not consult the Americans, 'it is difficult to believe that the 
CIA did not approach the South Africans' as relations between BOSS and the CIA were notoriously 
close.303 
During the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Mrican Affairs, it was officially acknowledged 
that South Africa and the United States did regularly exchange intelligence data.304 In sharp contrast to 
stated American policy, the CIA and the National Security Agency had been collaborating with Pretoria's 
intelligence service since the 1960s and continued to do so in regard to Angola.305 According to Stockwell, 
BOSS maintained close contact with the CIA: 'On two occasions the BOSS director [General van den 
298 Quoted in Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 284. 
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Bergh] visited Washington and held secret meetings with Jim Potts306 ••. The COS [chief of station], 
Pretoria, was ordered to brief BOSS about IAFEATURE, and nearly all CIA intelligence reports on the 
subject were relayed to Pretoria so his briefings would be accurate and up to date' .307 Stockwell also wrote 
that in October 1975, the chief of the CIA station in Kinshasa, was granted permission to meet BOSS 
representatives on a regular basis in Kinshasa and other CIA officers 'clamoured for permission' to visit 
South African bascs in Namibia.30s P.W. Botha has stated that the BOSS-CIA link was 'not the only 
channel' used for coordination.309 Spies' official history claims that 'at the beginning, there were no direct 
contacts between the two governments at the usual Foreign Ministry and ambassadorial levels' .310 Indeed it 
appears that Kissinger only saw Pik Botha, the South African ambassador once during the crisis.3I1 
However, it has been claimed that, between July and December 1975, Brand Fourie, the South Africa 
Secretary for Foreign Mfairs, made more than twenty clandestine visits to Zambia to liase with Kaunda and 
Jean Wilkowski, the American ambassador to Lusaka.3!2 
Stockwell categorically stated: 'We entered into joint activities with South Africa,.313 With regards to CIA 
operatives on the ground in Angola, Stockwell claimed that CIA paramilitary officers were training UNITA 
troops in Silva Porto and the FNLA in Ambriz.314 According to Du Preez when the South Mrican military 
instructors arrived to train UNIT A troops near Silva Porto, the CIA was already training recruits there' And 
in the following weeks the South Africans and Americans worked side by side - each under his own cover' . 
At their training camp the radio-transmitters of UNIT A, the SADF and the CIA were located in three 
adjoining rooms.315 Stockwell claimed: 'Especially in the field,CIA officers liked the South Africans, who 
tended to be bluff, aggressive men without guile. They admired South African efficiency' ?16 The journalist 
Fred Bridgland described an encounter at Silva Porto with the CIA's liaison officer with Savimbi who was, 
at the time, accompanied by Commandant 'Kaas' van der Waals, the SADF liaison officer in charge of 
instructors training Savimbi's troops.317 When Roberto launched his ill-fated attack on Luanda on the eve 
306 Potts was the head of the CIA's Mrica Division and chaired the interagency task group that oversaw 
IAFeature. 
307 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 187. 
308 Ibid, p. 187. 
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of independence he was accompanied by twenty-six South Africans operating heavy guns.318 From a ridge, 
CIA and South African advisors together watched Roberto's advance across the Quifangondo valley.319 
Stockwell claimed that 'To the CIA, the South Africans were the ideal solution for central Angola' ?20 
According to the BOSS defector Gordon Winter, the CIA used South Africa as its main base for ferrying 
arms and ammunition to UNlTA and the South African Air Force airlifted these supplies to UNITA via 
Namibia. He claimed the airlift was organised by William Rourke 'Big Bill' Jordan, head of the CIA's 
special operations in South Africa, and a personal friend of General van den Bergh.321 However, Winter is 
far from a reliable source.322 According to Stockwell, the CIA wanted to ship arms directly to South Africa 
and/or Namibia, which would then be transported into Angola. However, the sale or delivery of arms to 
South Africa by the United States was prohibited and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, Edward Mulcahy, threatened to resign. After that the CIA stopped trying to expand their 
cooperation with South Africa 'at the policy level', but CIA case officers continued to coordinate with the 
South Africans in Angola, Pretoria and Kinshasa.323 Stockwell wrote that during November and December 
'[e]very CIA station involved in the conflict urged official cooperation with the South Africans and devised 
joint operations which would tempt headquarters into escalating CIA involvement with them. The Kinshasa 
station, especially, promoted joint South African activities, and its officers flew to South Africa to discuss 
the possibilities. The Kinshasa station urgently recommended that a US Air Force C-141 be provided to fly 
six additional twenty-five-pounder cannon with crews from South Africa to Kinshasa for use in northern 
Angola, stating that it was "very much in favour of retaining to the fullest extent possible South African 
involvement'''. Although the request was turned down, 'Undaunted, Kinshasa relayed urgent South African 
requests for fuel, for more sophisticated weapons, air support and trucks' .324 
The South Africans and Americans cooperated in the distribution of American military aid that arrived 
through Zaire. Stockwell described how on 20 October, two South African C-130 airplanes arrived in Zaire 
to meet a CIA flight. CIA officers and BOSS representatives met the planes and, under the cover of 
darkness, jointly supervised the transloading. The South Africans then flew the shipment of arms down to 
Silva Porto.325 General Viljoen has corroborated this: 'Contact with the CIA was always through BOSS. 
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Our Defence Force was never directly involved with the CIA, except in cases when I was personally 
present, when American C-5A and C-141 aircraft were unloaded at the Kinshasa airbase at night. We 
usually had our own C-130 aircraft there. After the big aircraft discharged their cargo we delivered the 
weapons to bases in Angola.'326 In a similar vein, Botha told the South African Parliament in 1978: 'We are 
being condemned because we were in Angola on a limited scale, but there was a time when American 
aircraft offloaded arms at military bases and positions in Angola which were held by South African troops. 
I was there myself and I saw those arms being offloaded.'327 
Although exactly how it developed remains murky, it is clear that there was a certain level of collaboration 
between South Africa and the United States, which included joint training operations and cooperative 
airlifts. Furthermore, both countries launched their covert operations at roughly the same time; in August 
1975 stepped-up American assistance to the FNLA began arriving through Zaire and Pretoria ordered 
elements of the SADF into Angola. Stockwell claimed: 'I saw no evidence that the United States formally 
encouraged them [the South Africans] to join the conflict' .328 However, he also wrote that the South 
Africans 'came into the conflict cautiously at first, watching the expanding U.S. program and timing their 
steps to the CIA's,329 and that 'without any memos being written at CIA headquarters saying "Let's 
coordinate with the South Africans", coordination was effected at all CIA levels and the South Africans 
escalated their involvement in step with our own' . He commented that 'Escalation was a game the CIA and 
South Africa played very well together' .330 Chester Crocker, who became Ronald Reagan's Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs and had access to the classified record, wrote that through the late spring of 
1975 'an intense debate over Angolan developments had been underway within the South African 
government. Pretoria was in close contact with all the Western and African players, and was actively 
courted by FNLA and UNITA leaders as well as certain African governments to throw its weight into the 
balance ... Pretoria began providing clandestine aid to the FNLA and UNIT A. Zairean army units had 
started to deploy across the border into northern Angola in support of the FNLA. Washington, of course, 
was well aware of these moves: our winks and nods formed part of the calculus of Angola's neighbours'. 
Furthermore, Crocker claimed that: 'The United States and other Western governments had done nothing to 
discourage Pretoria's mid-October intervention' .331 
It is impossible to say whether South Africa ever got a secret nod from the United States; but South 
Africa's leaders insisted they had got the message correctly. Vorster expected, if not direct military 
involvement by Washington, then at least strong support for South Africa's own intervention. Vorster and 
his advisers critically misjudged the mood of America. Fallout from the Watergate scandal still hung heavy 
326 Hamann, Days of the Generals, p. 24. 
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in the air and neither the American public nor Congress, chastened and disillusioned by a lost war in 
Vietnam, would tolerate direct intervention in another obscure, distant conflict.332 Furthermore, 1975 was 
to be the 'Year of Intelligence' during which the Senate Intelligence (Church) Committee and the 
corresponding House (pike) Committee put the American community under unprecedented 
scrutiny. By July 1975, the Church Committee was likening the CIA to a rogue elephant on the rampage.333 
The role of other Western governments in the Angolan conflict is harder to pinpoint than that of the United 
States. On 28 November, TIle Star quoted an anonymous source in Pretoria as saying that South Africa was 
'in good company because we find ourselves in the company of the big free nations of the world', which 
the newspaper interpreted as France, Britain, the US and possibly Belgium.334 Moss claimed: 'Agents from 
most Western Powers bobbed up in Silva Porto throughout the [South African] campaign', and 'Before the 
end of the conflict, most Western nations - America, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Spain and Israel 
- had contributed their might to the anti-Soviet forces in Angola'. But he gave few details of what this 
contribution entailed.335 It does appear, however, that both France and Britain covertly assisted UNITA and 
the FNLA to a limited degree. Crocker asserted that by July 1975, the British and French governments had 
begun 'their own clandestine assistance programs' ?36 
Moss alleged that: 'British Intelligence and private interests especially Tanganyika Concessions and 
Lonrho, which loaned UNITA its pilots - remained in close liaison with UNITA and arranged delivery of 
smaller items such as radio equipment. UNITA leaders frequently came to London for medical treatment 
and to lobby British MPs,.337 However, Botha's official biography claimed that Edward Heath, the leader 
of the British Conservative Party, 'fairly apologetically tried to explain to Carel de Wet, South Africa's 
ambassador, on 19 February 1976, when South Africa was almost out of Angola, that British interests in 
Africa (i.e. Nigeria's oil) made it impossible for him to get involved in Angola,.338 Two separate sources 
documented assistance given to UNITA by the British multinational, Lonrho. When Stockwell flew from 
Lusaka to meet Savimbi in Silva Porto in August 1975, he did so aboard a small Lear jet with a British 
crew on loan from Lonrho. Stockwell remarked that Lonrho was betting on Savimbi winning the war, and 
hoped he'd reward them with preferential access to Angola's minerals?39 Similarly, Fred Bridgland 
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described travelling on the Hawker-Siddeley 125 executive jet which, together with British pilots, had been 
put at Savimbi's disposal by Lonrho?40 
During the war Vorster told Sir De Villiers Graaff, the leader of the Opposition in South Africa, that South 
Africa had the support of the French government.341 On 24 December, the Washington Post reported that 
the French Service de Documentation Exterieure et Contre-Espionage (SDECE) was channelling money 
and anTIS to the FNLA, in cooperation with the CIA and with the approval of Prcsident Giscard 
d'Estaing?42 In his memoirs Kissinger described a meeting with d'Estaing in Paris on 16 December 1975, 
at which the French President agreed to provide auxiliary (French African or Moroccan) troops, Alouette 
helicopters and Mirage fighters, and to help the United States gain diplomatic support for the FNLA and 
UNITA from French-speaking countries.343 Stockwell claimed that 'The Pretoria and Paris stations were 
euphoric, having greater access to BOSS and SDECE representatives than ever in agency history, but the 
intelligence exchange was entirely one-sided. The South Africans and French accepted voluminous 
intelligence reports and detailed briefings from those CIA stations but never reciprocated with much 
information about what they were doing in Angola' .344 However, he does state that the French cooperated 
in supplying arms for UNIT A and the FNLA and in recruiting mercenaries to assist them. The French 
contributed four Allouette missile-firing helicopters, which the Americans delivered to Kinshasa in early 
January 1976. The OA intended to deliver them directly to the South Africans (despite America's policy 
against military collaboration), but South Africa withdrew from Angola before pilots could be found.345 
Moss referred to two ships used to transport Cuban troops and arms into Angola from Congo being blown 
up 'by Portuguese agents in contact with the French intelligence service' .346 Furthermore, he claimed that 
when the South Africans eventually withdrew their instructors from Silva Porto, French mercenaries 
working for SDECE took over. Moss concluded that in Angola 'in many ways, the French were more 
adventurous than any other Western power' ?47 
Both Spies and Du Preez also attributed a key role to the French. According to Du Preez, Vorster had 
claimed in 1980 that South African involvement in Angola 'was a military adventure but the moment the 
French and Americans ran away, had we stayed then, it would have been a full-scale war for our side' ?48 
Spies wrote that Paris helped the FNLA and UNIT A and after the SADF conquered Lobito on 7 November, 
the American and French governments pressed the South Mricans to keep going: 'Both asked South Africa 
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to "chalk up a success against Luanda'" .349 Botha's official biography described French anns shipments: 
'France was not prepared to openly involved and French aid remained small. At the start of November 
nine cargo airplanes of French weapons were offloaded in Kinshasa. At the end of November four gunship 
helicopters with equipment anived without crew. When they decided to supply anti-tank missiles they were 
handed to the CIA at Istres in France to ensure that they could not be traced back to them' .350 A later 
official biography of Botha attributed a key role to the French in encouraging South African intervention: 
'With the knowledge and support of certain Western countries, like the USA and France, the South African 
government soon approved its military involvement in Angola as SUppOlt for Dr Savimbi' ?51 
R.W. Johnson was the first independent writer to speculate at any length about France's role in Angola. He 
proposed that France's continued supply of armaments to South Africa, despite international opposition, 
was such a diplomatic risk that it must have had 'a considerable pay-back'. He stressed that at the time 
France was trying to diversify the sources of its oil and reduce its dependence on the Arab-bloc. The French 
were well-established in Zaire and had strong links with Mobutu. Johnson claimed that French policy-
makers saw in the Angolan civil war a chance to extend their influence into the neighbouring oil-rich 
enclave of Cabinda. Therefore, France promoted the civil war in Angola in order to be able to promote 
Cabindan separatism through the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC).352 Despite 
having no firm evidence, Johnson claimed that the elements of a deal between Pretoria and Paris 'stare one 
rudely in the face' and that for French arms 'Pretoria might well have been willing to pay in blood,.353 
Although Johnson's account read somewhat like a conspiracy theory it may contain an element of truth. 
France was indeed South Africa's main supplier of arms and had played a key intermediary role in detente 
with some of the Francophone states. On 8 November 1975 Zairean troops and FLEC, assisted by French 
mercenaries, launched an attack against the MPLA and Cuban forces in Cabinda?54 According to 
Stockwell, these mercenaries may have been hired by the French intelligence service (SDECE).355 Two 
months previous, Neto had told Le Monde, 'It appears that it is France's destiny to help the reactionary 
forces in Africa: 356 
In June 1976, amidst a media frenzy, three American and ten British mercenaries were tried before the 
People's Revolutionary Tribunal in Luanda for 'war crimes against the Angola people,.357 Four were 
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executed by firing squad on 10 July 1976. The remaining nine were given prison sentences of up to 30 
years (though all were released within eight)?59 The Cubans and Soviets made much propaganda of the 
trial during which it was claimed that American and British intelligence services had played a role in 
recruiting the mercenaries.360 
On 29 January 1976, Kissinger told the Senate Hearings on Angola that the CIA was not involved in the 
recruitment of mercenaries for Angola. However, he conceded that in an indirect way, money given to 
UNITA might have then been used by UNITA to recruit mercenaries.361 In his memoirs Kissinger glossed 
over the issue of the mercenaries362, but Stockwell gave a more detailed account of the CIA's hiring of 
'foreign military advisers' ?63 According to Stockwell, the CIA made contact with Bob Denard, a veteran 
mercenary of the Congo and later of Benin and Grand Comoro, through the French intelligence service. For 
$500,000 Denard agreed to provide twenty French mercenaries to 'advise' UNITA.364 Denard has 
confirmed that the CIA gave him money to raise mercenaries for UNITA and by January 1976 he had just 
over twenty in Angola?65 Stockwell claimed that the CIA also recruited Portuguese mercenaries for the 
FNLA, but they only arrived in Kinshasa once the fighting in the north of Angola was virtually over.366 
Several American press reports at the time claimed that hundreds of Americans were fighting in Angola. In 
January 1976 The Christian Science Monitor reported that the CIA had shipped 300 mercenaries to South 
Africa and was awaiting funds to send a second group, including men on 'indefinite leave' from the Green 
Berets?67 In fact only six American citizens made it to Angola as mercenaries.368 George Bacon ill was 
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killed in action369 and three Americans, Gary Acker, Daniel Francis Gearhart and Gustave Grillo, were 
amongst those tried in Luanda. Gearhart was executed.370 
It was, in fact, Britain that became the main recruiting centre for mercenaries for Angola (through a 
company called Security Advisory Service run by John Banks, a former British paratrooper).371 Stockwell 
claimed that the CIA was not involved in the recruitment of these mercenaries?72 In the latter half of 
January 1976, about 140 mercenaries left England for Angola via Zaire. Another 60 followed in early 
February. Scotland Yard drew up a list of over 200 British mercenaries fighting for the FNLA.373 By the 
time the British mercenaries arrived in northern Angola the FNLA was crumbling and their escapades 
ended as a bloody farce. Their commander Costas Georgiou, a former British paratrooper known by the 
nom de guerre Colonel Tony Callan, executed fourteen British mercenaries serving under him. Callan 
himself was later tried and executed by the MPLA. When the MPLA began a major offensive against the 
FNLA's positions in the north, the remaining British mercenaries retreated to Zaire.374 
During an Old Bailey trial in March 1977, John Banks alleged that the British Secret Service (which he 
claimed to have worked for) had been closely involved in sending Callan and other British mercenaries to 
Angola. He claimed they were tasked to recover a stash of diamonds which had been looted from a large 
mine in Angola. In reporting this Winter claimed that, under torture by the MPLA, Callan had confessed 
the location of the diamonds, which were then delivered to Moscow. Winter alleged that British 
intelligence had been in league with BOSS in the recruitment of the British mercenaries. He claimed that 
'an inspector of the British Special Branch named Tucker' had helped Banks gets his mercenaries through 
British immigration control, and that Banks had been accompanied to Angola by a senior British 
intelligence man who later died there.375 Intriguing as Winter's account may be, it must be treated with 
some caution. However, the part played by the British government is far from clear. Although the British 
foreign secretary, James Callaghan, publicly deplored the recruitment of mercenaries, many of the 
mercenaries did indeed leave Britain without passing through passport or immigration controls.376 Two of 
the British mercenaries, Chris Dempster and Dave Tomkins, later confirmed that the Immigration Office 
allowed them to travel without passports.377 A memorandum sent from the American embassy in London to 
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Kissinger, in March 1976, stated: 'Britain's direct involvement in Angola was little and unhappy. And its 
last involvement - the haphazard introduction of largely British mercenaries to rescue the FNLA- ended in 
squalid tragedy,.378 
From Pretoria's point of view the prospect of a joint, or at least tacitly joint, covert campaign with the West 
was a tempting prospect. South African leaders had long nUltured hopes that their country would be 
accepted by the Western powers as a southern ann of NATO, or at least that some sort of military alliance, 
committing the West to the defence of South Africa, would be established.379 The changing regional 
situation spurred Pretoria into a more energetic pursuit of closer ties with NATO and individual Western 
powers. Within a month of the Lisbon coup top cabinet officials were in Europe and the United States 
seeking assurances of Western support?80 However, by the 1970s, South Africa was growing increasingly 
isolated. The evolving geo-strategies of the United States no longer gave priority to control of the Cape sea 
route and, in June 1975, the new British Labour government had cancelled the Simonstown Agreement, 
leaving South Africa without any formal security links?81 A cooperative military effort with the West could 
both demonstrate South Africa's strategic value and potentially serve as a catalyst for the long-sought-after 
formal alliance. Stockwell believed that 'The South Africans hoped to gain sympathy from the West by 
supporting the same side as the Zairians, Zambians and United States in the Angolan conflict ... South 
reports, Belgium gave covert aid, including arms to the FNLA. See: The Times, 9 November 1975; 
Washington Post, 6 January 1976. 
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Africa entered the war, watching the United States program closely and hoping for an overt nod of 
recognition and camaraderie' .382 He judged that 'the South Africans were attempting to draw closer to the 
United States, in preparation for future confrontations with the blacks in southern Africa,.383 
382 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, pp. 186-187. 











WHAT WERE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA? 
INTERNATIONAL RECRIMINATIONS AND DIPLOMA TIC RAMIFICATIONS 
'Rightly or wrongly, Operation Savannah led to South Africa being 
branded an out-and-out aggressor in the Hitlerian mould' .1 
Although MPLA spokesmen had been condemning South Africa's intervention since August 1975, 
throughout September and October, few western journalists gave much consideration to South African 
activities in Angola? Occasional references were made to 'white mercenaries', but these were usually 
assumed to be Portuguese. To a certain extent the international escalation of the war shielded South Africa, 
as the western media tended to accept the East-West context in which the United States had set the 
conflict? While most foreign journalists concentrated on the Cold War implications of Angola, only a 
vigilant few examined the South African presence.4 Furthennore, although the number of foreign 
correspondents in Luanda steadily increased as independence approached, communications between the 
capital and the south had virtually broken down and it was difficult to substantiate rumours of direct South 
African involvement.5 In general, the international media continued to downplay the MPLA's accusations, 
including Neto's, on 19 October, of the existence of the South African-led column moving northwards 
toward Luanda.6 
However, Neto's announcement was followed by the first indication of the diplomatic fall-out from 
Pretoria's involvement in Angola. On 27 October, the Chinese instructors who had been training the FNLA 
I Steenkamp, Borderstrike!, p. 19. 
2 Sanders, South Africa and the International Media, p. 140. The first news of the 'invasion' was given by 
an MPLA spokesman and reported in Le Monde, 25 October 1975. Two days later West Africa carried an 
MPLA statement that South African military aircraft were arriving at Nova Lisboa with anTIS for UNIT A. 
On 31 October, the Financial Times, quoting Portuguese sources, claimed the invading force contained 
three hundred white men, some of whom were 'English-speaking South Africans'. Portuguese military 
intelligence, as quoted in the The Observer on 2 November, claimed English-speaking officers, thought to 
be South Africans, were leading the column but put the date on which they crossed the border at 23 
October. 
3 E. Windrich, The Cold War Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi and the Angolan War (Greenwood Press, New 
York, 1992), p. 1. The New York Times first revealed the existence of an American covert operation in 
Angola on 25 September 1975. However, the first criticism of U.S. policy did not appear in the American 
press until the New York Times of 3 November. 
4 This could prove dangerous. During a visit to interview three Cuban prisoners held by UNITA in Silva 
Porto, journalists reported that 'Two white men who had not been seen before emerged with the 
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Journalists Held in UNIT A Prison', The Times, 8 January 1976. It was later reported that 'Two French 
journalists are in jail for asking embarrassing questions about the South Africans': Evening Standard, 16 
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5 Interview with Wilf Nussey, Argus Africa News Service Editor. For a description of the situation in 











left Zaire.7 The Guardian reported that, according to officials in Beijing, 'South Africa's presence, openly 
admitted by Pretoria, at least in the border areas, was the main factor that led the Chinese recently to reduce 
their involvement. They were embarrassed at finding themselves on the same side as South Africa,.8 The 
Soviets were not slow to call Beijing's revolutionary credentials into question9 and as a result China 
withdrew its support from the FNLA and loudly proclaimed a position of neutrality regarding Angola. 
In the weeks leading up to independence, as the South African Zulu column advanced up the coast toward 
Luanda, the composition of the column began to be more closely scrutinized. Eventually two westem 
journalists, Fred Bridgland of Reuters and Michael Nicholson of British Independent Television News, 
filed eyewitness accounts of the presence of South African troops in Angola. lO Tasked with reporting the 
UNITA side of the conflict, Bridgland had fIrst visited Angola in September 1975 and interviewed 
Savimbi.l1 Following reports of the military successes of the FNLA-UNITA forces, he returned to Angola 
to try and discover what had turned the tide in their favour. On 1 November 1975, he encountered fIve 
young white men transporting armoured cars at Silva Porto. They spoke with strong South African accents 
but claimed to be English mercenaries.12 A week later Bridgland encountered another South African (who 
he later discovered was Commandant Kaas van der Waals, the SADF liaison officer in charge of training 
UNITA troops).o Speaking with Nicholson on a flight to Lusaka on 9 November, Bridgland discovered 
that Nicholson shared his suspicion of a South African presence in Angola. 14 
Eager to show the world what it was accomplishing, UNITA flew a group of journalists into Lobito on 10 
November. Bridgland and Nicholson, who were part of the group, befriended the British pilots of 
Savimbi's private jet who urged them to stay onboard whilst they flew to a refuelling site. The refuelling 
stop was at Rundu, a South African military base just across the border in Namibia. There the journalists 
saw Panhard armoured cars being loaded onto transport planes, and so discovered what Bridgland 
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described as 'the pot of gold at the end of Jonas Savimbi's rainbow' .15 When they returned to Angola later 
that day, they spotted a group of young fair-haired white men at Benguela airport. Returning from their 
visit to the nearby town of Lobito, Nicholson's cameraman surreptitiously filmed a Panhard armoured car 
with its white crew guarding the approach road to Benguela airport. 16 At a press conference in Lobito on 13 
November they challenged Savimbi over whether South African troops were the secret of UNITA's recent 
successes. Savimbi's reply was ambiguous: 'There are no South African troops committed by the South 
African government here ... I agree that we have some white troops not soldiers, but technicians 
working for us here, doing things that we don't know how to do. I need people to fight with armoured cars 
that we cannot operate ourselves.' Savimbi then drew a comparison: 'If you are a drowning man in a 
crocodile-filled river and you've just gone under for the third time, you don't question who is pulling you 
to the bank until you're safely on it.' 17 
Bridgland and Nicholson filed their reports simultaneously on 14 November, in keeping with their 
agreement to release their scoop at the same time. Bridgland's report for Reuters, 'Angola-South Africans' , 
was released the following day. 18 Nicholson gave an eyewitness description of the South African troops and 
showed photographs of their armoured cars travelling through southern Angola. The Guardian quoted 
Nicholson saying that South African regular troops were spearheading the advance on Luanda, but the 
paper failed to stress the importance of his information and continued to describe the invaders as a 
'mercenary-supported FNLA-UNIT A column' .19 Although both journalists had achieved the expose of the 
Angolan war, the immediate impact was not that great. Nicholson's snatched film was not particularly 
convincing as it only showed 11 seconds of white faces?O The original story Bridgland had filed was that 
South African regular troops, not mercenaries, were leading the advance on Luanda. However, Reuters, 
erring on the side of caution, refused to state categorically that South Africa had invaded Angola. Instead 
the published report referred to 'white soldiers' .21 On 16 November The Observer published an article by 
Tony Hodges, who had been in Benguela with Bridgland and Nicholson. The article was titled, 'South 
African Troops Join Angola Civil War'. Hodges described how in Benguela he had seen 'fifty uniformed 
South African troops', and 'sandy-haired South African soldiers ... aged between 18 and 20, too young to be 
mercenaries'. However, his report was not put on the front page and The Observer did not follow up its 
claims. Eventually, on 21 November, Reuters ran a more assertive report stating that South African regular 
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reports, editorials in most opposition newspapers demanded that the government tell the nation what was 
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troops were fighting hundreds of miles inside Angola.22 Bridgland claimed that his reworked story had 
made the front page of the Washington Post and, none too modestly, that it changed the course of the war.23 
In fact, the Washington Post placed it on page lS?4 
In the western media the broader Cold War context of the Angolan story overshadowed the fact that South 
Africa had entered the war. The majority of British and American correspondents and commentators 
accepted the version of events that blamed the South African incursion on Soviet-Cuban escalation. The 
American press not only underrepOlted the fact of the South Mrican intervention, but when it did so, it 
failed to do so in the same negative and emotional terms with which it reported the Cuban involvement.25 
Their portrayal of the conflict was often simplistic, painted in terms of 'Communism' vs. 'Anti-
Communism'. Coverage did become more moderate, however, as knowledge of the CIA's involvement 
gradually emerged.26 Attempts to understand the motivation behind the South African incursion were 
mainly confined to the British media, although these interpretations were normally influenced by the belief 
that the South African action was reactive rather than proactive.27 In a study of the representation of South 
Africa in the international media, James Saunders claimed that: 'The coverage of the Angolan war 
represents one of the lowest points in British journalism's treatment of Mrican news. Only the Financial 
Times sustained a consistent level of balance in its coverage and ... even this was problematic' .28 British 
newspapers failed to adjust their position following the news of the South African invasion. This facilitated 
a shift to the right by the Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph and their support for South Mrica, 
disguised as attacks on the weakness of the West in response to the advance of communism. 
Following the first overseas press allegations of South African inteniention in mid-November, Pretoria 
continued to deny that it had troops in Angola. In London on 18 November 1975, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Hilgard Muller, categorically stated: 'South African forces are not operating in this war.' In the 
face of aggressive questioning, he did concede that there were 'small numbers' of South African troops 
guarding the Cunene water project but denied that South Africa was supplying arms or money to UNITA.29 
However, Pretoria's pretence was beginning to crumble. Stockwell described Bridgland's unabridged 
article published in the Washington Post and claimed that: 'The propaganda and political war was lost in 
that stroke. There was nothing the Lusaka [CIA] station could invent that would be as damaging to the 
other side as our alliance with the hated South Africans was to our cause' .30 The South African government 
22 Bridgland, 'Angola-Forces', Reuters, 21 November 1975. 
23 Bridgland, The War for Africa, p. 11; Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, p. 142. 
24 Bridgland, 'So African Regulars Fight Inside Angola', Washington Post, 23 November 1975. 
25 Sanders, South Africa and the International Media, p. 144. 
26 Ibid, p. 146. 
27 Ibid, p. 150. 
28 Ibid, p. 149. 
29 Rand Daily Mail, 19 November 1975. 
30 Stockwell incorrectly referred to Bridgland as Bridgefield: Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 202. The 











launched a damage limitation exercise and Botha and top SADF officials briefed the international media in 
Pretoria on 27 November. In what was the first official admission of South Africa's involvement in the war, 
Botha stated that the South African Defence Force was providing 'advice and logistic support' for the 
UNlTA-FNLA alliance. He denied that South Africa was taking part in the war in an active capacity.31 At 
the same time the United States' Senate was debating American involvement in Angola and Botha made a 
thinly-veiled appeal to the West. He told the assembled foreign journalists: 'I would like to see the Free 
World take a more direct interest in getting Russia out of Southern Africa. It is an absolutely arrogant 
attempt on the part of Russia to establish itself by sheer force in Southern Africa. And secondly it is a threat 
to the Cape sea route, which not only endangers South Africa's position, but endangers world trade and the 
oil link between the Persian Gulf and major countries.' He continued: 'If we have to fight, we will fight on 
our borders to the last man, but South Africa is not fighting the Free World's cause to the last South 
African.'32 
The fact that South Africa's initial intervention in southern Angola in August had aroused little overseas 
interest had given Pretoria a false sense of confidence, and left it unprepared for the diplomatic furore that 
arose once the nature of the South African element in the 'mercenary column' had been reliably 
confirrned?3 It was in Africa itself that South Africa's intervention was found most objectionable; UNIT A 
and the FNLA had committed the unpardonable sin of joining forces with apartheid South Africa. Prior to 
Angolan independence President Samora Machel of Mozambique, along with the leaders of Guinea-Bissau, 
the Cape Verde Islands and Sao Tome, had joined Neto in condemning 'the imperialist aggression' of 
South Africa and called for recognition of the government the MPLA was preparing.34 However, the OAU 
refused to recognise either of the two proclaimed Angolan governments. Instead it called for a cease-fire 
and a coalition government until free elections could be held. As South Africa's intervention became 
evident, however, African attitudes shifted and the OAU's policy came under increasing pressure.35 There 
was a backlash against UNlTA and the FNLA even from pro-Western and conservative African states. Not 
a single country had recognised the FNLA-UNITA coalition, which was now subjected to tirades like the 
one published in the influential West Africa: 'With increasing world condemnation of foreign intervention, 
the desperate gamble of Holden and Savimbi to snatch victory from defeat by making a devil's bargain 
with Pretoria has now rebounded against them. By taking aid from South Africa, UNlTA and its ally have 
and South Africa have climbed into the same bed' (Pittsburgh Courier, 27 December 1975). The seventeen 
members of the Congressional Black Caucus al so became very vocal, after months of silence. 
31 The South African press were permitted to report sections of the briefing a day later: The Star, 28 
November 1975. However, the local corps of defence correspondents was not briefed until 1 December 
1975: Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, pp. 186-188. 
32 The Star, 28 November 1975. 
33 Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola', p. 379. 
34 Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 442 fn.242. 











broken the unwritten rules of Pan-Africanism, and the conjuring of the Russian bogey will not avail them 
much, in Africa at least' .36 
One of the first nations to react was Nigeria. It was an unfortunate coincidence for Pretoria that on the same 
day that Bridgland's story appeared in the Washington Post, Nigeria denounced Soviet intervention on the 
side of the MPLA and reiterated its support for a government of national unity in Angola.37 On 27 
November, outraged and embarrassed, Nigeria announced its recognition of the People's Republic of 
Angola.38 Nigeria cited South Africa's intervention in the war as the reason for its turnabout: 'CulTent 
events in Angola must be seen in the right perspective - not just as fighting between factions in Angola but 
fighting between racialist South Africa and its backers and the MPLA' .39 In a statement explaining his 
country's change of heart, Colonel Garba, Nigeria's external affairs commissioner, said his government 
would have prefelTed a government of national unity in Angola, but 'the principal aim of Africa .. .is to 
liberate Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. And any government that is installed in Angola that does 
not go towards helping to fulfil these ends will not really be a government that has the best interests of 
Africa at heart' .40 The Nigerian press condemned what it considered to be an American-South African plot 
to destroy a 'sister African country,41 and demonstrators stoned the American embassy in Lagos.42 The 
Nigerian government promptly made a financial contribution of $20 million to the MPLA.43 Overnight 
Nigeria became an untiring champion of Neto's movement and sent envoys to neighbouring states to lobby 
on behalf of the MPLA. As the economic leader of black Africa and the United States' second most 
important source of foreign oil, Nigeria's recognition' carried considerable weight in Africa and overseas. 
Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA government was quickly followed by that of another Mrican heavy-
weight, Tanzania, on 5 December.44 Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere declared that: 'South Africa wants 
a client state in Angola ... so as to strengthen its hold on Namibia ... and weaken Mrica's united opposition 
to its internal policies of racialism and exploitation.,45 Tanzania soon announced plans to train MPLA 
troops in Tanzania in a joint programme with the Soviets.46 Further recognition followed from Ghana, 
Sudan and several other African states.47 Idi Amin reversed his decision to expel the Soviets from Uganda, 
and when the Soviets publicly defended their Angolan programme in late December, Amin supported 
36 West Africa, 1 December 1975. 
37 Legum & Hodges, After Angola, p. 29; Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 202. 
38 New York Times, 28 November 1975. 
39 Nigerian statement quoted in The Guardian, 19 December 1975. 
40 Quoted in Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, p. 276. 
41 New York Times, 4 January 1976. 
42 Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, p. 142. 
43 L. Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict (Cornell University Press, New York, 1979), p. 256. 
There were reports that Nigerian troops had been sent to assist the MPLA but these were untrue. 
44 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, p. 276. 
45 The Guardian, 13 January 1976. 
46 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 202. 











them.48 John Marcum testified before the United States Congress that published reports of the South 
African intervention had certainly changed the policy of Nigeria, Ghana and other states towards support of 
the MPLA.49 The shifting sands of African opinion influenced the thinking of the Western European 
powers. At a NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Brussels in December 1975, James Callaghan, 'was 
plainly anxious to avoid any suggestion that any NATO member become involved in support for 
UNlTAlFNLA'. The British position, which was supported by Canada, Norway and the Netherlands, was 
that 'neither Britain nor NATO can afford to be seen by Africans to be making common cause with lVlr 
Vorster' .50 
On 16 December the MPLA displayed four captured South Africans to the press in Luanda.51 The prisoners 
admitted to reporters that they had been seized north of Cela, 500 miles inside Angola.52 Although Botha 
claimed that the four had gone missing whilst carrying out 'logistical duties' his reiterated claim that South 
African involvement was limited to protection of the Namibian border and the Cunene hydroelectric 
scheme was clearly a sham.53 Three days later the United States! Senate prohibited further American aid to 
UNIT A or the FNLA and within a week Kissinger was calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, 
including South Africa.54 On 9 January The Guardian quoted Senator Dick Clark as saying that 'for us to 
stay with South Africa will be a disaster'. Jonathan Steele, the paper's Washington correspondent, reported 
an awareness of 'the damage which the link with South Africa is seen to be having on black Africa' and 
claimed that this view 'is at least as widely held on Capitol Hill as the more commonly publicised theme 
that the secret American commitment in Angola could become another Vietnam'. On 29 January 1976, at 
the opening of the Senate hearings into the American involvement in Angola, Senator Clark stressed: 'We 
must also examine what this commitment [to the FNLA and UNIT A] is costing us in terms of our relations 
with the rest of Africa. Our identification with South Africa's intervention in Angola will not help our 
relations with the black African states, which regard racial domination in South Africa as the most pressing 
problem on their continent. South Africa's intervention in the Angola conflict is regarded as an effort to 
assure that the government which comes to power does not challenge South Africa's illegal occupation of 
48 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 202. Amin stated: 'The main reason for Cuban and Soviet 
involvement was to help the Popular Movement [MPLA] drive South African forces out of Angola': 
Washington Post, 28 December 1975. 
49 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Hearings, p. 
130. 
50 The Guardian, 13 December 1975. 
51 Financial Times, 17 December 1975; Le Monde, 18 December 1975; Washington Post, 18 December 
1975. The four were: Sergeant Johannes Terblanche, Private Robert Wiehahn, Rifleman Robert Wilson and 
Private Graham Danney. 
52 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, p. 289. They had been captured on 13 December near 
Catofe: Du Preez, Avontuur in Ango/a, p. 170; Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, p. 214. 
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Namibia or its internal apartheid practices. The United States cannot afford to be associated with this effort 
to preserve minority rule in South Africa.'55 
The end of American involvement in Angola was a heavy blow to Pretoria. A decision to withdraw was 
taken by Vorster and Botha in either late December of early January. Any idea of trying to displace the 
f>1PLA and Cubans from Luanda was now abandoned.56 Botha signalled a shift in government thinking at 
the end of December when he made a statement to the effect that 'South Africa would almost certainly 
reconsider its involvement in Angola if its interests in southern Angola were guaranteed and if terrorists' 
attacks into South West Africa were halted' .57 In mid-1976, Botha explained that, 'When it became clear to 
us that we would be left in the lurch, we decided that we would not fight to the last South African on behalf 
of the free world, if they themselves were not prepared to fight.'58 A year later he claimed: 'In Angola, 
South Africa was prepared to take the chestnuts out of the fire on behalf of the West, but was let down at 
the most critical moment.'59 
However, South Africa did not withdraw from Angola immediately following the cut-off of American 
funds. Moss claimed that 'moderate black states' and 'senior American officials' pleaded with the South 
Africans to remain in Angola until the long-delayed OAU emergency summit on the Angolan crisis.6o 
Initially scheduled to open on 9 December 1975, the summit eventually took place between 10-13 January 
1976. The attending heads of state were tom between their discomfort with the Soviet and Cuban incursion 
and their loathing of South Africa. In the end the summit was deadlocked over rival proposals for the 
solution of the war.61 Twenty-two countries led by Nigeria's leader General Murtala Muhammed and 
Mozambique's Samora Machel, advocated recognition of the f>1PLA's People's Republic of Angola. The 
other twenty-two supported a resolution, sponsored by Senegal's President Senghor and supported by 
Kaunda and Mobutu, which condemned all foreign intervention and called for a ceasefire and then 
negotiations to form a tripartite 'government of national reconciliation' .62 The advocates of reconciliation 
insisted on including the phrase 'and other forces' in any condemnation of South African intervention, 
whilst the opposing camp refused to place the South African invasion on a par with the involvement of any 
other country. General Muhammed claimed that although the FNLA and UNITA had 'no doubt played 
55 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Hearings, p. 3. 
56 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 81. 
57 The Times, 30 December 1975. 
58 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 7 May 1976, col. 6299. 
59 Ibid, 21 April 1977. 
60 Moss, Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 1977. Brand Fourie, the South African Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs told Fred Bridgland that on 31 December 1975 Kaunda had summoned him to Zambia, and told 
him that South Africa should advance all the way to Luanda: Bridgland, 'Angola and the West', p. 136. 
61 Despite an American political offensive aimed at swaying the OAD against the f>1PLA: Stockwell, In 
Search of Enemies, p. 193. 
62 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Hearings, p. 
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their part in the liberation struggle' they had 'forfeited their right to the leadership of the Angolan people 
by joining hands with neo-colonialists, adventurers and racist soldiers of fortune, including the apostles of 
Apartheid, in a determined effort to destroy the sovereignty of Angola.'63 Hoping to sway the debate, 
MPLA representatives displayed South African prisoners of war outside the meeting hal1.64 The summit 
adjourned in deadlock for the first time.65 
Although it was not formally decreed, as Moss put it, 'The only thing that the black African leaders who 
assembled in Addis Ababa were able to agree on was a blanket condemnation of South Africa' .66 Even 
Zaire and Zambia found themselves obliged to follow a strongly anti-South African line, for fear of 
accusations of supporting apartheid.67 The deadlock was in fact a victory for the MPLA. More than thirty 
nations had already recognised the MPLA's People's Republic of Angola based in Luanda and not a single 
nation had recognised the FNLA-UNITA coalition government (the Democratic Repnblic of Angola based 
in Huambo). If the OAU had passed the Senegalese resolution, some nations would possibly have 
recognised the Huambo government.68 A few weeks after the OAU summit, Ethiopia and Uganda, which 
had abstained from the original vote, recognised the MPLA, triggering a cascade of African approvals. By 
February 10 the MPLA had been recognised by forty-one members of the OAU, and Neto's government 
became its forty-seventh member.69 Only Zaire protested openly, calling the decision 'illegal'. Zambia did 
not extend formal recognition and stated: 'In our view, the MPLA victory is not really theirs. It is a Soviet-
Cuban Victory' .70 
It was the OAU's condemnation of South African involvement, coming on the heels of the American 
withdrawal of support, which ultimately forced a reassessment of policy in Pretoria. The evaporation of 
African and Western support made it clear that whilst certain black Mrican countries would covertly accept 
South African aid, few sincerely bought its thesis of an African brotherhood which transcended racial 
issues, and, despite the CIA's camaraderie and whatever reassurances the South Africans felt they received 
63 General Muhammed condemned American efforts to get Mrican heads of state to insist on the 
withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban advisers from Angola as a precondition for the withdrawal of South 
Africa: Speech by H.E. General Murtala Muhammed, Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, 
at the Extraordinary Summit Conference of the OAU, concerning Angola, held in Addis Ababa on 11 
January, 1976', (Southern African Record, No.5, July 1976), pp. 22-23. 
64 Another three South Africans, Private Petrus Groenewald, Private Lodewyk Kitshoff and Private Andries 
Potgieter, had been taken prisoner since the first four in mid-December. 
65 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, pp. 294, 296. 
66 Moss, Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 1977. The government claimed that the split at the OAU was 
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from the Ford administration, the United States would not overtly support South Africa. To add insult to 
injury in Pretoria, France was the first Western country to officially recognise the MPLA government, on 
17 February 1976?1 Although the OAU had failed to recognise the MPLA government neither had it settled 
on a political solution that would include UNIT A and the FNLA in any future government.72 According to 
Moss: 'This was the end of the road for the South Africans. To have stayed on in Angola would have 
requircd a new injection of men and material, with no assurance of adequate backing from any major 
power, but with the certainty that a continued South African presence would be used by the Marxist lobby 
in the OAU in the bid to get a new vote that would commit the organisation to the MPLA, and in 
accelerated efforts to isolate South Africa within international bodies like the U.N.' .73 The day after the 
OAU vote, Botha told the South African Cabinet that the SADF would be withdrawing from Angola. The 
withdrawal should begin on 17 January and be completed by 25 January.74 On 16 January two South 
African generals flew into Angola and informed Roberto, Chipenda and Savimbi that South Africa would 
be withdrawing from Angola within a week.75 By 22 January 1976, the SADF had pulled back to a narrow 
buffer zone along the Angolan/Narnibian border.76 On 3 February, Botha told the Washington Post that 
between 4,000 and 5,000 South African troops were holding the southernmost strip of Angola up to fifty 
miles deep stretching from the Atlantic to Zambia?7 
In February 1976 the South Afriean government secretly funded a propaganda campaign which emphasised 
the threat posed by the communist presence in Angola and rebuked the West, specifically the United States, 
for its failure to act.78 The title of an advertisement placed in The Times warned readers: 'The Free World 
Stands Today in Greater Danger Than At Any Time Since The Darkest Days of World War II'. South 
Africa's intervention in Angola was described as a 'role of honour' in the defence of the West against 
communism. The advertisement continued: 'In some quarters in the West it was argued that having Russia 
take over Angola would be preferable to being caught on the same side as racist South Africa. In the First 
70 L. Devraun, South African Foreign Relations with Angola, 1975-1988: A Structural Realist Perspective 
(MA Thesis, International Relations, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, 1996), p. 
78. 
71 The French broke an agreement that the Common Market would act in concert. Britain, Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and West Germany followed suit over the next two days, as did 
Sweden, Switzerland and Canada: Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 343. By that time over seventy 
nations had recognised the MPLA regime: Devraun, South African Foreign Relations with Angola, p. 78. 
72 SADF Statement, 1977. 
73 Moss, Sunday Telegraph, l3 February 1977. 
74 Hamann, Days o/the Generals, p. 43. The Cuban build up, growing rifts between the FNLA and UNlTA 
and the fact that the FNLA was a spent force in the north were additional factors influencing South Africa's 
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75 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, p. 300. 
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77 Washington Post, 4 Febrnary 1976. 
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and Second World Wars the free world heard no such arguments when South Africa (infinitely more racist 
than today) fought and died on our side' .79 A similar advertisement in the New York Times warned that: 
'The Western World is now stuck with a long-term problem - the ceaseless expansion of the biggest 
imperialist power the world has ever seen. The advance of the Soviets threatens our whole way of life' . 
Roberto was quoted as saying: '1 am strongly against apartheid, but 1 will say this for South Africa - when 
they see a neighbour's house burning they come to put out the fire.' 80 
Pretoria's covert appeals to the West were to no avail. Both the British and French governments expressed 
concern that South Africa should completely disengage from Angola before the next meeting of the United 
Nations Security CounciLS! It is unlikely to have been a coincidence that the last South African troops 
crossed the border out of Angola on 27 March, as the Security Council met to debate 'the act of aggression 
committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola'. For years South Africa had rigidly 
stood by the non-intervention clause in the United Nations Charter as its main defence against foreign 
attempts to act against it because of apartheid. In light of Pretoria's own intervention in Angola, this 
defence now stood in tatters. It was claimed that South Africa's invasion of Angola was an act of 
aggression, and therefore further evidence that the South African regime was a threat to world peace.82 In a 
report to the United Nations, the People's Republic of Angola had estimated the damage caused by South 
Africa's intervention at $6.7 billion.83 In resolution 387 of 31 March 1976, the Security Council condemned 
South Africa's aggression against Angola and called for South Africa to pay war reparations to the Luanda 
government. The United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan abstained from the vote. The United 
States urged consideration of a resolution condemning all foreign involvement in Angola84 but also 
specifically criticised South Africa's involvement.8s China claimed that the South African invasion was a 
result of prior Soviet intervention and refused to participate in the vote.86 Botha was outraged: 'The action 
of South Africa in Angola was part ofthe action ofthe Free World, and more countries of the Free World 
knew about it and had no objection to it. It is not our conscience that should worry us, but the conscience of 
the countries that left us in the lurch in the Security Council.,s7 
79 The Times, 6 February 1976. 
80 New York Times, 9 February 1976. 
81 Moss, Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 1977. 
82 United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, Apartheid's Threat to World Peace: Paper presented to the 
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and Documents, Conf. 7, Lagos, November 1977), section 6. 
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86 For the full text of resolution see: C. Legum (ed.), African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and 
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An editorial in the London Daily Telegraph mourned that fact that: 'The sickness that has for long afflicted 
the General Assembly has in this case well and truly spread its contagion to the Security Council. It can 
only be a matter for deep concern and regret that the three Western permanent members, Britain, the United 
States and France, did not have the political gumption to veto the anti-South African resolution on the 
grounds that it was manifestly unbalanced and unfair. They did not do so because they are terrified of being 
accused of being pro-South Africa, than which, apparently, there is now no more ghastly crime in the 
world' .88 Similar dismay that South Africa's traditional 'allies' were not willing to defend Pretoria's 
involvement in Angola was echoed in the Cape Times. The article was entitled 'Isolated' .89 On 1 Dccember 
1976 Angola was admitted to the United Nations.9o 
Following South Africa's intervention in Angola, Vorster insisted that his policy of detente with black 
Africa was continuing and he spoke optimistically about its future potential.91 Hilgard Muller, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, claimed, 'our actions in Angola did not frustrate our endeavours to expand contacts with 
African countries. On the contrary, South Africa's involvement in Angola led to an expansion of contacts 
with Africa .. .Instead of being a setback to our detente policy in regard to Mrica, our reaction to the 
intervention by means of force by foreign powers in a neighbouring state promoted our peace offensive, 
inter alia, because it has furnished proof of our bonafides.'92 On 7 May 1976, Botha told Parliament that 
one of the benefits that had accrued from South Africa's actions in Angola was that it had 'made friends in 
Mrica who are still our friends today.'93 However, Vorster's efforts to project an image of South Africa as 
a benign, non-interfering power in the region, and of himself as Africa's chief peacemaker, could clearly 
not be sustained in light on South Mrica's Angolan adventure. Furthermore, events in Angola had 
underscored the liabilities of association with Pretoria. The leader of the Progressive Reform Party told 
Parliament that South Africa's involvement in Angola 'was an error of judgement and we believe that it has 
had a detrimental effect on relationships between South Africa and the rest of the African continent.'94 On 
27 February Zaire signed an accord with the MPLA providing for 'normalisation' of relations and in late 
1976, Mobutu and Neto met in Brazzaville.95 The Vorster-Kaunda alliance, already shaken by its failure to 
88 Daily Telegraph, 1 April 1976. 
89 Cape Times, 6 April 1976. 
90 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 54. The Ford administration refused to recognise the new 
Angolan state and vetoed Angola's admission to the United Nations. Subsequently under President Carter, 
the United States continued to refuse to formally recognise the Luanda government but abstained from the 
United Nations vote on Angola's admission, which was then successful. 
91 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1976, cols. 359-360; Cape Times, 2 
February 1976 quoting an interview Vorster gave to SABC-TV; Cape Times, 15 March 1976. 
92 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 27 January 1976, cols. 115-116. 
93 Ibid, 7 May 1976, col. 6300. 
94 Ibid, 26 April 1976, eols. 5392-5393. 












bring about a settlement in Rhodesia, was wrecked by Angola.96 Before the end of 1976 Zambia had 
normalised relations with Luanda. In March 1977, Kaunda received Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny on a 
state visit to Lusaka. His earlier warning about the Soviet 'tiger and its cubs' seemed long-forgotten.97 
South Africa's intervention in Angola unwittingly damaged the already shaky credibility of its much-
heralded 'grand apartheid' programme of separate development. The crucial test of the acceptability of 
Pretoria's Bantustan policy was to be the declaration of Transkeian independence on 26 October 197698 
The Republic of Transkei, although heavily promoted abroad, needed the backing of at least several 
African states if it was to stand any chance of gaining recognition from the international community. The 
deterioration of South Africa's relations with its previous partners in detente following Angola ensured that 
Transkeian independence was a fiasco. In July 1976, the OAU rejected recognition of the Transkei as an 
option.99 Furthermore, within South Africa the concern was broached that, in light of events in Angola, the 
Transkei and other African homelands might become springboards for Soviet military aggression against 
South Africa.lOO 
The Angolan conflict made it clear that the Western world's relationship with southern Africa had 
undergone a fundamental transformation; far fewer illusions remained that the West wonld rush to the aid 
of South Africa. WI Angola demonstrated that the expectation that any Western nation would identify 
openly with Pretoria was unrealistic. The reality was that South Africa was more of a pariah state than ever. 
Many whites believed that South Africa's participation on the side of the West in both world wars and in 
Korea meant the West owed them a debt of gratitude. 102 Angola demonstrated only too clearly that this was 
not the case. Parading South Africa as a bulwark against the expansionist communist ideology in the region 
would not necessarily ensure sympathy from the West. South Africa's leaders were deeply disappointed 
that their western and black African 'allies' had failed to give them open support in Angola. The Foreign 
Minister told Parliament in early March: 'Not only has the West so far done nothing or very little to halt the 
96 John Barratt placed the emphasis for the failure of detente on the Rhodesian impasse rather than Angola. 
However, he claimed that Angola had a negative impact on the attempt to find a solution in Rhodesia, as 
the black nationalists were encouraged to pursue an armed struggle rather than negotiate and the whites saw 
Angola as a possible scenario in Rhodesia under black-rule: Barratt, 'Southern Africa: A South African 
View', p. 154. 
97 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 54. In July 1976, Zambia accused South Africa of having 
attacked the village of Sialola, killing 24 civilians and wounding another 45, and took the matter to the 
United Nations, as the culmination of 14 provocative acts. South Africa claimed Sialola was a SW APO 
training camp. 
98 Legum, Vorster's Gamble for Africa, p. 6. 
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100 G.B.J. Stephan & H. Booysen, 'The Angolan Conflict: Its Relevance for South Africa in her Relations 
with Future Independent Bantustans and the Need for a Monroe Doctrine', (South African Yearbook of 
International Law 1975, University of South Africa Vol. 1,1976), p. 104. 
101 A. Nagorski, 'US Options vis-a-vis South Africa', in J. Whitaker (ed.), Africa and the United States: 
Vital Interests (New York University Press, New York, 1978), pp. 187-188. 











Russian and Cuban aggression in Africa, but it is actually helping the Russians by continually sniping at 
South Africa, by giving support to SW APO, by urging irresponsible action in South West Africa. This is 
indeed most disturbing.'l0~ In his New Year address Vorster lamented: 'If ... a Communist onslaught should 
be made against South Africa, directly or under camouflage, South Africa will have to face it alone, and 
certain countries which profess to be anti-Communist will even refuse to sell [us] arms.' 104 He claimed that 
the Angolan war had confirmed a lesson South Africa had previously learned: 'when it comes to the worst, 
South Africa stands alone.' 105 On 1 May Die Burger, the mOllthpiece of the N;:ltionaI Party in the Cape of 
which Botha was the leader, published a long article expressing anti-American sentiment and condenming 
the United States' betrayal of South Africa. Botha carried his suspicion and distrust of the West, and the 
United States, in particular, into his own administration. To this day, Botha remains bitter and disinclined 
to talk about the United States 'duplicity'. 106 
Since the late 1960s some Nationalist voices had suggested that South Africa should assume non-
committed status rather than allying itself with the West. This idea was reiterated amid the recriminations 
in the wake of Angola. 107 Although Pretoria renewed demands for the formation of a 'South Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation', claiming wildly that the Soviets would soon construct a naval base at Lobito lO8, Angola 
seemed finally to end any determined South African efforts to find a role in the Western defence system.109 
Pretoria initiated a new diplomatic move that illustrated her disenchantment with Washington and a search 
for new allies. On 9-12 April 1976, Vorster and his Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, visited Israel. The 
outcome was an agreement to form a joint committee to foster scientific, industrial and commercial 
cooperation,'l° Vorster hoped that cooperation between Israel and South Africa would he 'an example 
which can be emulated by other middle-rank powers,.1Il 
Official announcements began to claim a more neutral role in international affairs. In his New Year's 
speech to welcome in 1977, Botha suggested: 'Perhaps we have tried too hard to assure the West of our 
support. Perhaps we should consider not letting our availability be taken for granted quite so much.'112 
Whilst explaining to Parliament the reason for the withdrawal from Angola, Botha said: 'I have on various 
occasions stated that South Africa is not prepared to fight on behalf of the free world alone. Furthermore, 
103 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 5 March 1976, col. 2604. 
104 Nagorski, 'US Options vis-a-vis South Africa', p. 188. 
105 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1976, col. 375. 
106 Telephone interview with P.W. Botha. 
107 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 13 June 1977, cols. 9963-9964. 
108 Admiral Biermann, head of the SADF, visited Washington immediately after Pretoria's withdrawal and 
held a special meeting with 17 US admirals and a number of Congressmen: Johnson, How Long Will South 
A~rica Survive?, p. 220. 
19 A. Seegers, 'Apartheid's Military: Its Origins and Development', in W. James (ed.), The State of 
Apartheid (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo., 1987), p. 153. 
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South Africa wiII defend with determination its own borders and those interests and borders we are 
responsible for.' He claimed that 'The whole history of Angola may yet come to be known as the great lost 
opportunity of the free world.' 113 A year later Botha was still threatening: 'It must not be taken for granted 
that South Africa will take part in a war on the side of the West. If it suits us, we can remain neutral.' 114 By 
1978 Botha was more strident: 'South Africa will never fight for the West on its battlefields again. South 
Africa will in future be neutral. For as long as I am Minister of Defence, I will not allow the sons of South 
Africa to die for a West who has rejected South Africa and ,"ULllPl'C;',,-l ab:mcloned her.,115 
However, Vorster's subsequent actions were not consistent with a defiant 'go it alone' posture, Despite his 
disenchantment with the United States, Vorster agreed to cooperate with a new American-led peace 
initiative in southern Africa. The African endorsement of the Soviet- and Cuban-backed N1PLA led to a 
broad review of Africa policy within the Ford administration. According to Chester Crocker, Angola 
brought Africa into the mainstream of global politicS.116 Washington would no longer be content to allow 
its European allies to mediate developments in Africa without American involvement.1l7 In contrast to its 
previously blandly acquiescent stance, the United States was determined to play an active and direct role in 
southern Africa to define change in the region. Personally, Kissinger was also keen to regain some of the 
ground he had lost in Angola by bringing peace to Namibia and Rhodesia. It was election year and Ford 
and Ronald Reagan, his challenger for the Republican nomination, were wrangling over Kissinger's 
polices, with Reagan accusing Ford of 'losing'Angola and of selling out the Rhodesians.1l8 
Convinced that southern Africa had become an important piece in the geopolitical game and spurred by the 
possibility that war there would provide an opportunity for Cuban/Soviet involvement, Kissinger launched 
a version of his 'shuttle diplomacy' in an attempt to address the problems of the region. Fears of 'another 
Angola' meant there was a new sense of urgency about the need to solve the outstanding colonial problems 
of Rhodesia and Namibia.1I9 Kissinger made his first official visit to Africa in April 1976. He did not stress 
the horrors of Soviet intervention or try to recast the region's conflicts as a clash between ideological 
spheres, as both he and Vorster had done with regard to Angola. Instead Kissinger promised a thorough 
revision of American policy toward southern Africa. He announced his willingness to work with African 
112 Botha's New Year Message, 31 December 1976 quoted in J. Scholtz (ed.), Fighter and Reformer, p. 72. 
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114 Quoted in The Times, 28 January 1977. 
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11 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 51. Following the Angolan war South Africa was subjected 
to a degree of international media coverage not hitherto experienced in its history. The number of foreign 
correspondents and 'stringers' in South Africa increased rapidly, in contrast to many other areas of the 
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leaders to achieve negotiated settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia.12o His Lusaka speech of 26 April 1976, 
firmly committed, for the first time, the United States to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and to the 
ending of 'institutionalised separation of races' in South Africa.12l The dismay felt in Pretoria when the 
United States had disassociated itself from South Africa's Angolan adventure now approached something 
like dis gust. 122 
Nevertheless, Vorster had three rounds of talks with Kissinger, bctwcen June and September 197G123 , the 
result of which was the abortive Geneva Conference of October-November 1976. The talks were something 
of a diplomatic breakthrough for Pretoria. Not since Smuts had conferred with Truman thilty years before 
had there been such a high-level meeting between South Africa and the United States. Pretoria claimed it 
signified an upgrading of South Africa on the American priority listl24 and that Ford was making it clear to 
the Soviets that 'the future of Southern Africa is the concern of America and the West,.125 However, 
Angola had starkly illustrated to the United States the negative implications of dealing with South Africa in 
terms of African politics. Whereas the United States had hoped tacit cooperation with South Africa would 
stem communist involvement in Angola, in fact this had opened the way to greater Soviet and Cuban 
intervention by removing any risk of united African opposition. Kissinger invited South Africa to 
participate in his initiative, solely because he realised that Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa made 
South African cooperation necessary. This was the narrow basis on which South African-American 
cooperation was based. The administration of Democrat President Jimmy Carter ushered in a tougher 
American policy towards South Africa and a period of increased tension between the two countries. In May 
1977, Vorster met with Carter's Vice President, Walter Mondale, who made it clear that the United States 
did not consider white minority rule in South Africa to be stable in the long term. Mondale informed 
Vorster that the constructive relations which United States would prefer with South Africa would suffer if 
there was not 'a change of course' towards the ending of racial discrimination and the goal of 'full political 
participation by all citizens of South Africa' .IZ6 
In October 1977, the United Nations adopted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa127 and South 
Africa's actions in Angola were mentioned in evidence.128 South Africa's military involvement in Angola 
120 National Security Archive, South Africa, p. 122. 
IZI J. Whitaker, 'Africa and US Interests', in J. Whitaker (ed.), Africa and the United States, pp. 2-3; New 
York Times, 27 April 1976. 
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was said to 'constitute a threat to international peace and security' .129 In June 1975, the United States, 
Britain and France had vetoed a similar resolution130 and Japan and Italy had abstained.13l In January 1976, 
J.D. Van der Vyver, Professor of Law at Potchefstroom University and a supporter of the Nationalist 
government, had condemned 'South Africa's Angola escapade' as probably 'the greatest blunder of the 
century' on the grounds that South Africa's 1920 League of Nations mandate over South West Africa had 
specified that South Africa should not maintain a military presence in the territory. Van der Vyver claimed 
that, because South Africa had launched its invasion of Angola from Namibia, South Africa now faced a far 
greater possibility of a positive finding by the United Nations Security Council that its activities in Namibia 
constituted a threat to international peace. In terms of the United Nations Charter this would justify the 
implementation of compulsory sanctions against South Africa. Van der Vyver also predicted that a decision 
by the Security Council to impose such sanctions would not be vetoed by France, the United Kingdom or 
the United States.132 In contrast, John Dugard, Professor of Law at the University of Witwatersrand, 
claimed that the United Nations would not impose mandatory sanctions as the United States had supported 
South Africa's involvement in Angola, and consequently would veto any resolution that reflected upon 
South Africa's activities in Angola.133 It was Van der Vyver who was proved correct. By 1977, following 
Angola, the Soweto uprisings of 1976 and the murder in detention of the Black Consciousness leader Steve 
Biko, South Africa had no such support in the West. All the Western powers including the United States 
declined to veto the embargo. 134 International pressure on South Africa had reached a new level. 
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DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE WAR 
SOUTII AFRICAN PRESS 
'The British newspaper reader still knows far more about the South 
African involvement in Angola than do the South African families 
whose men have been fighting there' . 
(The Gliardiall, 27 January 1976). 
Within South Africa the government invoked official secrecy and defence legislation on all news of their 
intervention in Angola. Although the National Party paid lip service to the democratic importance of a free 
press it had, in fact, developed a draconian censorship apparatus. The government employed 'repressive 
tolerance' , allowing a certain level of dissenting discourse in order to promote an image of South Africa as 
a liberal society. Consequently, 'censorship became an integral part of the South African condition, 
affecting every facet oflife' 135 and The Newspaperman's Guide to the Law became every editor's bible.136 
According to one leading journalist: 'We had two South Africas, the official version and the real one: 137 
The government's complete news blackout regarding its invasion of Angola took restrictions on the press to 
an unprecedented level. It was possible because the Official Secrets Act (No. 16 of 1956) in conjunction 
with the Defence Amendment Act (No. 85 of 1967) prohibited the publication of virtually all matters. 
concerned with South Africa's defence, without the express pernrission of the Minister of Defence. 133 
'Official secrets' were widely defined to include 'anything relating to munitions of war or any tnilitary, 
police, or security matter' .139 The Defence Act prohibited newspapers from publishing any statement 
'relating to any member of the SADF or any activity of the SADF or any force of a foreign country which 
is calculated to prejudice or embarrass the government in its foreign relations or to alarm or depress 
members of the public' .140 The broad scope, and intentional vagueness, of this legislation led newspapers to 
135 C. Merrett, A Culture of Censorship: Secrecy and Intellectual Repression in South Africa (David Philip 
Publishers, Cape Town, 1994), p. 2. According to Merrett, 'One of the biggest secrets in South Africa is the 
extent of government secrecy': C. Merrett, What's Public is Propaganda, What's Secret is Serious: Official 
Secrecy and Freedom of Information in South Africa (talk delivered to the Western Cape Library and 
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Figure 6: The Official Secrets Act in conjunction with the Defence Amendment Act 
prohibited the publication of virtually all matters concerned with South Africa's defence, 
without the express permission of the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha. 
[A. Berry, Act by Act: 40 Years of Nationalist Rule in South Africa, 


















Sacred cow '" 
Figure 7: The Defence Act prohibited newspapers from publishing any statement 
'relating to any member of the SADF or any activity of the SADF or any force of a 
foreign country which is calculated to prejudice or embarrass the government in its 
foreign relations or to alarm or depress members of the public'. 
[A. Berry, Act by Act; 40 Years of Nationalist Rule in South Africa. 










refer all matters connected with defence, no matter how tenuously, to the defence authorities prior to 
publication. 141 In this way the press employed what became, in effect, self-censorship.142 
During the war in Angola, Botha issued confidential directives to the South African media, banning reports 
or speculation concerning South African troop movements and activities.143 Editors were warned that 
unauthorised publication of information would result in the Defence Act being invoked them.144 
Consequently, press coverage of the war was almost completely dependent on official press releases and 
thus open to official manipulation. Graeme Addison commented in his study of South African press 
censorship that, 'Once there is censorship it is not possible to regard the officially-permitted material as 
anything but deliberate propaganda, no matter how accurate specific items of published information may 
be' .145 In May 1976, the South African Society of Journalists, at its annual congress, condemned the way in 
which the South Mrican press had become 'unwilling victims of a conspiracy of silence' by being unable 
to report what had happened in Angola. The society stated: 'As journalists, we insist on the right to public 
enquiry and public debate on the Angolan war, and we demand to know the facts ... The Goverrunent has 
subverted the Press and its role as watchdog of the public interest, and the honesty and integrity of the Press 
has been brought into question' .146 It claimed that only information flattering to the government had been 
cleared for publication, thus turning the South African press into a 'propaganda machine' .147 Henri Geyser, 
military correspondent for The Argus and a Citizen Force member in Angola during 1976, asked to be 
relieved of the defence post on the paper shortly after the war. He felt that to continue 'would be a 
propaganda exercise' .148 
Although constrained by censorship legislation, some South African newspapers did strive to inform the 
South African public about events in Angola. As a result the long-standing antagonism between the 
National Party goverrunent and the English-language press reached a new level. Whilst the Afrikaans-
language press was an integrated part of the National Party and government machine, the English-language 
press was increasingly perceived as being little short of an extra-parliamentary opposition.149 Indeed, given 
the United Party's failure to oppose the government in any real sense, in practice the English-language 
press was the only legal opposition during this period.150. 
141 E. Potter, The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers (Chatta & Windus, 
London, 1975), p. 122. 
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143 These directives were issued on 11 August, 16 August, 30 October, 30 December 1975, 6 January and 
15 January 1976. 
144 Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, p. 137. 
145 Ibid, p. 2. 
146 Rand Daily Mail, 25 April 1976. 
147 Burgess et aI., The Great White Hoax, p. 19. 
148 Telephone interview with Henri Geyser. 
149 Potter, The Press as Opposition, p. 27. 











The most overt protest against censorship during the war came from the Rand Daily Mail, which twice in 
four days carried blank spaces on its front page to indicate stories that had been censored. On 15 November 
1975, a notice below a blank column told readers that: 'A report on Angola which would have occupied 
this space has not been published because permission, which is required in terms of the law for such 
publication, has not been granted,.151 The main story of 18 November, headed 'More servicemen killed in 
action', began with a large blank space, in which was written: 'For reasons totally unrelated to military 
considerations or the security of the state, an announcement of the death in action last Thursday of South 
African servicemen has been delayed by the Defence authorities'. Above the space was a photograph of 
one of the casualties, Lieutenant Christopher Robin, along with a copy of his funeral notice, which had 
appeared in the paper's classified section the previous day.152 Botha castigated the editor, Raymond Louw, 
for this stance. 153 He threatened government action against the paper after it published a satirical 
description of a horseback invasion of Angola by a Boer War-type general, easily identified as Botha.154 In 
March 1976, the paper's military correspondent, Bob Hitchcock, had his official SADP accreditation 
removed.155 At the start of that month, he had called on the government to 'quit the war we can't win. The 
chances of withdrawing from Angola with clean hands are long gone. But the dangerous risk of getting 
them bloodier yet. .. grows every hour we continue to dally on foreign soil' .156 Following Vorster's 
announcement that South African troops would withdraw by 27 March, the paper's editOlial was headed 
'Angolan blunder: the reckoning'. It claimed the venture had been characterised by 'misjudgements, 
mistakes, miscalculations and precipitation of possible disastrous consequences still to come' .157 
Alongside the Rand Daily Mail the Cape Times was the other South African newspaper to campaign 
tirelessly for the South African public to be given more information about developments in Angola. On 18 
November 1975 a strongly worded article, entitled 'Angola and South Africa', stressed that if events made 
it necessary for South Africa to become involved in a conflict between East and West, 'the South African 
public must be kept fully informed and not dragged in total ignorance from the tested policy of non-
involvement'. Anthony Heard, the editor of the Cape Times, heard during a confidential talk on 19 
November with Vorster, with whom he maintained cordial relations, that South African forces had been 
sent to help take Luanda. Heard found himself in a professional dilemma: 'South Africa was invading 
151 The item was to have been the British Independent Television report showing South African troops and 
armoured cars in Angola: Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, p. 183. 
152 Robin's parents had only been allowed to attribute his death to a 'fatal accident': Tyson, Editors Under 
Fire, p. 177. 
153 1 Stewart, South Africa: Press Freedom? (paper presented to Black Sash Congress, March 1979, Africa 
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another country and I was sworn to silence' .158 Consequently the Cape Times led the veiled criticism in the 
press, especially in deputy editor Gerald Shaw's weekly 'Political Survey' column. 159 Shaw's criticism 
earned him personal rebukes from Botha, who described him in Parliament as 'an unfair fellow' and a 'fifth 
columnist' who wrote 'subversive' articles. 16O When news broke of South African prisoners of war Shaw's 
column stated: 'You cannot take a country to war on foreign soil without discussion in Parliament and 
without the support of pubJic opinion ... South Africans have been grievously misled' .161 On 20 January 
1976 a leader in the Cape Times demanded answers from the government to four questions: 1) Is South 
Africa fighting in thc Angolan civil war? 2) If so, why have we departed from our policy of non-
intervention in the affairs of our neighbours? 3) Why was the public not kept informed? 4) What is the 
extent of our present commitment and what will it be in the future? A year later an editorial in the Cape 
Times, referred to the Angolan involvement as 'an act of folly' and as 'a political and diplomatic debacle, a 
blunder for which the country has already paid dearly' .162 
As a result of the Cape Times' criticism of the government's policy on Angola, a vendetta developed 
between that paper and the Afrikaans-language Die Burger. Botha was a director of Nasionale Pers, Die 
Burger's management boardl63 , and the paper questioned the patriotism of the Cape Times. Similarly, Die 
Transvaler dismissed most criticism of the government as being politically inspired. It insisted that the 
majority of South Africa's population supported the goverument's actions and claimed that South African 
sacrifices had been worthwhile. 164 However, some Afrikaans-language newspapers in the Transvaal-based 
Perskor group discreetly pointed out the widespread confusion surrounding the government's actions in 
Angola.165 The most overtly critical was Die Vaderland, which earned the wrath of Botha when it reported 
in November that South African troops had been killed in Angola. Botha denied the report (which was true) 
and accused Die Vaderland of breaking the Defence ACt. I66 In Parliament, Botha criticised 'some of South 
Africa's own reporters' for violating the government's 'trust' and 'certain newspapers of both 
languages ... which did us a disservice: 167 At a February 1976 meeting with representatives of the National 
158 Heard, The Cape of Storms, p. 153. 
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Press Union, Botha formally complained about the way certain newspapers had leaked news of South 
Africa's involvement in Angola and had protested against official news policy.168 In Parliament in May 
1976, Botha complained about the behaviour of the Cape Times and the Rand Daily Mail in particular, 
'newspapers which brim over with disloyalty to South Africa.' 169 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE & PARLIAMENT 
'Between October 1975 and March 1976, debate about the rights and 
wrongs of South African policy in Angola dominated political 
discussion in South Africa in a way that no other issue of foreign affairs 
has done at least in the course of the last decade' . 
(Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola' , p. 349). 
In stark contrast to South Africa's entry into both world wars, both of which processes were accompanied 
by considerable domestic turmoil 170, it was only after South African troops had already been committed in 
Angola that the issue was publicly debated. Between June 1975 and January 1976 Parliament had been in 
recess. According to Deon Geldenhuys, who attempted to reconstruct the decision-making process during 
the Angolan episode in his book The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, 
Vorster and Botha toyed with the idea of convening a special in camera session of Parliament towards the 
end of 1975 in order to inform MPs of developments in Angola. 17l However, they decided against taking 
Parliament into their confidence for fear of leaks by the opposition parties, specifically the Progressive 
Reform Piuty.172 In January 1976, at the beginning of the new parliamentary session, the government was 
criticised by the two opposition parties because the invasion had not been sanctioned by Parliament. By this 
time, following the OAU meeting in mid-January, the decision to withdraw from Angola had already come 
into effect. 
Eschel Rhoodie, the ex-Secretary for Information, later made the extraordinary claim that even Vorster, as 
Prime Minister, had been kept in the dark by Botha: 'Vorster swore to Dr Mulder [Cornelius 'Connie' 
Mulder, the Minister of Information] and General van den Bergh that he did not know what was going on 
168 Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, p. 60. 
169 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 6 May 1976, coL 6211; 7 May 1976, col. 6301. 
170 On the ramifications of the commitment of South African troops outside of South Africa see: K. 
Grundy, Defense Legislation and Communal Politics: The Evolution of a White South African Nation as 
Reflected in the Controversy Over the Assignment of Armed Forces Abroad, 1912-1976 (papers in 
International Studies, Africa Series No. 33, Ohio University Center for International Studies, Athens, 
1978). 
171 The Defence Act provided that if mobilisation was ordered and Parliament was in session, the reason 
was to be communicated to it forthwith. If Parliament was not sitting, then it had to be reconvened within 
thirty days: South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1976, p. 
36. 











until it was too late ... Botha converted, on his own, the limited, defensive role played by South African 
troops in guarding the northern water supplies of South West Africa, into an active invasion,.173 Rhoodie 
claimed that Botha authorised the SADF to pursue, to Luanda if necessary, those terrorists that had targeted 
Calueque, so presenting Vorster and his Cabinet with a fait accompli. 174 This accusation was also supported 
by Van den Bergh. Allister Sparks recalled a conversation with the ex-head of BOSS, some years later, in 
which Van den Bergh claimed that the Angolan operation was not discussed in advance with Vorster and 
that Botha had acted on his own, telling Vorster that the task force was only going to protect Calueque, 
whilst privately authorising it to strike much deeper into Angola. l75 General du Toit has since claimed: 
'P.W. Botha was a doer not a talker. He thought it [intervention in Angola] was the right thing to do. If he 
hadn't been Minister of Defence we probably wouldn't have gone in.' l76 
However, Deon Geldenhuys refuted the charge that South Africa's intervention in Angola had been Botha's 
'personal adventure' and that he had unilaterally ensured that South Africa became embroiled in a foreign 
war. He identified Vorster and Botha together, as 'the two principal (if not the only) political decision 
makers who were to control South Africa's military involvement in the Angolan war'.177 Although Botha 
was 'the driving force between their joint decisions, a man whose strong views more often than not 
prevailed', Vorster had been involved in the political decision-making from the outset. GeJdenhuys 
claimed: 'It would have been quite inconceivable for the head of government not to have been a party to 
such far-reaching decisions as involving South Africa as a war beyond its borders,.178 Vorster later told 
Parliament that he had 'full confidence' in Botha and his handling of the Angolan situation, adding: 'I was 
with him all the way in this matter.'179 Indeed, it must be noted that Van den Bergh and Botha had long 
shared an antipathy towards each other and, at the time of his allegations, Van den Bergh was a bitter man 
having recently been forced to resign.lso Rhoodie, disgraced and in exile following the exposure of the 
misuse of public funds by the Department of Information, also had his own axe to grind and harboured a 
personal antipathy towards Botha.181 Yet the fact that these allegations were repeated, and apparently 
173 E. Rhoodie, P. W. Botha: The Last Betrayal (S.A. Politics, Melville, 1989), p. 194. 
l74 Rhoodie, The Real Information Scandal, pp. 144-145; Rhoodie, P. W. Botha, p. 195. 
115 Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, pp. 304-305. 
176 Telephone interview with General Hein du Toit. 
177 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 79. 
178 Ibid, p. 82. 
179 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1976, col. 359. 
180 General Hein du Toit explained: 'Van den Bergh didn't like the Defence Force and he didn't like the 
influence Botha had. He considered himself the power behind the throne': Interview with General du Toit. 
Van den Bergh later joined the extreme right-wing Conservative Party. 
181 Rhoodie also alleged that Botha had tried (without Vorster's knowledge) to supply weapons and 
assistance to counter-revolutionaries trying to unseat President Machel but had been foiled when Van den 
Bergh's BOSS agents immobilised the military equipment. Similarly Rhoodie claimed that whilst Vorster 
had been exerting strong pressure on the Smith regime in 1975, Botha had secretly assembled a unit of 
South African paratroopers to assist Rhodesia, and that Vorster had stood the unit down just in the nick of 











believed, by some journalists and political commentators is a telling reflection of how Vorster's style of 
government was regarded. 
Geldenhuys cited South Africa's involvement in the Angolan war as an outstanding example of 'a seriously 
deficient decision-making process under Vorster,.182 Vorster typically displayed a preference for 
unstructured decision-making involving only a small inner circle.183 Therefore, far from the cabinet model 
of government that Vorster professed to be following, decision-making 'was not infrequently a rather 
haphazard process involving only a tiny number of participants - a far cry from a structured concept of 
government allowing for inputs from a variety of interested parties' .184 Although the formulation of policy 
was not the one-man affair it had been under Verwoerd, it remained a secretive, cliquey, 'almost cabalistic' 
business.185 Robert Jaster judged that: 'There is no doubt that the Angolan debacle occurred because of 
Vorster's inexperience in foreign affairs and his personalised and unsystematic approach to major policy 
decisions.' 186 
Although Botha's official biography claimed that the Cabinet was consulted at every of the gradually 
escalating South African involvement187, in fact neither the full Cabinet nor the National Party caucus had 
been consulted about the invasion of Angola. 188 The climax of South Africa's involvement in Angola 
coincided with the Christmas vacation, during which Cabinet members were away from office and they 
only learnt the true state of affairs in Angola at their first meeting after the Christmas holiday. Historically 
the sidelining of Cabinet to a peripheral role was not entirely unusual: 'South Africa lacks a body of 
experience or even precedent for decision making in times of emergency or crisis as a consequence of her 
former complete dependency on the British government in such matters ... [W]hen one looks at the 
experience of South African cabinets in the past it is indeed astonishing to see how little they were 
concerned with the conduct of the wars in which their forces were involved and to which the taking of 
decisions was abdicated almost entirely' .189 
Despite having been kept in the dark, the Cabinet presented a united front when the Angolan issue was 
discussed in Parliament. This was not very surprising. Given the strict discipline the National Party 
demanded of its MPs and the severe penalties for breaching it, the Party could usually count on their 
182 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 75. 
183 Jaster, The Defense of White Power, p. 25. 
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185 De St. Jorre, A House Divided, p. 55. In other instances General van den Bergh had been Vorster's main 
if not sole adviser. The Information Scandal again revealed Vorster as being surrounded by only a handful 
of advisers. 
186 Jaster, The Defense of White Power, p. 27. 
187 De Villiers, PW, pp. 241-277. 
IS8 However, according to Geldenhuys, the Executive Council of the elite Afrikaner Broederbond was made 
privy to confidential information on South Africa's involvement in Angola: Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of 











complete support.190 Fwthermore, on foreign policy issues the National Party showed a high degree of 
consensus; its MPs and supporters were neither particularly interested nor well informed, and generally 
accepted the views expressed by the leadership.191 As one National Party parliamentarian commented: 'In 
South Africa the people are overwhelmingly uncritical of the leadership. We politicians subscribe to the 
maxim: act, then talk. We first proceed, and then we explain,.192 
The tendency to regard national interests and the National Party's interests as one and the same, meant that 
many Nationalist MPs perceived criticism of the government's policies on foreign affairs and security as 
questionable, even disloyal. 193 The chairman of the National Party's parliamentary defence group, H.J. 
Coetsee, claimed that the lives that had been lost in Angola 'could be rendered fruitless through 
irresponsible conduct.. . Their deaths may have been in vain if people to the far right of the political 
spectrum were to be allowed to disseminate lies and attempt to demoralise our people serving in the 
Defence Force. It could also be the case if certain persons on the far left were to continue to call into 
question the legality of the actions of our Government.' 194 
The 'far right' to which Coetsee referred was the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), the verkrampte 
(inward-looking) breakaway faction from the National Party. In the April 1974 general election, the Party 
had not gained a single seat. 195 Parliamentary opposition in South Africa was therefore confined to parties 
representing political 'liberals', mainly from South Africa's English-speaking community. The 'far left' 
was occupied by the small Progressive Reform Party (PRP), which had eleven sitting members. The official 
Opposition, the United Party, held only 41 seats out of a total of 171 and was in the last stages of its 
decline.196 The Nationalist hold on power seemed unassailable and meant that there was no need for the 
government to bargain with opposition parties to win their support, or even to explain its policies to them. 
Whilst government leaders frequently consulted Opposition leaders on specific issues, they did not consider 
this a regular or obligatory parliamentary practice. 
Vorster disclosed to Parliament that he had personally briefed Sir De Villiers Graaff, the leader of the 
United Party, about Angolan developments from time to time. 197 However, according to Graaff he was first 
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194 Republic of South Mrica, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976, col. 68. 
195 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, p. 367. 
196 Dalcanton, 'Vorster and the Politics of Confidence', p. 179. It was eventually dissolved in 1977 and 
succeeded by the New Republic Party. 











infonned of South Africa's Intervention only in late 1975, when thcre were already rumours of it in foreign 
newspapers. He did not share the infonnation with the NIPs in his shadow cabinet.198 Although he kept 
Vorster's confidence he appealed to the Prime Minister to tell the public what was happening in Angola. 199 
The failure 'to take the public into its confidence, and to motivate it adequately in regard to the 
Government's actions and objectives in Angola' was cited by Graaff as grounds for his customary motion 
of no confidence in the govcrnment. He claimed that the position in Angola was 'uppennost in the minds of 
most people as an area of immediate danger' and called for 'the fullest possible disclosure of 
infonnation' .200 Although his motion of no confidence was defeated, Graaff was satisfied that the debate 
'resulted in the public gctting a lot of the information to which it was entitled without damage being done 
to the morale of troops or security' .z01 
Graaff did not object to South Africa's intervention per se, but rather the secrecy in which it was 
conducted. In Parliament he conceded that 'there are tactical arguments and I have heard some that are 
most persuasive - to justify a calculated degree of support to the groups that are resisting the assault.. .by 
forces assisted by Cuban soldiers and Russian arms and advice.' He agreed that, 'South Africa cannot 
ignore the military intervention of a foreign communist-spearheaded consortium in Southern Africa whose 
declared intention it is to take Angola and to use it as a springboard for further aggression.'202 Graaff 
supported a motion from Vorster, which only the Progressive Refonn Party objected to, outlining 'grave 
concern at the Communist aggression committed in Angola by Russia and Cuba' , the likelihood that similar 
aggression would be directed at South West Africa and South Africa, and directing the government 'to take 
all reasonable steps to foil this aggression and to safeguard our country as well as the territories and borders 
for which we are responsible' .203 When Graaff met Henry Kissinger later in 1976 he followed the 
government line and questioned the Secretary of State 'as to whether he was satisfied with the withdrawal 
of American support to South Africa and UNITA in Angola, which had resulted in a Communist takeover 
in the country with the aid of the Cubans' ?04 
The most outspoken critic from within the ranks of the United Party was Japie Basson, the Party's leader in 
the Transvaal and spokesman on foreign affairs.2os He had repeatedly warned against direct intervention in 
198 Telephone interview with Japie Basson. 
199 Vorster told Graaff that as a result of attacks on the Ruacana scheme the SADF had engaged in hot 
pursuits and so found itself involved in the civil war. He assured Graaff that the Government's actions had 
the support and assistance of the American and French administrations. Graaff claimed he only 
subsequently discovered that the CIA was involved in Angola without the knowledge of Congress: Graaff, 
Div Looks Back, p. 242. 
200 Republic of South Mrica, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976, cols. 25-26. 
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Angola.206 At a public meeting in Middelburg, the week before the opening of Parliament, he claimed that 
South Africa's involvement in Angola not only posed grave new dangers for South Africa, but also had a 
serious effect on the future of South West Africa. He stressed that the two main pillars of the country's 
foreign policy: non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries and the undertaking that South 
West Africa would not be used as a basis for military action across the border, had been thrown 
overboard.207 In Parliament Basson claimed: 'Por the first time in years the Government is out of touch 
with what is going on amongst the people outside.'208 Although he declared that: 'There is no right-minded 
person in South Africa who does not realise the danger of the communist threat', he queried why the 
government considered the situation in Angola to be different from that in Mozambique or Madagascar, 
where Marxist states had recently been declared?09 As a result of his speech Connie Mulder, the Minister 
of Information, called Basson's patriotism into question?10 
Vorster thanked Graaff and the United Party's defence spokesman, Vause Raw, for their 'understanding' 
and 'the spirit in which they discussed matters with us' .211 Raw had opened his comment on the debate with 
veiled criticism of the Progressive Reform Party for 'the anxiety with which they have called for special 
sessions and have tried to conduct the debate in the Press.'212 He criticised 'the Progressive generals ... who 
came to the military conclusions that led to their decisions on whether we should or should not have been in 
Angola.'213 In December, the leader of the Progressive Reform Party, Colin Eglin, had asked for 
Parliament to be summoned but the United Party claimed this was unnecessary.214 The PRP also asked 
Botha to make a statement on Angola the day Parliament opened but this was also rejected.2ls Eglin was 
not briefed on Angola as Vorster 'was afraid to run the risk'. Vorster explained to Parliament, 'I was not 
afraid because I did not trust the hon. member, but because the han. member and members of his party go 
along with people 1 do not trust:216 
In Parliament Eglin was more outspoken than Graaff. He declared that the government's decision to 
intervene in Angola was 'an error of political judgement which could seriously prejudice and jeopardize the 
future security of South Africa,.217 He claimed the government's failure to take the people of South Africa 
206Por example: Cape Times, 5 December 1975, and 13 December 1975. 
207 Cape Times, 21 January 1976. This earned him a personal rebuke from Vorster who asked him in 
Parliament: 'Why do you not take your seat where your mouth is?': Republic of South Africa, House of 
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into its confidence had 'destroyed a bond of trust which traditionally exists in South Africa between the 
people on the one hand and the Government on the other' .218 He challenged the government line that South 
African troops were only involved in protecting the country's borders and interest in the Cunene 
hydroelectric scheme219 and continued to call for the withdrawal of all South African troopS.220 Eglin 
claimed the government had underestimated both the extent to which South Africa's involvement could be 
seen to legitimise the Soviets' involvement and the sophistication of the weapons which the Russians and 
the Cubans would employ. Furthermore, the government had overestimated the probable response of the 
West, particularly the United States.221 Eglin stressed that Angola 'has revealed that even at a time when 
we claimed that we were fighting the cause of the free world, we could not count on a single active 
participating ally in the West.222 The Progressive Reform Party called for domestic reform in order to 
regain Western support for South Africa. The party's defence spokesman, Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, 
stressed that it was necessary for the government to take action if it were to retain the loyalty of all its 
people, including blacks and coloureds: 'We shall have to continue to create circumstances here in South 
Africa in which we shall all be prepared to defend this society everywhere and at all times against any 
outside aggression.,223 
In earl y May 1976, Botha challenged the PRP in Parliament over a pamphlet that had been distributed from 
house to house in Cape Town. Entitled 'Angola and its consequences' it described the intervention in 
Angola as a 'disastrous blunder' which had been counterproductive and jeopardised the security of South 
Africa, by causing a massive escalation by Russia and Cuba and the increased militarisation of SW APO. 
The pamphlet stated: 'The PRP stands for the effective defence of South Africa ... We believe we can best 
secure our country and counter the dangers of communism and external aggression by necessary internal 
change,.224 Botha condemned the pamphlet's 'blatant lies' as 'a base and vile attempt to disparage the 
Defence Force and to create mistrust' and labelled the author a 'cockroach' .225 
The Cape Times claimed that the government had been let off lightly in the debate over Angola because 
opposition parties placed national interest above party interests.226 In fact, the Angolan episode had 
underscored the ineffectuality of opposition politics in South Africa, reflecting both the impotency of the 
opposition parties and the diminishing importance of Parliament as an arena of political debate. The 
government had clearly shown its disregard for Parliament, and its perceived need for secrecy had 
effectively circumscribed the role of the House of Assembly in the decision-making process. One political 
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analyst claimed that South Mrica's invasion of Angola was a 'watershed event' when the rise of the 
'executive state' and the sidelining of the political parties and parliament, as institutions through which 
support of the citizenry could be mobilised, was manifested for the first time.227 
HERSTIGTE NASIONALE PARTY ANDRlGHT-WING OPPOSITION 
Although the Herstigte (Reconstituted) National Party had failed to win a single parliamentary seat by 
1975, its presence was both vocal and worrying for the government Led by Dr Albert Hertzog, the HNP 
was the result of a breakaway from the National party228 and served as a persistent reminder of the 
cleavages within Afrikanerdom, including the broader rift between the so-called verligtes ('progressives') 
and verkramptes ('conservatives,)?29 The National Party was always more sensitive to opposition from 
within the ranks of Afrikanerdom itself and consequently the HNP exerted an influence out of all 
proportion with its size. Given the verligtelverkrampte divide there was the fear that, as one Mrikaner 
political correspondent put it, 'What the HNP says in public a third of the Nationalists think in private' .z30 
The Angolan adventure was very unpopular among the Afrikaner right, for 'helping out the Kaffirs' .z31 It 
also gave the HNP ammunition in its attacks on Vorster's policy in Rhodesia. John Stockwell commented: 
'Only recently, in March 1975, had it [South Africa] withdrawn its forces from Rhodesia, and racist whites 
would now question why their sons were fighting for black freedom in Angola,.m In late 1976 a South 
African political observer predicted: 'The line that it was criminal of the government to send South African 
boys to be killed fighting for Africans in distant Angola and not be allowed to defend their white kith and 
kin in neighbouring Rhodesia is heady stuff at the stump. It is a theme that will grow louder as the situation 
deteriorates in Rhodesia and will find an echo in the hearts of many verkrampte Nationalists,.233 Vorster's 
defence that the invasion had been in keeping with his detente policy could only serve to aggravate the 
HNP?34 
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The HNP newspaper, Die Afrikaner, attacked the government for its 'dishonesty' during the war and its 
alleged abandonment of the seven prisoners of war held in Angola. Following South Mrica's withdrawal 
from Angola, the National Press Union agreed to a SADF 'request' that they avoid giving prominence to 
the prisoners of war.235 It was an issue that the government was careful to avoid in the run-up to the 1977 
general election. Whilst the rest of the South African press refrained from mentioning the prisoners for over 
a yea?36, at a HNP congress in September 1977 it was decided that Die Afrikaner should withdraw from 
the NFU and conduct a public awareness campaign about the prisoners. Between 6 February 1976 and 15 
September 1978237 the newspaper published eighteen major articles and letters on the subject. One of these 
articles contained fourteen references to 'young soldiers', 'young men' and 'minors'; another contained 
thirteen such references. Die Afrikaner also published photographs showing the South African prisoners in 
handcuffs (which the NFU had also agreed not to use) on at least five occasions. A Commission ofInquiry 
into the Reporting of Security Matters, appointed by Botha at the end of 1979, concluded that: 'The effect 
of this emotional politically motivated campaign on the next-of-kin of the seven soldiers in particular, and 
on the next-of-kin of other serving soldiers can be imagined,.238 However, the sensitivity of the issue was 
illustrated by that fact that the government took no action against Die Afrikaner. 
OPPOSITION FROM TIffi BuSINESS COMMUNITY 
'Our involvement [in Angola] has been a military miscalculation and a 
diplomatic disaster for which the country may have to pay a very high 
price indeed'. (Financial Mail, 30 January 1976). 
The final cost of Operation Savannah for the Defence Force was estimated to have been $133million?39 
However, some South African commentators claimed the broader implications of South Africa's 
intervention had proved much more costly. In March 1976, The Star claimed that the Angolan war had led 
to a steep fall in the price of South African shares; they fell by 25 percent on the London stock exchange 
between October 1975 and March 1976?40 The Financial Mail described how 'a 25 million doUar 
235 The ban on reports went into effect on 27 February 1976 and was not lifted until the men were freed: 
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Eurobond loan floated during the Angolan adventure failed dismally' ?41 The Financial Mail, South 
Africa's leading financial paper, claimed the 'Angolan debacle' had resulted in an outflow of capital, which 
in turn had been one of the factors that forced Pretoria to increase interest rates, impose import deposits and 
borrow heavily from the IMF.242 
South Africa's Angola episode coincided with the worst economic recession since the 1930s, the result of 
an interplay of internal and external factors: a delayed product of the world recession, a devastating fall in 
the gold price, a high level of government spending and record inflation.243 Describing the economic 
outlook in March 1976, the Minister of Finance, Senator O. Horwood said: 'Recent developments in 
Angola and Mozambique might be thought to have provided an unexpected unfavourable influence on our 
balance of payments, particularly on the capital account. I am glad to say that in informed and responsible 
quarters abroad, confidence in the South African economy continues unabated.'244 However, writing in 
1977, the South African military correspondent A.J. Venter judged: 'Rumours during the Angola war did 
much to halt the flow of foreign investment into Southern Africa ... We also have the spectre of some South 
African businessmen packing and leaving the country as a result of uncertainty following the Angolan 
adventure' ?45 RW. Johnson judged that 'Angola was an economic disaster,246 and Callinicos and Rogers 
claimed that South African 'big business' had demanded that the government withdraw from Angola 
because government spending was spiralling and businesses were being forced to compete with the 
government for funds, so forcing up interest rates?47 
Another cause of discontent was the perceived encroachment of military requirements into the business 
sector. The National Supplies Procurement Act (No. 89 of 1970) had given the Minister of Defence the 
power to order any individual or company to 'manufacture, produce, process or treat and to supply or 
deliver or sell' any goods or services to the SADF 'when necessary for the security of South Africa'. The 
sweeping powers of the Act were first utilised by the government in order to meet a shortage of tents during 
the intervention in Angola,248 leading some businessmen to fear subordination of production to military 
purposes?49 The disruption caused by the call-up of Citizen Force units for three-month training camps at 
the end of 1975, instead of the usual three weeks, was criticised by some businessmen.25o The United 
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Party's spokesman for defence claimed that some of the servicemen who had been called up had been 
illegally fired by their employers.251 Some companies refused to make up the difference between their 
employees' army pay and their usual civilian salaries?52 According to Willem Steenkamp, some employers 
refused on the ground that they would not pay for services they had not received, and at least one large 
employer had stated that he opposed the government's intervention in Angola and saw no reason why he 
should give it tacit support.253 Although firms were not legally obliged to make up their employees' pay, 
Kent Durr of the National Party threatened to draw up a 'roll of shame' of companies not doing SO.z54 The 
Cape Times criticised Durr for trying to stir up 'party political animus' .255 
WlllTE PUBLIC OPINION 
'Rumour is rife and confusion and concern are growing, particularly 
amongst parents, wives, girlfriends and relatives of servicemen, simply 
because statements made by or on behalf of the Minister of Defence 
and others cannot be reconciled with facts which appear to be obvious.' 
(De Villiers Graaff, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976)256 
Once news of South Africa's intervention in Angola became available to the rest of the world, the 
government's attempts to suppress the information within South Africa were rendered counterproductive. 
Foreign radio broadcasts could be picked up in South Africa, foreign newspapers were on sale and there 
also existed an effective 'bush telegraph' conveying allegations and rumours amongst the troopS?57 
Consequently rumours prevailed, leading Botha to declare that: 'Rumour mongers in our midst are as great 
a danger to South Africa as the terrorists: 258 There were conflicting stories of military successes followed 
by reports of major disasters,z59 Rumours circulated that South African forces were fighting Russians and 
that Voortrekkerhoogte Military Hospital in Pretoria was filled with casualties. In Parliament Vause Raw of 
the United Party referred to rumours that troops had been subjected to inhumane suffering and were 
returning home with shellshock?60 
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The news blackout in South Africa had worked surprisingly well; white South Africans were 'stunned and 
horrified' to learn of the capture of four of their soldiers in Angola.261 There was also mounting uneasiness 
over the steady trickle of casualties in the 'operational area'262, which were officially ascribed to contacts 
with 'terrorists' 0263 The relatives of those that were killed were given no details of where or how their 
deaths had occurred?64 Botha later announced that 29 South Mricans had been killed in action and 14 in 
accidents between 14 July 1975 and 23 January 1976.265 Until Operation Savannah, South Africa's long-
simmering counter-insurgency had cost almost no South African lives. On 18 November, beside a large 
map of Angola, The Star ran a lead report on troop losses in action. On the same day, the Rand Daily Mail 
protested at the lack of information about deaths-in-action released by Defence Headquarters, and both Die 
Transvaler and Die Vaderland published lists of casualties (which proved to be incorrect). On 28 
November the Cape Times pointed out the escalation of 'border' casualties: 11 South Mricans, including 
teenage National Servicemen, had died in the previous month. In his recollections of his national service, 
Rick Andrew, a young musician living in Cape Town at the time, remembered: 'Every now and then news 
filtered down that more South African soldiers had been killed in the operational area. The operational area. 
Was that Angola or the border? No one really knew' .266 
The longer-term impact on white South Africans is difficult to gauge from conflicting reports?67 John 
Stockwell wrote that: 'The damage to its [South Africa's] white population's morale, the bitterness over the 
deaths of its soldiers in a secret, ill-conceived campaign in Angola, the humiliation of having two soldiers 
paraded before the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa, ,were all impossible to measure' .268 
261 The Guardian, 18 December 1975. The Defence authorities refused permission to publish a transcript of 
their interrogation: Rand Daily Mail, 18 December 1975. 
262 The Guardian, 18 December 1975. 
263 On 26 November the Rand Daily Mail's front page lead claimed: 'terrorist suicide squads based in 
Zambia and Angola are responsible for a sudden escalation of skirmishes in South Africa's northern 
operational area. The same suicide-terror squads are also responsible for the increased number of casualties 
among South African troops stationed in the area.' This false story was fed to Bob Hitchcock, the defence 
correspondent, by a senior SADF source and was never refuted by the SADF: Addison, Censorship of the 
Press in South Africa, p. 171. 
264 Mystery and confusion still surrounds some of the deaths. Corporal Neville Beechey was killed together 
with three other South Mricans, on 29 October 1975, when a UNITA reconnaissance plane crashed in 
mysterious circumstances: P. Els, We Fear Naught But God (Covos-Day, Johannesburg, 2000), p. 28; 
Breytenbach, Forged in Battle, p. 95; Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 105-106; Geldenhuys, A 
General's Story, pp. 53-54. On an internet roll of honour for SADF members Beechey's brother has 
commented: 'It has been over 25 years since you were killed. We still have no information on your death, 
the whole family still misses you.' (Correspondence with Larry Beechey). 
265 Republic of South Mrica, House of Assembly Debates, 26 January 1976, col. 50. Spies listed 35 Defence 
Force casualties, 5 Portuguese and an unknown number of black casualties between 29 October 1975 and 6 
March 1976: Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, Appendix A. 
266 R. Andrew, Buried in the Sky (Penguin Books, London, 2001), p. 6. 
267 The difficulties in assessing white opinion are presented in D. Baker, 'The Impact of Regional Events on 
Whites in Rhodesia and South Africa', (Plural Societies, Vol. 10, No.1, Spring 1979); D. Baker, 'Retreat 
from Challenge: White Reactions to Regional Events Since 1974', in 1. Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since 
the Ponuguese Coup, pp. 155-180. 
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Figure 8: White South Africans were stunned and horrified 










. [photograph taken by the author at VoortrekkerhoogteMilitary Base Cemetery, Pretoria] 
Figure 9: Twenty-nine South Africans were killed in action and 14 in accidents 










However, Heribert Adam, an American scholar writing from Cape Town in late 1976, claimed: 'What 
strikes the visitor to South Africa is the very absence of a feeling of threat among Afrikaners, even after the 
Russia-Cuban invasion in Angola, [there is] a high degree of complacency ... Pseudo-issues or false 
priorities, such as the information policy of the government ... are hotly debated, while the real issue of 
South Africa's military involvement is avoided. While Defence Minister P.W. Botha admits that South 
Africa cannot match each Cuban weapon, the illusion of being able to march right to Lagos or at least 
Luanda, if necessary, is still widespread, the confidence of being able to hold the White fortress is virtually 
unbroken' .269 
Public opinion polls provide one, albeit flawed, means to assess popular reaction. In May 1976, The Star 
published the conclusions of a nation-wide survey it had commissioned from a company called Market 
Research Africa. Of the 1,000 white South Africans questioned, 64 percent of respondents overall felt the 
government had been right to send troops into Angola, whilst only 18 percent disagreed (the remaining 18 
percent had 'no opinion'). A larger proportion of Afrikaans-speakers (70 percent) than English-speakers 
(55 percent) felt the government's action had been correct, whilst a smaller proportion (14 percent as 
opposed to 22 percent) objected. Just over half the respondents (51 percent) felt South Africa had been 
right to withdraw from Angola. More Afrikaans-speakers (32 percent) than English-speakers (20 percent) 
felt that the troops should have been kept in Angola. Only 27 percent of those surveyed believed that 
Cabinet should have the right to send troops to fight in another country without first consulting Parliament 
(a majority of 53 percent disagreed). 46 percent of all respondents felt that the government had failed to 
keep the public properly informed of events in Angola (35 percent were satisfied) and 49 percent felt the 
South African press should not have been prevented from publishing information on Angola that had 
already been published abroad (33 percent did not object). The Star concluded that: 
'Most White South Africans think the Government was right to send 
troops into Angola but are unhappy over the fact that this was done 
without Parliament being consulted. The majority also feel that South 
Africans were not kept properly informed on the Angolan adventure, 
and that the Government should not stop newspapers from printing 
information on Angola that has already been published or broadcast 
abroad' .270 
In June and July 1977 Market and Opinion Surveys sent a postal questionnaire to a randomly selected 
nationwide sample of 1,352 Afrikaans-speaking whites and 946 English-speaking whites. A general 
question about recent events was posed in an open-ended form: 'Think about our national affairs and 
politics over the last three years. Which events have influenced your political thinking the most?' The 
'Angola situation' emerged as the second most prominent issue after the townships revolts of 1976. Given 
the proposition that 'citizens have still not been adequately informed about the South African government's 











Angolan intervention, the reasons for it and the consequences of it', 44.1 percent of respondents agreed 
completely (34.7 percent of Afrikaans-speakers and 56.6 percent of English-speakers), 25.8 percent agreed 
partly, 22.1 percent disagreed entirely (30.1 percent of Afrikaans-speakers and 11.5 percent of English-
speakers). The survey showed that while white South Africans tended to support broad propositions of a 
democratic kind, the likelihood of embarrassment to the government was sufficient to nullify claims to 
explanations of government actions (especially with regards to Afrikaans-speakers). Whilst a substantial 
proportion of the respondents (76.7 percent) supported the general proposition that political representatives 
have an obligation to account to the public for their actions during their term of office, only 35 percent 
agreed completely with the proposition that the press and public have a right of access to the reasons for 
government decisions even if the government would be embarrassed. 52.7 percent of English-speakers, but 
only 21.6 percent of Afrikaans-speakers, agreed completely with this proposition (42.9 percent of 
Afrikaans-speakers disagreed entirely, whilst only 12.1 percent of English-speakers did).271 
An election is perhaps the most authoritative measurement of white public opinion. In the general election 
of November 1977, V orster won a landslide victory. The National Party secured 134 of the 165 seats in the 
House of Assembly, the highest proportion of parliamentary seats ever gained by a political party in South 
Africa?72 Although Vorster had made external interference in South African affairs, especially from the 
United States, a key issue of the election, the Nationalists' gains were largely attributable to the electorate's 
approval of the severe measures that had been used to put down the Soweto uprisings.273 Seventy percent of 
South Africa's 1.2 million white voters had supported the National Party. At the time it was an electoral 
victory unparalleled in the country's history. 
BLACK REACTION TO THE WAR AND THE SOWETO UPRlSING 
'Black Africa is riding the crest of a wave generated by the Cuban 
success in Angola... Black Africa is tasting the heady wine of the 
possibility of realising the dream of "total liberation'" . 
(The World, Johannesburg, 24 February 1976). 
The nature of apartheid society was such that it is necessary to consider the opinions of white and black 
South Africans separately. However, if it is difficult for one to assess the reaction of the white community 
to South Africa's Angolan intervention, it is harder still to examine its impact on the country's other racial 
270 The qtar, 12 May 1976. 
271 L. Sd'l.emrner, 'Change in South Africa: Opportunities and Constraints', in R. Price & c. Rosberg (eds), 
The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination (David Philip, Cape Town, 1980), pp. 243-
244; Matthews, The Darker Reaches of Government. pp. 198-199. 
272 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, p. 426; Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 36. 












groups. Evidence from within the black conununity (which was far from a homogenous unit) is much 
harder to come by, and where available tends to be anecdotal. 
As early as July 1974, Die Burger predicted that the inuninent presence of black governments in Angola 
and Mozambique 'could have a particular effect on the Coloured and black people of this country who 
would naturally be inclined to identify themselves with those who achieve power in the Portuguese 
territories,.274 The South African government acknowledged that the demise of the Portuguese empire 
might encourage other liberation efforts, including those within South Africa. The 1975 White Paper on 
Defence claimed: 'Revolutionary forces regard the Portuguese developments as an important victory. In 
conformity with the Marxist dialectics concerning balance of power, this therefore represents to them a 
significant shift of the centre of gravity in their favour. This will undoubtedly encourage the radical 
elements in revolutionary organisations inside and outside the R.S.A and incite them to greater efforts. 
They regard Angola and Mo~ambique as new allies and potential new operational bases for action against 
Rhodesia and the R.S.A' .275 
There was clearly a level of identification between some South African blacks and the liberation 
movements in neighbouring countries. Nelson Mandela recalled: 'we had leamed what the [prison] 
authorities did not want us to know. We learned of the successful liberation struggles in Mozambique and 
Angola in 1975 and their emergence as independent states with revolutionary governments. The tide was 
turning our way' .276 News of the establishment of a transitional government in Mozambique was greeted in 
Soweto with a level of enthusiasm reached before only when Albert Luthuli was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize??? In 1974, SASO and the BPC had regalvanised black public protest in South Africa, when they 
organised solidarity 'Viva FRELIMO' rallies in Durban and at the black University of the North in 
Turfloop.278 Their celebration of the independence of Mozambique conjured up a vision amongst young 
blacks of eventual political freedom in South Africa. Although banned by the police, the rally at Currie's 
Fountain in Durban went ahead and according to the Black Review, about five thousand people attended?79 
274 Die Burger, 29 July 1974 quoted in M. Simons, 'Mrikaner Nationalist Perspectives About Change in 
South Mrican Domestic Policies', in J. Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, p. 118. 
275 Republic of South Africa Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 1975, p. 7. 
276 N. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Abacus, London, 1995), p. 596. 
277 Rand Daily Mail, 23 September 1974. 
278 Ibid, 24 September 1974. Following the rallies the offices of SASO and BPC were raided and their 
leaders detained under the Terrorism Act: Black Review 1974-75, pp. 80-81 quoted in L. Wilson, 'Bantu 
Steve Biko: A Life', in N. Pityana, M. Ramphele, M. Mpurnlwana & L. Wilson (eds) , Bounds of 
Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness (David Philip, Cape Town, 1991), p. 53. 
The subsequent two-year trial and conviction of nine Black Consciousness organisers (seven Africans and 
two Indians) was in effect a judgement of the Black Consciousness philosophy: H. Mashabela, A People on 
the Boil: Reflections on Soweto (Skotaville Publishers, Braamfontein, 1987), p. 85; Herbstein, White Man, 
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Over a thousand students attended the rally at Turfloop?80 The report of the Snyman Commission, which 
was appointed to examine the Turfloop disturbances, listed slogans that had appeared on the university 
campus as posters and graffiti. These included: 'Frelimo fought and regained our soil, our dignity. It is a 
story. Change the name and the story applies to you'; 'Viva Frelimo. Azania is bored and from this 
boredom a Revolution shall erupt. Down with Vorster and his Dogs! Power! We shall overcome'; 'The 
dignity of the Black Man has been restored in Mozambique and so shall it be here' .z81 
During the war in Angola there were few public statements by prominent blacks in support of the MPLA, 
and a seeming reluctance to discuss the issue in print. The most notable exception was the Black Peoples' 
Convention CBPe) , one of the principal organisations of the Black Consciousness movement in South 
Africa?82 The movement had been born into the vacuum left by the banning of the African National 
Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress and the central theme of its philosophy was black psychological 
liberation and self-assertion?83 At its Fourth Annual Congress in December 1975, at the height of the 
Angolan war, the BPC openly announced its recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate government of 
Angola?84 Steve Biko told Donald Woods that the Black Consciousness movement as a whole supported 
Neto but predicted that the MPLA's use of Cuban troops to counter the South African invasion would lead 
the West to call Neto a puppet of the Communist powers?85 
Some conservative black leaders did make statements but most were oblique because they could not be 
seen to support a movement or government that the authorities condemned as Marxist. In a speech to a 
mass rally in Soweto on 14 March 1976, Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of the KwaZulu 
homeland government and president of Inkatha, avoided mentioning the MPLA but claimed: 'The Prime 
Minister's detente policy has not succeeded. Not only has it not succeeded, but white South Africa has 
burnt her fingers in Angola. There was a scream of applause throughout South Africa, and outside, when 
South African troops were withdrawn from Zimbabwe. But we have seen in a matter of months that score 
erased by South Africa herself, through her Angolan connection.' He continued: 'The pace of events and 
the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa is gaining momentum ... every hour of the day, the time is 
280 J. Wolfson (ed.), Tunnoil at TUifloop: A Summary of the Reports of the Snyman and Jackson 
Commissions of Inquiry into the University of the North (South African Institute of Race Relations, 
Johannesburg, 1976),pp. 1,3,30. 
281 Wolfson (ed.), Tunnoil at Tuifloop, p. 28. 
282 The movement was spearhead by the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), encompassing 
African, coloured, and Indian university students, which had been established as a break-away from the 
multi-racial but white-dominated National Union of South African Students in 1969. With Steve Biko as its 
first president, SASO had been instrumental in the 1972 formation of the BPC, which aimed to expand the 
Black Consciousness philosophy to a broader adult constituency. Mashabela, A People on the Boil, pp. 10, 
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drawing nearer, when we will see White South Africa's enemies encamped on South Africa's border.,286 
The Star reported that Buthelezi's speech had been enthusiastically received by ten thousand Sowetans 
shouting, 'Power is ours'. Dr Andries Treuruicht, the new junior Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Education, warned that Buthelezi was 'preaching revolution' and that 'this sort of talk is very dangerous for 
South Africa' ?87 
In an article entitled'S. African Role Upsets Its Blacks' , Denis Herbstein reported the reactions of several 
other black leaders to the South African invasion. Bishop Desmond Tutu, Anglican Dean of Johannesburg, 
pointed out that South Africa's disenfranchised blacks were not mesmerised by the spectre of a communist 
threar88 : 'many Blacks do not see themselves threatened as they are victims of other ideologies in South 
Africa.' The Chief Minister of Gazankulu, Hudson Ntsanwisi, had said: 'People are saying "The devil we 
don't know cannot be worse than the devil we now know'" , and noted that: 'Our restless youth is espousing 
the cause of the MPLA.' Another homeland chief, Cedric Phatudi of Lebowa, had called the South African 
intervention 'a mistake' and stressed: 'If the blacks don't have a stake in the country, they cannot give it 
their fullloyalty.'289 Herbstein believed that the main internal aim of the government's censorship was to 
keep the black population, specifically, in ignorance of the war: 'It is dangerous for a country to fight a war 
when five sixths of the population are either neutral of rooting for the enemy'. 290 
Whilst the government called for national solidarity in the face of 'communist imperialism' threatening 
blacks and whites alike, the Angolan war called into question the issue of where the loyalties of South 
Africa's blacks would lie if South Africa were to face an external threat. Buthelezi stated that, 'The 
majority of blacks will not find it in their hearts to die on the country's borders to defend a system which is 
to them morally repugnant, a system which dehumanises them and which mocks God Almighty for creating 
us blacks also in his image.'291 Sonny Leon, leader ofthe coloured Labour Party, declared: 'I will never tell 
286 M. Buthelezi, Power is Ours: Selected Speeches of South African Statesman M. Gatsha Buthelezi, 
Buthelezi Speaks on the Crisis in South Africa (Books in Focus, New York, 1979), p. 24; Buthelezi, 'A 
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threat of communism having seen anti-Asian and anti-Arab activities in Zanzibar and President Arnin of 
Uganda's railing against Indians as 'capitalist exploiters': K. Moodley, 'Structural Inequality and Minority 
Anxiety: Responses of Middle Groups in South Africa', in R. Price & c. Rosberg (eds), The Apartheid 
Regime, p. 233. 
289 Washington Post, 24 January 1976 quoted in Legum, Vorster's Gamble for Africa, p. 45. See also The 
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my people to fight for the perpetuation of white baasskap. It would be unfair to expect Coloured soldiers to 
risk their lives for their country when they are still being treated as second-class citizens.'292 
As the Defence Force withdrew from Angola, The World, South Africa's main black newspaper, asked its 
readers: 'Would you fight for South Africa if we are invaded from Angola?' Some 244 letters were 
received in reply, 203 of which said they were opposed to fighting in defence of South Africa. The most 
common reason given was that it would be a white man's war in which most blacks would have little to 
defend. Some recalled the Second World War and the bonuses given to white veterans while 'worthless 
medals' were offered to blacks. One Soweto resident commented wryly: 'I'm a Bantu homeland citizen, so 
I'd be indulging myself in foreign politics - South Africa's.' Another asked, 'How can a black man be 
expected to fight with the dompas [pass book] in his pocket, because if he leaves it at home he will be 
arrested?' However, some who opposed fighting said they would change their minds if the pass laws were 
abolished or if their economic conditions were improved?93 
Black public opinion is harder to gauge than the reaction of politicians or the black press. On 22 February 
1976, the South African Sunday Times ran a series of articles detailing black reactions to the war in Angola. 
Howard Lawrence reported that in coloured bars in Cape Town 'when South African soldiers appear on the 
[television] screen, the coloured customers hiss', but 'when scenes are shown of MPLA or Cuban soldiers, 
there are shouts of exultation' ?94 Lawrence also noted that 'in the townships, at the lowest socio-economic 
level, gang names are changing from the "Panorama Kids" and "Naughty Boys" to "Cuban Kids" and 
"MPLA Terrors'" .295 In late February 1976, a SW APO fighter being interviewed in Luanda claimed: 'Our 
friends [in South Africa] report on black reactions to documentaries on the Angolan war in cinemas. 
Enthusiastic applause when MPLA victories are portrayed, dead silence on anything favourable to the 
South Africans.'296 
292 K. Grundy, Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1983), p. 222. Evidence of the fact that the Defence Force was seen by 
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soldiers in 21 Battalion were moved out of Soweto and into a military camp for their own protection. 
293 Quoted in The Star, 13 March 1976. See also, Herbstein, White Man, p. 131. 
294 Similarly an eye-witness described to the authors of Southern Africa after Soweto, how in Cape Town 
huge black audiences would watch the television news in Coloured hotels and cheer every report of South 
African casualties in the 'operational zone': Callinicos & Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto, p. 157. 
295 Sunday Times, 22 February 1976. However, it may be that such names were intended to offend 'middle-
class' black opinion as much as white sensibilities. In his work on Sowetan gangs, Clive Glaser has 
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In mid-I976, a 'leading ANC cadre' who had been in Johannesburg at the time of South Mrica's 
intervention, said he believed: 'It was the defeat of Vorster's troops in Angola which completely 
transformed people's thinking, especially the young people whom our traditional organisations had not 
been able to reach until now.'297 Writing in the Rand Daily Mail, Roger Sargent claimed: 'In Angola Black 
troops - Cubans and Angolans have defeated White troops in military exchanges. Whether the bulk of the 
offensive was by Cubans or Angolans is immaterial in the colour-conscious context of this war's 
battlefield, for the reality is that they won, are winning, and are not White; and that psychological edge, that 
advantage the White man has enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonialism and empire, is slipping 
away. White elitism has suffered an irreversible blow in Angola and Whites who have been there know 
it' ?98 The New York Times quoted the principal of a black high school in Soweto as saying that Angola 
'was very much on the minds of his 700 students .. .it gives them hope.' Similarly a young black man in 
Soweto had mused: 'It makes us all think. In Rhodesia they are talking and after 10 years they have 
nothing. In Angola and Mozambique they fought, and they have won.'299 
Representatives of both the United Party and the Progressive Reform Party foresaw the possible impact that 
Angola could have on South Mrica's blacks. Dr G.P. Jacobs of the United Party predicted: 'We must 
expect a hardening of the attitudes of our own Non-Whites.' 300 He believed that the 'imperative lesson we 
learnt from Angola is that we will not survive unless we can have the loyalty of all South Africans.'301 
Similarly his leader, Sir De Villiers Graaff, claimed: 'unless things change in South Africa there are going 
to be many people of the non-White races in South Africa who are going to be less afraid of communism 
than they are of the present deal they are getting in South Africa.'302 Colin Eglin of the PRP was more 
specific in claiming that: 'many black people see what is happening in the north and in Angola as part of 
the process of their liberation from discrimination and domination within South Africa ... Just as many of 
them cheered the Frelimo victories in Mozambique, so I believe that many of the Black people of South 
Africa are getting a silent satisfaction out of the successes of the MPLA.'303 Helen Suzman stressed: 'You 
can give our men at the border the most modern, sophisticated weapons and they will be as effective as 
bows and arrows if behind them, inside South Africa, there is a growing ground-swell of discontent 
amongst 80 percent of the population.'304 
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OPERATION SAY ANNAB AND THE SOWETO UPRISING 
'It happened in Angola. Why not here?' 
(Placard displayed in Soweto on 16 June?05 
On 16 June 1976 black schoolchildren in Soweto protested against the government's introduction of 
compulsory Afrikaans-language instruction in their schools. The unrest and its brutal suppression sparked 
angry protests throughout the country, the first widespread black collective action since the early 1960s. 
'Soweto' came to represent the whole of the disturbances, which included strikes in the Cape that were 
joined by Coloured workers. In Soweto Remembered: Conversations with Freedom Fighters, Paddy 
Colligan interviewed David Ndaba, a student activist who had left South Africa after Soweto and joined the 
ANC in exile. Ndaba claimed: 'The defeat of the South African troops that invaded Angola in 1975 and in 
1976 is one of the elements that inspired our popular uprisings of 1976.'306 
In 1977, R.W. Johnson claimed: 'The Angolan deMcle was, for South Africa's White Establishment, an 
appallingly comprehensive disaster. The triumph, first of FRELIMO and then of the MPLA, contributed 
powerfully to the new and assertive mood of the Republic's black population'. Johnson believed that in the 
'psychological impact of Angola', together with the deteriorating economic situation, lay the root cause of 
the black-white confrontations of 1976?07 John Kane-Berman, a liberal South African journalist who 
published the first academic analysis of Soweto, claimed the single most important factor leading to the 
volatility of the South African townships was the influence of Black Consciousness ideology. He judged 
that: 'The liberation of Mozambique and Angola and the guerrilla wars being waged in Namibia and 
Rhodesia are likely to have had an impact on a fairly wide cross-section of blacks, firing them with the 
expectation of major change. Moreover, to the extent that black South Africans saw the withdrawal of 
South African military forces from Angola as a sign that white power was not invincible, this too would 
have had an important psychological impact' ?08 Also published in 1978, Southern Africa after Soweto by 
Alex Callinicos and John Rogers claimed that 'the Angolan debacle provided the catalyst to the revolt'. 
They believed that the MPLA's victory over the South African regime's troops together with FRELIMO's 
victory in Mozambique 'helped to instil in black South Africans the confidence that their white rulers could 
be taken on and beaten' .309 
Denis Herbstein pointed out that although the Defence Force had claimed its withdrawal had been for 
political rather than military reasons, it could not control the public's perception of events: 'The black 
305 Republic of South Africa (Justice Petrus Malan Cillie), Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
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people of South Africa, rightly or wrongly, believed that their white soldiers had been given a bloody nose 
by the black Angolans'. Consequently, 'A small chink had appeared in the monolithic armour of the 
country's defence system. Coming so soon after the victory of the Frelimo 'terrorists', this had an 
incalculable impact on urban blacks,.310 In Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a 
Revolution?, Baruch Hirson claimed the reassertion of black working-class militancy as evidenced by the 
wave of strikes in 1973 overshadowed Black Consciousness in contributing to the ideological climate of 
rebellion but claimed that 'the army's venture into Angola was the dominant factor that changed the mood 
of the black townships,.311 Also writing from within the community of exiled South African activists, A. 
Brooks and J. Brickhill placed the emphasis of their analysis on the changes in the educational system. 
However, they recognised: 'Throughout their formative years, there were few events with which the young 
people could identify and from which they drew encouragement, but those there were gave them hope and 
determination ... Within South Africa there were the Natal strikes by black workers in 1973 and, above all, 
the defeat of South African troops in Angola in 1975-76, showing that the white army was not 
invincible' .312 
On 24 June 1976, Justice P.M. Cillie was appointed as the chairman and sole member of a Government 
Commission of Enquiry into the events of Soweto. Chapter 5 of his report, entitled 'Political and Military 
Developments Outside the RSA' , considered whether developments in southern Africa had contributed to 
the outbreak of the 'riots'. CUM posed the question of 'whether the Black man in the RSA did not regard 
the Black man who had fought for freedom in other parts of Southern Africa as an ally in the struggle 
against the White oppressor and whether that idea did not contribute to the outbreak of the riots,.313 The 
evidence CUM considered included pamphlets issued by the African National Congress detailing the 
success of liberation movements in neighbouring countries and the international support those movements 
had received. Cillie stated that it was not known how many of the 'rioters' read the pamphlets but 
concluded that some of their leaders must have been aware of their contents.314 
One ANC pamphlet, entitled 'South Africa Get Out of Angola', was issued on 10 December 1975. It 
described how the 'patriotic forces' in Angola had achieved victory with Soviet, Russian, Vietnamese and 
Cuban assistance. It stressed that all the peoples of southern Africa were fighting the same fight and that 
revolution had reached the borders of South Africa. A second pamphlet distributed by the ANC on 8 March 
1976 was headed: 'Don't collaborate with the racist intervention in Angola'. A further pamphlet issued in 
309 Callinicos & Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto, pp. 8, 157-158. 
310 Herbstein, White Man, p. 134. 
m Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash, p. 167. 
312 A. Brooks & J. Brickhill, Whirlwind Before the Storm: The origins and development of the uprising in 
Soweto and the rest of South Africa from June to December 1976 (International Defence and Aid Fund, 
London, 1980), p. 68. 
313 Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto, p. 578. 











March and May 1976 claimed that the lesson of Angola was that there was nothing that could stop the 
flames of freedom spreading throughout southern Africa. According to a pamphlet issued in June 1976, 
FRELIMO and the 11PLA had shown that the South African Army was not invincible. A pamphlet 
distributed in December 1976 claimed: 'These racist murderers who slaughter unarmed children and 
women fled in panic when they came face to face with the armed freedom fighters of Umkhonto in 
Zimbabwe in 1967 and 1968. Their racist alTogance shrank when our 11PLA comrades thrashed them in 
Angola. And now the time is coming when Umkhonto will punish the racists on our soil' ?15 
eillit':' s finding was that 'Although political and military events in Southern Africa were not a direct cause 
of the riots and disturbances, they were undoubtedly a factor which, together with many others, helped to 
create a state of mind in which rebelliousness could easily be stirred up' .316 
315 Ibid, p. 579. 
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Figure 10: On 27 March 1976, Botha stood on a dais at Ruacana:and took the salute as 










THE SECURITY SITUATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DEFENCE FORCE 
'Whatever the Government's intentions may have been, we believe that 
they have committed an error of judgement in this matter. It has not 
resolved the Angolan issue. The MPLA is still there. The Russians are 
still there. The Cubans are still there ... in the space of three months we 
have moved from an era of peaceful, albeit strained, co-existence into a 
new era of militarism in which the effective defence of South 
Africa ... becomes a new and immediate factor.' 
(Colin Eglin, House of Assembly Debates, 27 January 1976)317 
On 22 January 1976, the Defence Force began its withdrawal from Angola. By the end of the month it had 
pulled back to a 50 kilometre-wide buffer zone inside the Angolan border.3J8 In mid-February the Sunday 
Times reported: 'The speed of MPLA's advance has taken everyone by surprise. It is now less than 150 
miles from the South African troops, who are stationed up to 30 miles from the Namibian border. It could 
be only a matter of days before the Cubans bump up against the South Africans,.319 However, as the MPLA 
and Cuban forces advanced into the areas vacated by the South Africans both sides behaved with 
considerable circumspection.32o On 27 March 1976, Botha stood on a dais at Ruacana and took the salute as 
the last South African troops crossed over the Cunene River and back into Namibia.321 In subsequent years 
the date was marked in Angola by a Carnival of Victory - victory in what the MPLA termed the 'Second 
War of National Liberation,.322 
THE COMMUNIST PRESENCE IN ANGOLA 
'We went to confront a potential enemy in Angola and because of that 
confrontation we may expect to meet with a real enemy today. In other 
words, this Government precipitated this problem for South Africa.' 
(H.E.J. van Rensburg, Progressive Reform Party, 28 January 1976)323 
By the start of April, MPLA-Cuban forces were at the Namibian border. At the end of the month, Botha 
claimed that there were between 12,000 and 15,000 Cuban troops in Angola.324 South Africa's intervention 
317 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 27 January 1976, cols. 106-107. 
318 Washington Post, 3 February 1976. The buffer-zone was occupied by between 4,000-5,000 troops. 
Citizen Force units were called up to allow the discharge of the National Servicemen who had reached the 
end of their service period. 
319 Sunday Times, 15 February 1976. 
320 Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola', p. 384. Moss claimed that the MPLA sent spotter 
planes ahead to check for any signs of remaining South African forces: Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 
1977. 
321 Le Monde, 30 March 1976. With Britain, Russia and Nigeria acting as intermediaries, the South African 
government had received assurances from Luanda that work on the Cunene scheme would not be interfered 
with: Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola' , p. 384. 
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had helped bring about the security situation most feared by successive National Party governments, a 
strong communist military presence on South Africa's borders. Vorster claimed that South Africa had 
'done the free world a service' in 'exposing' the Russian-Cuban involvement in Angola.325 However, it 
could be argued that through its own intervention, South Africa had forced Cuba to build up a truly massive 
military presence. Had South Africa not become involved, Cuba and the Soviet Union might well have 
followed a different policy in Angola, at least with regard to the extent of their own military 
involvement,326 South Africa's intervention certainly served to legitimate Soviet and Cuban involvement in 
the eyes of many African states. Pretoria had underestimated the convulsive effect its own entanglement 
would have, so allowing Cuba and the Soviet Union to invoke the spectre of the conquest of Angola by 
white snpremacists. J apie Basson of the United Party told Parliament, 'The Cubans are now the people 
who are regarded as heroes in the Black world.,327 
The fear in Pretoria was that the Soviet and Cuban posture in Angola, large-scale support for a selected 
insurgency movement, was a harbinger of their future regional policy. The intervention of Cuban troops in 
Angola concentrated Pretoria's attentions on the possibility of a conventional war along South Africa's 
own borders?28 The continuing Cuban presence in Angola presented the threat of an attack against 
Namibia, Rhodesia or South Africa itself. Robert Moss predicted: 'What the Russians learned from Angola 
is that war by proxy pays off. They will be strongly tempted to use the same technique in other places - and 
almost certainly in the assault on Rhodesia and South-West Africa' ?29 When the Director General of the 
Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation visited Pretoria on 16-17 March 1976, his discussion with 
General Van den Bergh revolved around 'the Cuban invasion threat': 'We discussed at length the South 
African Military assessment of Cuban plans to attack Rhodesia ... ,330 
The United Party claimed in Parliament that: 'Angola has been a traumatic experience of immense 
consequence. It has jolted the national conscience to an extent that no single event has done for the last 20 
years. This is so because for years we thought we had time ... For years we thought that Russia was 7,000 
miles away. Now Russia is, as it were, in our back garden. This brings about a completely different 
324 Ibid, 26 April 1976, col. 5398. Most estimates suggest that Cuban forces reached 12,000-13,000 by early 
1976: Le Monde, 11 January 1977. The Cubans were joined by symbolic contingents from Guinea-Bissau 
and Guinea (the soldiers from Conakry arrived in early March too late to participate in the fighting). There 
were false rumours about the presence of contingents from Mozambique, Algeria and Czechoslovakia: 
Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 343,498 fn.72. 
325 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 30 January 1976, col. 365. 
326 S. Nolutshungu, 'South African Policy and United States Options in Southern Africa', in G. Bender, J. 
Coleman & R. Sklar (eds), African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1985), p. 51. 
327 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 9 April 1976, col. 4934. 
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situation to which we will have to react.d3! The danger of the 'Red impis' became the new refrain. Marais 
Viljoen, the Minister of Labour, claimed: 'As South Africa's existence was threatened by Dingaan's impis 
137 years ago, so the existence of the Republic and its neighbours is now threatened by the imperialist 
impis of Moscow,.332 In light of Angola, concern was expressed within South Africa that when the 
Transkei and other Bantustans were given 'independence' by South Africa they could become springboards 
for Soviet military aggression against the Republic. An article in the South African Yearbook of 
International Law stressed South Africa's need for 'collective regional defence' against communist 
intervention and suggested a treaty of mutual self-defence with the future independent homelands.333 
The Angolan war had certainly introduced the Soviet Union as a major diplomatic factor in the affairs of 
southern Africa.334 The Soviet Union had demonstrated its willingness and capability to provide effective 
military support for a liberation movement in southern Africa.335 Consequently Moscow made some 
immediate diplomatic gains with black governments in the region. In early 1976 it was reported that 
Angola and the Soviet Union had concluded a twenty-year treaty of 'friendship and cooperation' ,336 which 
was followed in October by an agreement formalising closer political and commercial ties.337 The most 
dramatic change occurred in relations with Mozambique where the Soviets soon eclipsed the Chinese in 
influence. Mozambique feared that the Rhodesian conflict would develop into a conventional war and the 
Soviets, in contrast to the Chinese, had brought from Angola the reputation of being a reliable ally. The 
February 1977 FRELIMO party conference extended a welcome to delegations from the Soviet Union, 
Cuba and several Eastern European countries, but not from China. Improved Soviet relations with African 
countries was symbolised by President Podgorny's March 1977 tour of Tanzania, Zambia and 
Mozambique. Whilst in Mozambique he signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation similar to those 
already concluded with Somalia and Angola?38 South Africa's White Paper on Defence for 1977 predicted: 
'The impact of events in Angola on the RSA's security interests ... will probably have far-reaching 
consequences in the long run ... there is a Soviet shadow over parts of Africa,.339 
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Speaking in February 1976, Vorster foresaw new dangers ahead. He warned that the Russians and Cubans 
in Angola were testing to see how far the Free World would let them proceed. He stressed that 'the 
possibility exists that South Africa will have to meet an onslaught not only from within but also from 
without. .. .340 In March 1976, the Minister of Finance claimed: 'Political developments in Southern 
Africa ... clearly demand that we increase our defence effort and strengthen our economic and military 
preparedness.'341 Following the war an interdepartmental committee was appointed to consider urgently 
'the formulation of strategy on the national level' and the organisational structures required for the 
purpose?42 In light of Angola, it was felt that Western support for South Africa could no longer be relied 
upon in a future anned confrontation.343 Diplomatically isolated and territorially threatened, the 
government perceived itself to be besieged by a 'total onslaught', directed by Moscow and waged at 
different levels. It was assumed that Pretoria's security dilemma was not attributable to legitimate black 
demands for political and economic participation, but to manipulations by forces from outside the region?44 
The 'external threat', rather than the policy of apartheid was seen by Pretoria as the precipitant of South 
Africa's internal problems.345 The perceived threat on South Africa's borders was thus linked to its internal 
security.346 In his New Years speech Vorster commented: 'We have lost men - good men and brave men 
I salute them, and I pray that their families will find comfort in the thought that they died so that men, 
women and children could live free of the yoke of atheist communist enslavement. ,347 
The 1977 White Paper on Defence was largely devoted to an exposition of the concept of a 'total national 
strategy' that was required to counter this 'total onslaught'. 'Total strategy' was 'total' because it did away 
with the previous distinctions between military and civilian, peacetime and wartime. It was to involve all 
the means available to the state: military, economic, psychological, political, sociological, diplomatic, 
cultural and ideological. Although the themes of total onslaught and total strategy had predated the 
intervention of South Africa in Angola, specifically in the 1973 and 1975 White Papers on Defence, they 
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were little more than slogans?48 It was only after Angola, the uprisings in Soweto and Botha's assumption 
of power that the concept of managing the country's security on an integrated basis became operational.349 
A heavy emphasis on South Africa's security in a hostile environment was an important feature of Botha's 
administration. The 'total strategy' was characterised by a near wartime level of resource mobilisation. It 
was described by one American military analyst as 'the most sophisticated development of low-intensity 
conflict doctrine in the world today'. 350 The total onslaught greatly overstated the danger of the external 
environment in which the country found itself. Its antidote of total strategy was a quest for security and an 
affIrmation of political power in a world in which South Africa found itself isolated.351 
ESCALATION IN SW APO ACTIVITY 
'The SW APO incursions took a new turn. Many military observers 
consider 27 March 1976 to be the date on which the insurgency war 
really started in all seriousness. SW APO was now potentially in a 
stronger military position than before.' 
(Jannie GeJdenhuys, A General's Story, pp. 58-59). 
The period of South Africa's intervention in Angola had seen an obvious increased SW APO presence along 
the Angolan-Namibian border. Although the SADF claimed that its involvement in Angola was partly 
motivated by the need to counter SW APO terrorism, in fact PLAN military activities in the Ovambo region 
of Namibia intensified. David Phillips 'Ho Chi Minh' Namholo, PLAN's Chief of Staff (and later Chief of 
Staff of the Namibian Defence Force), explained that while South Africa was striking into Angola, PLAN 
had been able to operate almost with impunity in the area near the border ('shallow Angola,).352 
Limitations placed on SW APO by the Zambian government, as a result of Vorster's detente initiative, also 
necessitated the opening of the Ovambo and Kavango fronts.353 In October 1975, SW APO was reported to 
have established several training camps in Angola.354 On 13 October, the SADF announced that SW APO 
guerrillas from Angola had raided two Namibian villages near Oshikango, murdering a deputy headman 
and his wife and seven tribal policemen?55 In December 1975, the new Ovambo Chief Minister, Cornelius 
Njoba, said that insurgents had been seen as far into Namibia as Ondangua and Oshakati, some 60 
kilometres from Angola?56 Just before Christmas a white woman and child were killed near Grootfontein, 
348 S. Metz, 'Pretoria's "Total Strategy" and Low-Intensity Warfare in Southern Africa', (Comparative 
Strategy, Vol. 6, No.4, 1987), p. 437. 
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352 Brown, 'Diplomacy by Other Means', p. 25. 
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and the subsequent uproar prompted the South African Minister of Justice to personally supervise the 
search for the guerrillas responsible.357 
Following the Defence Force's withdrawal from Angola, South Africa was more vulnerable to PLAN 
forces than ever before. The government was now confronted by an antagonistic counterpart in Luanda that 
was supportive of the liberation movements in Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa itself. SW APO 
acquired a militant ally in the MPLA regime. It was reported that Sam Nujoma was 'overjoyed with the 
quality of the support SW APO was already getting from the MPLA even when South African troops were 
still occupying the Angola-Namibia frontier areas.'358 SW APO had a new base-country from which to 
operate and PLAN's headquarters were transferred to Angola in 1976. Willem Steenkamp claimed: 'The 
most important consequence of the American-South African failure [to prevent an MPLA victory in 
Angola] was that for the first time SW APO acquired an asset generally held to be essential for a successful 
insurgency: a safe border over which it could operate and behind which it could seek sanctuary and general 
support' ?59 
The MPLA government allowed SW APO to establish a network of training camps and bases in southern 
Angola, from which they stepped up their incursions into Namibia.36O No less important to SW APO was the 
military presence in Angola of the Soviet-assisted Cubans, which offered the SW APO leadership a new 
source of assistance.361 Backed by the MPLA's logistical system, SW APO was able to access and distribute 
Soviet supplies more successfully. 362 In February 1976, even the pro-Nationalist newspaper Die Vaderland 
judged: 'The decision of Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, to ask in Pretoria last year for assistance, may 
still have a disastrous result for South West [Africa] because it drove SW APO into the arms of Russia' .363 
There is also the possibility that, like South African blacks, SW APO drew psychological strength from the 
SADF's apparent defeat in Angola. Interviewed in December 1980 Ellen Nomsa Musialela, a SWAPO 
activist living in exile in Luanda claimed: 'When the South African army got defeated in Angola, that was 
an excellent thing. It was a very painful thing for them in their hearts, I'm sure. It was a victory for us. It 
was a happy thing to happen.'364 
357 Ibid, 22 December 1975. 
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359 Steenkamp, 'Politics of Power' , p. 194. 
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The SADF established a kilometre-wide demilitarised zone and a string of new bases across northern 
Namibia.365 The number of South African troops in the country swelled from 16,000 to over 50,000 in 
1976366 and Pretoria declared a state of emergency in northern Namibia. Neto was soon accusing Pretoria 
of supporting continued armed incursions along the Angolan border. On 11 July 1976, the Angolan 
government directly accused South African of burning three Angolan villages?67 However, these measures 
failed to stem the escalation in SW APO infiltrations.368 SW APO was able to move into southern Angola 
and base itself close to the border of Ovambo, the heartland of its support.369 Operating in bases close to the 
border, PLAN cadres were able to move unobtrusively into Namibia to undertake politicising work among 
local people. PLAN's military strategy changed with the opening of its Angolan front. Instead of 'hit and 
run' attacks just across the border, the objective was now to cross the 'red line' (the ,:eterinary'J cordon 
sanitaire dividing the Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi regions from the white farming areas to the south). 
By 1977 there were three military 'fronts', northern, north-eastern and north-western, each a dedicated 
military unit targeting different sectors of the border.37o By October 1977, the SADF was claiming that 
contacts between security force patrols and PLAN were averaging about 100 a month.371 
The intensity of the border conflict escalated as PLAN started to use its Angola springboard more 
effectively and South Africa, in reaction, moved into the phase of 'external operations,.372 In July 1977, 
General Jannie Geldenhuys was placed in command of all troops in Namibia. His strategy to counter PLAN 
was threefold: attempt to win the hearts and minds of the local popUlation, intensify counter-insurgency, 
and, most importantly, destroy PLAN's logistical bases and supply lines in Angola. Geldenhuys, together 
with other Defence Force generals, argued that instead of fighting a defensive war, South Mrica should 
stage pre-emptive attacks against SW APO in Angola?73 On 4 May 1978, the SADF launched its first large-
scale cross-border operation into Angola since Operation Savannah. The raid on Kassinga374, 250 
kilometres inside Angola foreshadowed the phase of South African 'external operations', raids and 
sometimes full-scale conventional invasions which, by 1981, amounted to occupation of key areas of south-
365 The United Nations Commissioner for Namibia told a press conference in Lusaka on 28 August 1976, 
that between 40,000 and 50,000 people had been forcibly removed from the area in 'a gross violation of 
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west Angola. Cross-border operations against SW APO into Zambia in 1978 and 1979 (Operations Safraan 
and Rekstok), were followed in June 1980 by Operation Sceptic/Smokeshell. It was the Defence Force's 
first full-scale penetration of Angola since the 1976 withdrawal. It involved larger forces than those 
deployed in 1975 and saw the first serious clashes between the SADF and the Angolan army.375 
Pretoria employed another tactic in its attempts to counter SW APO; it continued to support Jonas Savimbi 
in southern Angola.376 On 12 February 1976, Savimbi had announced that his forces would revert to 
guerrilla warfare.377 UNITA withdrew into the south-eastern corner of Angola where it began regrouping 
and reorganising. By 1977 UNITA was waging a stubborn guerrilla war, which prevented the MPLA 
regime from consolidating its control over southern Angola. Although not a threat to the MPLA regime's 
survival, UNIT A inflicted serious economic damage by disrupting the coffee harvest and halting the normal 
operation of the Benguela railway.378 It was after P.W. Botha became Prime Minister at the end of 1978 
that large-scale support to UNITA was resumed. The SADF supplied Savimbi's guerrilla headquarters at 
Jamba and provided combat training and weapons for his troopS?79 To enhance UNITA's domestic and 
intemational prestige, special SADF units helped carry out sabotage attacks against the infrastructure of 
southern Angola. These were then claimed by UNITA. Pretoria, assisted by the Reagan administration's 
position on the Cuban linkage issue380, attempted to strengthen UNITA's international image by projecting 
Savimbi as a leading pro-Western figure in African politics.381 Savimbi was presented as a legitimate 
liberation leader fighting to save his country from Soviet imperialism.382 The Reagan administration used 
South Africa as a conduit to supply arms to UNITA383, until the United States Senate repealed the Clark 
Amendment in August 1985.384 The following month the South African Minister of Defence, General 
Magnus Malan, publicly disclosed South African military support for UNITA for the first time.385 
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The Defence Force reasoned that if UNIT A controlled south-eastern Angola, SW APO would not be able to 
operate from there into Namibia. Later, Angolan forces that might have helped SWAPO were tied down 
fighting UNIT A.386 Destabilisation and the promotion of civil war in neighbouring countries, through 
UNITA in Angola and RENAM0387 in Mozambique, became a new strategy of defence for South Africa. 
IMPACT OF ANGOLA ON THE DEFENCE FORCE 
The Defence Force maintained that it was never militarily defeated in Angola. Within South Africa the 
SADF was portrayed either as victorious, or at least as having performed heroically under difficult 
circumstances.3g8 The 1977 White Paper on Defence stressed: 'Despite the anti-South Mrican propaganda 
unleashed in an effort to discredit the South African forces in Angola, factual evidence makes it quite clear 
that these forces gave an excellent account of themselves in their contact with opposing forces, including 
the Cuban troops assisting the MPLA' .389 The recent Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Mrica 
concluded that the SADF 'swept through vast areas of central and eastern Angola, capturing numerous 
towns until it was halted on the outskirts of Luanda by stiff Cuban-led resistance'. This conclusion was 
rejected by the SADF Contact Bureau, consisting of Generals Malan, Viljoen, Geldenhuys and Meiring, 
who claimed that it was without substance.39o 
The SADF officially claimed that 'The allied FNLAIUNITA forces supported by South Mrican forces 
could have conquered the whole of Angola'. It was claimed that the reason that they did not take Luanda 
was because Savimbi was determined to reach a political settlement with the MPLA.391 Subsequently, 
numerous other reasons were put forward. Holden Roberto was blamed for his failed attack on Luanda on 
the eve of independence.392 General Geldenhuys claimed: 'In the end his [Roberto's] stubbornness 
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1991), p. 39. 
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389 Republic of South Africa Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 1977, p. 6. 
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sabotaged not only his own future but, to a large extent, that of Operation Savannah as well,.393 The 
Defence Force also shared the government's belief that South Africa had been betrayed by its Western and 
African 'allies' ?94 General Viljoen has stated: 'There is absolutely no doubt the Americans left us in the 
lurch: 395 It was reported that the Defence Force had wanted to continue with Operation Savannah396 and 
felt that it was made to bear the stigma of withdrawal from Angola unfairly.397 
Although Admiral Biermann, the Chief of the SADF, maintained his silence on the subject until his 
unexpectedly early retirement in July 1976398 , the military high command believed that South Africa's 
politicians were responsible for the damage to its credibility.399 Colonel Jan Breytenbach has claimed that 
the Defence Force was not given a clear directive: 'They never told us what the objective was. The military 
objectives changed with the political objectives: 4OO General Malan, who was Chief of the Army during 
Operation Savannah, has stated: 'We were let down by our politicians:401 Breytenbach believes that, 
'Militarily it was a success. We had them running. We were winning the war but back home the politicians 
were busy losing it. Vorster and Van den Bergh got cold feet politically speaking. We only needed a couple 
more weeks, but their courage failed them.'402 General Geldenhuys was more magnanimous: 'I do not 
intend to blame the politicians. They have their considerations and military objectives are always 
subordinate to the overall political strategy. I did not have to worry about Clark Amendments, or UN and 
OAU sessions' .403 There was specific criticism of the Department of Foreign Affairs and BOSS.404 BOSS 
was blamed for miscalculating American intentions and the military high command held Vanden Bergh 
personally accountable.405 
positions. The FNLA column fled in the face of heavy artillery fire: Moss, 'Battle of Death Road', Sunday 
Telegraph, 13 February 1977; Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 136-137; Du Preez, Avontuur in 
Angola, pp. 116-117; De Villiers, PW, pp. 256-258. 
393 Geldenhuys, A General's Story, p. 54. 
394 Du Preez, Avontuur in Angola, p. xii. During an exchange in Parliament on 6 May 1976, PRP MP Harry 
Schwarz said that he had been told by Botha that South African troops had not entered Luanda because of 
opposition from Washington: Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 6 May 1976, cols. 
6223-6224. 
395 Hamann, Days of the Generals, p. 40. 
396 The Guardian, 22 January 1976. This claim was supported by Jan Breytenbach in interview with this 
author. 
397 Grundy, Soldiers Without Politics, p. 284. 
398 J. Serfontein, Namibia? (Fokus Suid Publishers, Randburg, 1976), p. 336. 
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the time, has claimed: 'Van den Bergh staffed BOSS with security policemen who knew a little about 
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Figure 11: The military high command believed that South Africa's politicians were 
responsible for the credibility gap that had developed. 
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The SADF felt that it had not been permitted to fight without fetters in Angola. It claimed that military 
operations had been hampered by the lack of a clear political objective and the fact that there was often 
indecision about whether involvement should be escalated or even discontinued.406 The military also 
resented the politicians' restrictions on weapomy and personneL407 Vorster had decreed that no more than 
2,500 men and 600 vehicles could be used, and casualties were to be kept to a minimum.408 General Malan 
has asked: 'How could they expect us to do the job properly when they put those sort of troop restrictions 
on us? We were hamstrung before we even started, but as soldiers we went ahead and did the job:409 
Although South Africa's military effort was limited and could have been substantially increased, the 
SADF's claim that it 'could have gone all the way' to Luanda is only conditionally true. In early November 
the two major SADF-Ied combat groups probably had the momentum and capability to take Luanda, but the 
stiffening opposition by MPLA and Cuban forces would probably have begun to inflict intolerably heavy 
casualties.410 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SADF 
'The South African Defence Force by all professional criteria is 
Africa's premier military organisation ... Yet this force that is so central 
to the fortunes of the Republic of South Africa is in almost all respects 
a new force. It was all but born out of the birth pangs of Operation 
Savannah'. 
(Roherty, State Security in South Africa, p. 27). 
Attempts to modernise the Defence Force were begun in response to the changed political climate of the 
1960s. However, according to Helmoed-Romer Heitman, an authority on the SADF, 'the most important 
impetus was the experience of the 1975-76 incursion into Angola. This removed most remaining doubts 
concerning the need to rebuild the Army's conventional forces'.411 Pretoria sought an enhanced military 
406 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 79. 
407 Ibid, p. 80. 
408 Interview with General Andre van Deventer. (When South Africa stayed in Angola after 11 November, 
101 Task Force was established and General Andre J. van Deventer took command of the operation). In 
fact, South African troops eventually numbered 4,000-5,000 men: Legum & Hodges, After Angola, p. 37; 
W. Steenkamp, "'Rommel" in Angola', in L. Scholtz (ed.), Beroemde Suid-Afrikaanse Krygsmanne 
(Rubicon-Pers, Cape Town, 1984), p. 181. 
409 Hamann, Days of the Generals, p. 31. 
410 See the pessimistic reports of Generals Andre van Deventer, Magnus Malan and Con stand Viljoen in 
Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, pp. 259, 261. 264. When the SADF's 1987 military campaign in 
Angola led to large numbers of troop deaths it provoked a wave of war resistance which significantly, 
included the Afrikaans community for the first time: Catholic Institute for International Relations, Out of 
Step: War Resistance in South Africa (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1989), p. 120. 
411 H.-R. Heitman, South African Armed Forces (Buffalo Publications, Cape Town, 1990), p. 20. The Army 
Battle School was established at Lohatlha, in the northern Cape, with suitable terrain for ground forces to 
train in conventional war techniques: J. SeIfe, The Total Onslaught and the Total Strategy: Adaptations to 











capability in line with its understanding of the changed strategic situation. The Defence Force was 
modernised and re-equipped in order to conduct large-scale pre-emptive raids into neighbouring countries 
and to counter any conventional attack. The Defence Force was to have two roles: counter-insurgency at 
home and the projection, if necessary, of conventional power abroad.412 General Geldenhuys, who 
conducted the debriefing conferences after Operation Savannah, has described the changes that were 
instituted: 'We identified and formulated the lessons we had learnt and planned our follow-up programme 
of action. We made substantial changes and adjustments, which proved invaluable later on. The 
improvements affected battle techniques and procedures; hardware projects; closer cooperation between 
different corps of the Army, and between the arms and branches of the service,.413 
CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMS OF THE DEFENCE FORCE 
'The Army and the Air Force had been talking about joint operations 
for quite some time, but it had always been pretty theoretical. Savannah 
stopped that from being theoretical. It was realised that it was essential 
for the Army and Air Force to work together. By the latter stages of the 
border war they were working so closely together that in at least one 
case the ground operations were directed by a helicopter pilot. That's 
how close they got. That was an important effect of Savannah. 
(Interview with Willem Steenkamp) 
Botha told Parliament that in Angola the Air Force had only been used 'in a supporting capacity, i.e. in a 
transport capacity' and that the Navy had only been used in a guarding capacity.414 In fact, the SAAF had 
flown reconnaissance missions, had provided an air strike during the FNLA's attempt to take Luanda and, 
when that attack failed, had airlifted troops from north of Luanda onto the frigate SAS President Steyn.415 It 
has been claimed that a lack of coordination between the Army and Air Force during Operation Savannah 
had hampered the military effort. According to Willem Steenkamp, a breakdown in communications 
resulted in a 'friendly fire' incident. Army anti-aircraft gunners were not warned that an Air Force 
helicopter would be over flying and shot it down killing four South Africans.416 
1987), p. 64. In 1978 the first formation-level exercise in conventional warfare for almost ten years was 
carried out: Heitman, The South African War Machine, p. 38. 
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(Macmillan Press, London, 1988), p. 241. 
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414 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 6 May 1976, col. 6220. 
415 M. Louw & S. Bouwer, The South African Air Force at War (Chris van Rensburg Publications, 
Johannesburg, 1995), p. 141; D. Becker, On Wings of Eagles: South Africa's Military Aviation History 
(South African Air Force and Walker-Ramus Trading Co., Durban 1996), p. 217. Brig. B. de V. Roos, who 
had been liaison officer with the FNLA at Ambriz, was picked up with his men at the Ambrizette harbour 
on 28 November 1975: De Villiers, PW, p. 259. 
416 Interview with Willem Steenkamp. The incident is confirmed by Hilton Hamann in Days of the 











Communication between the AnDy and the Navy during the early stages of Operation Savannah was non-
existent.417 Until early November 1975, no one in the Navy knew that the SADF had been directly involved 
in the Angolan war. The AnDy sought no advice or assistance from the Navy until the operation was 
approaching the original termination date of 11 November 1975. The planning staff at Defence 
Headquarters who had been running Operation Savannah, a small group of 'designated initiates', did not 
include a naval officer.418 The ftrst the Chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral 1. Johnson, knew about Operation 
Savannah was when an instruction was received from SADF Headquarters on 3 November 1975, that a 
frigate be prepared to patrol the Angolan coast. At the time Johnson was attending a cocktail party hosted 
by the Chief of the Air Force, Lt Gen. R. Rogers. When Johnson asked Rogers about Operation Savannah 
he was told that if the Chief of the Navy did not know about the operation then the Chief of the Air Force 
was not authorised to tell him. Although Johnson was eventually given a full brieftng, the Navy was still 
not placed on an equal footing with the AnDy and the Air Force.419 
Rear Admiral Chris Bennett, who was Senior Staff Offtcer Operations (Navy) at the time, has stated: 'It is 
extremely difftcult to say in retrospect what the actual effects of this failing in the planning staff was on 
operations and the long-term political situation. After all, the enemy was using the coastline and being very 
effectively supported by sea, and a proper South African naval presence could have influenced the situation 
markedly'. One effect of Operation Savannah was that it showed that Naval Headquarters should be located 
with the other Defence Force Headquarters in Pretoria. In late 1976 it was announced that Naval 
Headquarters were to be transferred from Simonstown to Pretoria so that the functions of the three service 
arms could be better coordinated. Announcing the decision Botha said that he had ftrst been sceptical of the 
idea but that circumstances had so changed 'in this dangerous world of today' that the decision had to be 
taken earlier than had been expected.42o According to Bennett, the success of the move was confirmed by 
the 'excellent co-operation and support' between the Navy and the other services during operations in the 
1980'S.421 
417 The following details were provided by Rear Admiral Chris Bennett who was Senior Staff Officer 
Operations (Navy). He was the first person in the Navy (apart from the cryptographic staff at Silvermine 
and Naval Headquarters) to hear about Operation Savannah. 
41S This group initially came together weekly, but once things 'hotted up' met on a daily basis. It included 
one Major General (AnDy) and one Brigadier (Air Force) from Chief of the SADF's operations staff, one 
Lieutenant General and one Brigadier each from Army and Air Force Headquarters, plus senior Military 
Intelligence and Logistic staff representatives. 
419 The regular Navy representative at the, by then daily, meetings in Pretoria, was a Commander (not a 
Commodore as claimed in Spies & du Preez, Operasie Savannah, p. 144). One of the two designated 
Commodores flew up from Cape Town once a week. 
420 South African Digest, 12 November 1976, p. 4. 












'Politically the MPLA and Cubans had everything on their side and in 
terms of equipment they also had all the advantages. But that was one 
of the best things that ever happened to South Africa. It made the 
politicians realise they'd better spend money on the military or else, 
sooner or later, we were going to end up getting a hiding.' 
(General Malan quoted in Hamann, Days of the Generals, pp. 44-45). 
In February 1976, Botha admitted that 'South Africa has no answers to some of the weapons being used by 
Cubans in Angola.'422 Operation Savannah was the Defence Force's first experience of conventional 
warfare since the Second World War, and had shown up its inadequacies in weaponry, particularly long-
range artillery and armoured firepower. Consequently the Armaments Corporation of South Africa 
(ARMSCOR) embarked on a major programme for the procurement and development of modem 
equipment.423 South Africa's defence expenditure for 1976-1977 was Rl,350 million, 300 percent more 
than the level in 1973-1974 and 17.2 percent of the government's total budget. 424 
The artillery that the SADF faced in Angola, Soviet-supplied guns and multiple rocket-launchers, had 
outranged the South African World War II-vintage artillery.425 The Defence Force had been unprepared, in 
particular, for the 122mm Soviet Katyusha rockets, known as 'Red Eyes' .426 During the operation, Vorster 
had told De Villiers Graaf that the SADF's forward troops had run into a new weapon of Soviet origin and 
that the entire South African advance had been halted at the Cuanza River, 100 kilometres south of Luanda, 
pending the supply of suitable artillery from the United States or France.427 Although not very sophisticated 
in terms of being able to deliver pinpoint accuracy, the 122mm was capable of carrying a 20kg warhead 
and was effective over a 40m radius from where it struck. The rockets were fired from 'Stalin Organs', 
BM-21 multi-tubed mobile rocket launchers, which had a range of 20 kilometres.428 They outranged the 
British 80-pounder (5.5 inch) cannons used by South Africans.429 They had a devastating impact on the 
South African offensive. There were many reported cases of UNIT A and FNLA troops fleeing in panic and 
refusing to continue fighting.43o The Army brought a captured Stalin Organ back from Angola43 \ and it was 
422 In response to Botha's claim, the Progressive Reform Party stressed, 'If there is a danger of being out-
gunned or out-ranged, the weapons must be made or must be bought and the price must be paid': Harry 
Schwarz, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 28 January 1976, col. 213. 
423 Heitman, South African Armed Forces, p. 20. In 1976 the Armaments Board and the Armaments 
Development and Production Corporation were merged to form ARMSCOR: Roherty, State Security in 
South Africa, p. 123 fn.53. 
424 The Star, 3 April 1976. 
425 Interview with Philip Schalkwyk (Chief of Staff, 2 Military Area at Cela); Heitman, South African 
Armed Forces, p. 20. 
426 Interview with Jan Breytenbach. The rockets glowed red earning them this nickname. 
427 Graaff, Div Looks Back, pp. 242-243. 
428 Venter, Vorster's Africa, p. 213. 
429 Uys, Cross of Honour, p. 26. . 











used to produce the Valkiri 127mm multiple rocket launcher, which was fired in battle for the first time in 
1981, during Operation Protea.432 The G-5 155mm artillery system was also developed. Announced in 
1979, the G-5 had a range of up to 30 kilometres and was designed to replace the World War II generation 
of guns.433 
The United Nations voluntary arms embargo against South Africa had led the Verwoerd administration to 
begin efforts to build up a local arms industry in the 19608.434 However, although the government claimed 
that 94 percent of the equipment used in Operation Savannah was of South African manufacture435 , this 
was a massive over-estimate. The Defence Force's experience in Angola underscored its concern that the 
arms boycott might widen whilst its enemies gained greater access to weapons from Soviet arsenals.436 
These fears were confirmed by the mandatory United Nations embargo of November 1977. The result was 
'a spectacular period of growth in South Africa's armaments industry, almost unparalleled in the history of 
armaments development' .437 South Africa built up the tenth largest arms industry in the world and was soon 
able to manufacture most of its own weapons.438 Botha's official biography concluded that 'Without 
Operation Savannah ARMSCOR would not have become the giant that made South Africa independent in 
its arms requirements armaments specifically designed for war situations in Africa' .439 
Following Vorster's visit to Israel in April 1976 press reports suggested that the two heads of state had 
discussed the joint construction of nuclear weapons.440 During 1977 there was continuing speculation about 
South Africa's nuclear warfare capability. The Washington Post quoted American and British sources who 
believed that South Africa was close to producing an atomic bomb.441 In response Connie Mulder said that 
should South Africa be attacked it would use all the means at its disposal 'whatever they may be'. He also 
pointed out that South Africa had never signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In August 1977, it was 
reported that Soviet and American spy satellites had spotted preparations for the testing of a nuclear 
431 It was exhibited at the Pretoria show from August-September 1976: South African Digest, 17 September 
1976, p. 10. 
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Geldenhuys, 'South Africa and the West', in R. Schrire (ed.), South Africa: Public Policy Perspectives 
(Juta & Co., Cape Town, 1982), pp. 306-307. 
435 Republic of South Africa Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Production, 
1982 (Department of Defence, Pretoria, 1982), p. 23. 
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437 W. Doming, 'A Concise History of the South African Defence Force (1912-1987)', (Militaria, Vol. 17, 
No.2, 1987), p. 2l. 
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weapon in the Kalahari Desert.442 When the United Nations Security Council imposed a mandatory arms 
embargo on South Africa in November 1977, it included in its justification reference to South Africa being 
on the brink of producing nuclear weapons.443 
However, it was only in 1993 that President F.W. de Klerk confirmed that South Africa had developed 
nuclear weapons.444 It has been claimed that South Africa's experience in Angola provided the final 
impetus for the development of its clandestine nuclear weapons programme.445 The presence of Cuban 
forces in Angola, and the increase in Soviet influence that this represented, strengthened the incentive to 
acquire a nuclear capability in order to deter further Soviet intrusion in Rhodesia, Namibia or South 
Africa.446 Self-sufficiency in terms of defence against the 'total onslaught' involved acquiring a nuclear 
capability.447 Nuclear weapons could also be used as leverage with Western powers, by demonstrating their 
existence and then threatening to resort to nuclear attack if outside assistance proved necessary and was not 
provided. 
During a hearing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission it was claimed that the Defence Force's 
experience in Angola influenced the decision to develop a chemical and biological warfare programme. In 
the early 1980s a CBW programme, code-named 'Project Coast', was established under the auspices of the 
SADF. At a public hearing of the TRC in 1998448 , the former project manager, Daniel Knobel, claimed that 
during Operation Savannah South African troops confiscated Cuban-operated vehicles in Angola. These 
were found to be fitted with air filters, gas masks and medical bags containing nerve gas antidotes. 
According to Knobel, this caused the Defence Force to believe that the Cubans intended to use chemical 
weapons and that South African soldiers operating in Angola needed a defensive CBW capacity to counter 
the threat. 449 
442 Leonard, South Africa at War, p. 11. 
443 Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, p. 208. 
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448 In a separate criminal trial, the project officer, Dr Wouter Basson, was acquitted of charges ranging from 
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449 C. Gould & P. Folb, The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview 
(internet published, September 2000). The authors, who participated in the Truth & Reconciliation 
Commission investigation into chemical and biological warfare, stressed that Project Coast was not solely a 
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The SADF formed two new units from remnants of its allies in Angola. Task Force Zulu had included 
Battle Group Alpha of Angolan San ('Bushmen') who had previously acted as trackers for the Portuguese. 
Following the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola, many of these 'Flechas' (Arrows) fled into 
Namibia and were recruited by the SADF.450 Conu:rumdant Delville Linford, who had experience of Flecha 
operations from his time as senior South African liaison officer with the Portuguese forces in Angola, had 
secretly trained the Bushmen for cross-border operations against SW APO. During Operation Savannah the 
Bushmen fought alongside their previous enemies the FNLA and UNITA.451 In September 1976 Battle 
Group Alpha was officially recognised and designated 31 Battalion (later 201 Battalion).452 
Alongside the Bushmen in Task Force Zulu was Battle Group Bravo, made up of Daniel Chipenda's FNLA 
troops under Jan Breytenbach. At the end of Operation Savannah, Breytenbach refused to leave his troops 
behind in Angola and they were withdrawn to South Africa.453 They were retrained and re-equipped and 
formed into the secret 32 (Buffalo) Battalion, based in the Caprivi Strip. Under Breytenbach they operated 
against PLAN in southern Angola where their attacks were passed off as the work of UNITA.454 The 
Battalion's existence was only publicly acknowledged by the South African government in 1981, following 
revelations published in The Guardian.455 
IMPROVEMENTS IN LOGISTICS 
During Operation Savannah the Defence Force's logistic support systems were found to be outdated.456 
Indeed it was judged by one military commentator to have been 'a logistics disaster,.457 According to Jan 
Breytenbach: 'During Savannah we were pretty much told to live off the land.'458 Strategically the most 
serious omission was that although the Army had engineers in Angola it did not have any bridging 
equipment.459 As the South African and UNITAlFNLA columns moved north the MPLA and Cuban forces 
slowed their advance by destroying bridges. This led to a stalemate at the Queve River in late November 
with the Zulu column holding Novo Redondo and the MPLA holding Porto Amboim.46O Probes by Task 
450 Weaver, 'The South African Defence Force in Namibia', p. 101. 
451 Breytenbach, They Live by the Sword, p. 17. 
452 Uys, Bushman Soldiers, p. 59; Geldenhuys, A General's Story, p. 58. 
453 Breytenbach, They Live by the Sword, p. 65. 
454 See Breytenbach, They Live by the Sword and Forged in Battle. 
455 The Guardian, 29 January and 2 February 1981. Trevor Edwards, a Briton who had served as a 
mercenary platoon commander with 32 Battalion, made a series of allegations about the wide-scale 
massacre of Angolans by 32 Battalion. 
456 Interview with Willem Steenkamp; Heitman, South African Anned Forces, p. 20. 
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Forces 'Foxbat' and 'Orange,461 towards Quibala were also stalled by blown bridges. South African troops 
were therefore forced to use tree-trunks as crude bridges for their vehicles.462 There were subsequent 
rumours that the South African forces had run short of weapons, ammunition and food as a result of 
ineptitude in the organisation and transport of supplies from South Africa.463 This apparently led to the 
sacking or demotion of some officers and the appointment of a senior officer to reorganise the stocking, 
records and transport of supplies. The SADF also began to compile computer records of all its war 
materials.464 According to the 1977 White Paper on Defence the SADF's logistics system had been 
overhauled and the concept of 'log-ops' (logistics in support of operations) had been introduced.465 
MANPOWER AND AREA OF SERVICE 
Operation Savannah clearly demonstrated the manpower shortages facing the Defence Force. In rnid-
December 1975, Botha had been forced to announce that the period of service for some National 
Servicemen would be extended for a month and that a num~er of Citizen Force units would be called up for 
annual training camps of twelve weeks, instead of the usual 19 days.466 In 1977 the government increased 
the length of national service to two years and the length of the annual Citizen Force camps to 30 days each 
year, over an eight-year period.467 
When the South African public was finally informed about their country's intervention in Angola, 
questions were raised about whether it had been legal for the government to send national service 
conscripts out of the country.468 The Defence Act of 1957 included a stipulation of written consent 'A 
member of the South African Defence Force may be required in time of war to perform service against an 
enemy anywhere in South Africa, whether within or outside the Union and may with his written consent be 
required to perform such service outside South Africa. ,469 Botha stressed that 'Everyone serving over the 
461 Orange was a fourth battle group formed in November 1975 to operate in the east of Angola. 
462 Jaster, The Defense of White Power, p. 72. 
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466 South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1976, p. 37. 
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border in Angola is doing so on a voluntary basis.'410 Further statements by the Defence Force reiterated 
Botha's assertion and referred to a 'form' that soldiers had to sign before they could be sent into Angola.471 
Defence officials refused repeated press requests to view the form, leading some to question whether it 
actually existed.472 There was a steady stream of complaints to newspapers and Members of Parliament 
from parents who said that they had not given permission for their minor sons to fight outside South 
Africa.473 Vause Raw, of the United Party, claimed that 'literally dozens' of parents had raised the question 
with him.474 Similarly Helen Suzman, of the PRP, claimed that parents had phoned her to say that their sons 
were hundreds of kilometres inside Angola, and asked whether the government had the right to send them 
there.415 Such speculations led the government to introduce a Defence Amendment Bill, when Parliament 
opened in 1976.416 
The Defence Amendment Act (No. 1. of 1976) removed all geographic limits on the external deployment 
of SADF members without their prior written consent. The Amendment allowed the Defence Force to send 
personnel 'to perform service against an enemy at any place outside the Republic,.417 'Service in defence of 
the Republic' was broadened to include 'any armed conflict outside the Republic which, in the opinion of 
the State President, is or may be a threat to the security of the Republic.'478 The Act was made retroactive 
to 9 August 1975, the date that South African forces had crossed into Angola to occupy Calueque. 
According to Botha this was 'in order to obviate any doubt which may exist in regard to the legality of 
action taken to date.'479 The Progressive Reform Party wanted to retain the volunteer principle480 and 
Boer/Commando tradition, which held that a citizen army had to be consulted before being sent abroad: 
Seegers, Dimensions ofMilitarisation, p. 19. 
470 Rand Daily Mail, 9 January 1976. A Defence Force spokesman seeking to dispel the (correct) 
implication that South Mrican troops were therefore deep inside Angola, stressed that Botha had been 
referring to the troops guarding the hydroelectric facilities. 
471 Rand Daily Mail, 9 January 1976 and 10 January 1976. 
472 Rand Daily Mail, 24 January 1976. In response to an appeal in several national newspapers, the present 
author was contacted by twenty ex-servicemen who had taken part in Operation Savannah. These included 
Permanent Force members, National Servieemen and Citizen Force soldiers. The majority of these ex-
servicemen specifically recalled signing a form of consent to enter Angola. However, there was a certain 
degree of confusion regarding the form. Several of those interviewed believed that they had signed away 
their South African citizenship and become mercenaries. 
473 For examples see, Rand Daily Mail, 24 January 1976 and Sunday Times, 25 January 1976. 71le Star 
(weekly edition), 17 January 1976, included a brieflegal analysis by Dr. H. Booysen entitled, 'Border Duty 
and South African Law'. The bulk of the forces in Angola during 1975 were National Servicemen (mainly 
under the age of 21) as they were instantly available and could be sent off without any of the public fanfare 
(and consequent demands for information) that a Citizen Force call-up would entail. 
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475 Ibid, 29 January 1976, col. 341. 
476 Grundy, Defense Legislation and Communal Politics, p. 41. 
477 Republic of South Mrica, House of Assembly Debates, 3 February 1976, cols 851-853. 
478 Republic of South Africa, Defence Amendment Act, No. 1 of 1976 quoted in Grundy, Defense 
Legislation and Communal Politics, p. 42. 
479 Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 2 February 1976, col. 401. 











objected to the definition of armed contlict outside South Africa as part of the defence of South Africa.481 
Colin Eglin stressed that 'the Government is asking Parliament for a licence to intervene militarily in 
foreign countries' .482 Although the PRP rejected the Bill, members of the United Party were more emphatic 
than National Party members in their readiness to remove all geographical restrictions on the SADF, and 
the Act was passed with relative ease.483 The Amendment led one analyst to judge: 'Clearly, the South 
African Government was gearing up for the era of civil and guerrilla warfare.'484 
MILITARY-PRESS RELATIONS 
'South Africa's military men began their political education over 
Angola: not only did it throw them into the limelight of international 
politics but it taught them the vital necessity of artful propaganda back 
at home.' 
(Addison, Censorship of the Press in South Africa, p. 206.) 
Writing in 1985, Helmoed-Romer Heitman commented that 'the obsessive secrecy surrounding the 
operation [Savannah] even after it had become public knowledge all over the world did serious damage to 
the standing and credibility of the SADF in the eyes of its nation damage that has not yet been fully made 
good' .485 The government never attempted a complete news blackout again. The Defence Force and 
government learnt from Operation Savannah that the press and public opinion, at home and abroad, needed 
sophisticated and careful handling.486 In February 1976, Botha summoned representatives of the National 
Press Union for discussions on their Defence Agreement with the government. The result was an extension 
of the SADF's Directorate of Public Relations. The military-press liaison section at Defence Headquarters 
was strengthened by the recruitment of a number of professional journalists as public relations officers 
(PROs). A Defence Committee, composed of representatives from the NPU and the military, was 
established to oversee the broad policy of news publication. The Committee drew up a list of accredited 
defence correspondents who had the sale right to approach military PROs and top personnel for news 
releases.487 
In interviews conducted by Graeme Addison with senior journalists and defence correspondents for his 
study Censorship of the Press in South Africa during the Angolan War: A Case Study of News 
Manipulation and Suppression, there was a general consensus that press-military contacts had improved 
thanks to the lessons of the war.488 According to the defence correspondent Willem Steenkamp: 'What 
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happened was the Defence Force reacted very fast and they set up a proper public relations section. They 
set up a system of accredited defence correspondents and they gave them quite genuine in-depth briefings 
two or three times a year. What it amounted to was that quite a lot of stuff could be published. So it was 
quite an effective system. They realised that the old blind censorship didn't work at all.'489 Subsequently 
the government tried to co-opt the services of the press where possible, so moving towards 'a more 
effective hegemony' .490 The government leamt that it could use the media to good effect by selectively 
releasing pre-censored information. The dependence of the press on the Defence Force as a monopoly 
source of military news meant newspapers frequently became the conduit for government propaganda.491 
Writing in 1981, Graeme Addison judged: 'The mistakes of news censorship appear to have been carefully 
analysed by the SADF, and clearly the military press officers have become more expert at their job of 
selling a 'positive' image of the Defence Force.' He believed that the Angolan war marked 'a watershed in 
press-Government relations in South Africa' .492 
DEFENCE FORCE'S ROLE IN POLICY-MAKING 
In The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, Deon Geldenhuys identified the 
Defence Force as the most vocal 'hawks' over the Angolan issue. As Minister of Defence, Botha had 
outmanoeuvred BOSS and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), both of which were 'powelful 
domestic voices raised against South Africa's involvement in the Angola war' .493 It was only towards the 
end of South Africa's involvement in Angola that the DFA was able to exert any influence over events.494 
At the outset the Department found itself largely excluded from the decision-making on Angola. It might 
have provided a more accurate assessment of the impact of South Africa's invasion in Africa and 
elsewhere, but it was not consulted.495 The DFA and Hilgard Muliers' discreet diplomacy of detente, 
together with their almost religious adherence to the principle of non-interference in the intemal affairs of 
other states, was in stark contrast to the Defence Force's belief that South Africa should take a hand in 
shaping Angola's destiny.496 The DFA's relegation to the sidelines was evidenced by their hearing of the 
SADF's first major offensive, the advance on Pereira d'E~a on 22 August 1975, only when the Portuguese 
government handed South Africa's ambassador in Lisbon a note of protest.497 
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Van den Bergh of BOSS stressed that he had always been opposed to South African military involvement 
in Angola and claimed the credit for South Africa's eventual withdrawa1.498 General Hein du Toit has 
confirmed that Vanden Bergh opposed intervention and has even alleged that he tried to sabotage the 
Defence Force's efforts in Angola by withholding information.499 However, Van den Bergh's role seems to 
have been more complicated than one of simple opposition. He had been involved in the supply of arms to 
the anti-MPLA forces and had been in personal contact with the leaders of these movements. Furthennore, 
BOSS had been a channel for communications with the CIA and the African governments that had urged 
South Africa to intervene in Angola.5OO 
According to Geldenhuys, the Defence Force took a cynical view of Van den Bergh's proclaimed 
opposition, claiming that he was bound to object to anything suggested or undertaken by the military. 501 
There was nothing less than antipathy between Van den Bergh and Botha.s02 Botha and the military had 
long resented Van den Bergh's position as Vorster's right-hand man.S03 Relations between the Defence 
Force and Van den Bergh had not been helped when Vorster, under pressure from Van den Bergh, had used 
the police in Rhodesia, which the SADF felt was a military matter.S04 There was also a long-standing 
internecine rivalry between Military Intelligence and BOSS, its civilian counterpart. 505 The Potg~ter 
Commission, appointed by Vorster in 1969 to investigate which agency should control intelligence-
gathering operations, had done little to clarify the situation.506 The head of Rhodesian intelligence has 
claimed that, in March 1976, Van den Bergh appealed to him 'to commit to the wastepaper basket all 
reports received from their Military Intelligence' . He wrote: 'It was depressing for us on our visits to South 
Africa to have to listen to BOSS reviling the Military, [and] the Military berating BOSS' .507 James Roherty 
has claimed that Angola provided 'a meeting point for two agencies on a collision course.'508 
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In 1980, General Malan, who had been Chief of the Army during Operation Savannah and was then the 
Minister of Defence, commented that, 'The events in Angola in 1975·76 focused the attention on the urgent 
necessity for the State Security Council to playa much fuller role in the national security of the Republic 
than hitherto.'509 Geldenhuys interpreted this statement as meaning that the Angolan debacle underlined the 
need in top government circles for regularised and formalised decision-making procedures. It was felt 
necessary to allow for the consideration of all relevant interests and to prevent decision-making, on matters 
of national interest, being usurped by a particular individual or agency in government.510 Geldenhuys 
claimed that Malan's statement indicated that the State Security Council owed its character to 'an 
acknowledgement of the deficiencies and dangers involved in the military's dominance of decision-making 
on South Africa's involvement in the Angolan war,.511 
The State Security Council (or Committee for National Security) had been in existence since 1972.512 
Whereas under Vorster the SSC rarely met and tended to confine itself to narrowly defined security 
matters, its scope dramatically expanded during Botha's administration.513 Under Botha the office of the 
prime minister was strengthened and reorganised, with Vorster's twenty ad hoc committees replaced by 
five permanent cabinet committees, the SSC being the only statutory body of these five.514 The SSC sat at 
the apex of the National Security Management System, an intricate political-military apparatus devised by 
Botha and General Malan, to ensure bureaucratic cohesion under the prescriptions of 'total strategy'. The 
SSe's mandate was to advise the government on the 'formulation and implementation of national policy 
and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic,.515 Botha chaired the council, which included the 
minister of defence, five other cabinet officers and the heads of the Defence Force, the police and the 
intelligence services.516 In 1983, Geldenhuys claimed that the SSC and its substructures had become the 
most important elements of the decision-making process in South Africa.517 When the SSC presented a 
recommendation to the cabinet for final approval, that recommendation effectively carried the prime 
minister's stamp of approval and, given the salience and urgency ascribed to security concerns, the SSC 
enjoyed a wide decision-making brief.518 General AJ. van Deventer (who had commanded Operation 
Savannah) was appointed secretary to the SSe. Geldenhuys commented: 'That this key post has been 
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assigned to a professional soldier can hardly have been coincidental: not only some of the military's 
management methods but also its manpower has been drafted into top-level decision making' .519 
The role of the SSC in executive-level decision-making aroused considerable attention from both South 
African and overseas scholars.52o Most agreed that Botha's bureaucratic and cabinet-level reorganisation 
had deepened the trend towards administrative or executive government, a trend further accentuated by 
Botha's personal style.521 The SSC was accused of being a form of inner cabinet, led by Botha.522 Grundy 
likened it to the Politburo of the Soviet Communist party, the real decision-making body, with the cabinet, 
like the Soviet Council of Ministers, a rubber-stamp and policy-coordinating body.523 Because the SSC 
consisted mainly of men from the security establishment, the military was seen as being at the hub of the 
decision-making structure.524 The elevation of the SSC into a principal policy-making body reflected 
important features of Botha's leadership style: following the Angolan debacle in 1975-6 he wanted to 
formalise and regularise top-level decision-making; he placed a high premium on expert advice and he was 
familiar and comfortable with a forum that bore a distinct military imprint.525 General Malan has 
commented on Botha's ascension to the prime ministership: 'He was fairly involved in the military 
because, remember, he had the experience of Savannah and he learned the lessons that we did in Savannah 
and he applied them.'526 Annette Seegers has claimed that the Cabinet, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Parliament never recovered from the 'blow' of Operation Savannah as 'the hawks' took charge in 
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Pretoria: 'For about fifteen years decisions made on behalf of Total Onslaught would rarely rise above the 
treetops of the Operational Zone,.527 












The Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique led to a profound shift in the regional balance of 
power, changing the face of southern Africa. By 1975 the geopolitics of the Cold War brought an 
unexpected degree of internationalisation to the burgeoning civil war in Angola and incalculable suffering 
to the Angolan people. For South Africa, with its protective buffer rapidly crumbling, an insulated era of 
confidence was over. In 1975 Angola became an unlikely theatre of the Cold War. Pretoria's response was 
to invade Angola. It was South Africa's first military intervention in a black African state and one from 
which it was forced to retreat ignominiously. 
The goverument attempted to keep news of the invasion from the South Mrican people and employed a 
smoke screen of disinformation. It used the protection of its economic interests in Namibia and 'hot 
pursuits' of SW APO guerrillas, deemed to be acceptable actions by the South African electorate, to dismiss 
any reports of greater South Mrican penetration. When Pretoria finally admitted limited involvement in 
Angola, it sought to present this as a justifiable reaction to communist intervention. The National Party had 
long preached the dangers of the 'communist menace' to its white electorate. Despite Pretoria's claims to 
have simply responded to the Cuban presence, recent research in the Cuban archives has produced strong 
evidence that the South African intervention in Angola was the cause, and not the consequence, of Cuba's 
introduction of regular troops. By the time South African troops withdrew there were more than ten 
thousand Cuban troops engaged. This begs the question of why, if Pretoria was so strongly motivated by 
the Cuban threat, did it withdraw without ever mobilising the full might of the SADF, when the Cuban 
presence had increased dramatically? For its part, it appears that initially Soviet aid was limited and 
motivated as much by rivalry with the Chinese as with the West. The subsequent increase in Soviet 
weapons support and the introduction of large numbers of Cuban troops were probably not fully anticipated 
in Pretoria. 
The truth about South Africa's motivations in Angola was only gradually revealed as the government 
became increasingly embittered at its perceived betrayal and evident international isolation. In 1975, 
Pretoria, which for so long had suffered a position of diplomatic isolation, found itself in the gratifying and 
unusual position of pursuing the same objective as several African states and the United States. Despite its 
convictions about communist aims for domination of southern Africa, the South African government would 
not have entered Angola without these two demonstrations of interest and apparent support. Angola was 
perceived as a chance to become integrated into Africa and a chance to strengthen South Africa's links with 
the West 
South Africa's Angolan intervention was perceived at the time as an aberration, an abandonment of its 











stance towards FRELIMO in Mozambique, where superficially at least, Vorster played his hand with 
studied correctness. However, paradoxical as it might sound, a key motivation for South Africa's 
involvement in Angola is found in the context of its government's policy of detente. Vorster saw in 
Operation Savannah an opportunity to prove to his detractors, both at home and abroad, the efficacy of his 
flagging outward policy. Intervention in Angola, alongside Zairean troops and at the urging of Zambia (and 
possibly the Ivory Coast and Senegal), was an opportunity to act in concert with moderate black Africa and 
to prove that South Africa was a reliable ally against communist expansion. It was a chance to respond to 
appeals from black Africa and to demonstrate that South Africa was willing to expend its lives and money 
for a common cause. 
South Africa's invasion of Angola was also an effort to establish South Africa's credibility as a loyal ally 
of the 'Free World'. If South Africa did not intervene at the instigation of the West then it did so in the 
belief that it was embarking on a common struggle for which would receive due recognition. The United 
States claimed that there was no foreknowledge, military collusion or cooperation. South Mrica claimed it 
had been 'left in the lurch'. Although exactly how any collaboration between South Africa and the United 
States developed remains murky, it is now clear that it did exist at a certain level. Such a firm conclusion is 
more difficult to reach with regard to instigation. In the absence of concrete evidence it is impossible to 
establish whether the South African government ever did receive a 'secret nod' from its United States 
counterpart, as its Pretoria's leaders insisted they had. The role of other Western powers in Angola is even 
less clear. France provided limited aid to the FNLA and the British government has been implicated in the 
recruitment of British mercenaries by the FNLA, even if simply in 'turning a blind eye'. For South Africa 
the prospect of a joint, or at least tacitly joint, campaign with the West was a golden opportunity and a risk 
worth taking. It was also a gross miscalculation. 
The government in Pretoria miscalculated the international support the invasion would garner and 
underestimated the political liability its allegiance represented abroad. Vorster did not appear to understand 
the enormity of the risks involved and displayed an astounding naivety with regard to South Africa's true 
international standing. He misread both the degree and nature of Mrican support for South African 
intervention; private nods and winks from a handful of African leaders did not represent meaningful or 
practical support. When the initiative became mired in a rising tide of criticism against South Africa's 
intervention, there was no African support to be found. The targets of Pretoria's wooing through detente 
were not prepared to risk the wrath of black Africa by standing by the white oppressor. Pretoria's belief that 
the interests of the West coincided with those of South Africa and its expectation that Western (particularly 
American) support would be forthcoming, although perhaps correct on the first count, proved woefully out 
of touch on the second. Although American involvement remained clandestine and low level, Vorster and 
Botha apparently believed that it represented a firm policy commitment by the Ford Administration. South 
Africa failed to see that southern Africa was only a small part of the international global scheme of 











world that South Africa was of strategic importance to the Free World, and too important to be sidelined as 
the pariah of Africa, it seems Vorster had convinced only himself. Vorster and his advisers critically 
misjudged the mood in the United States. It would have been politically impossible for Ford to have openly 
endorsed the South African invasion and, after its humiliation in Vietnam, the American public, was 
certainly not going to condone the sending of American soldiers to another distant Third World battlefield. 
Such a reaction might logically have been anticipated in Pretoria. 
The United States congressional mandate against continued American involvement and Pretoria's failure to 
win either Western or African endorsement for its intervention in Angola, left South Africa in an exposed 
position. As the scope of the SADF's involvement became known, the government found itself alone and 
facing international condemnation. The news also cast a different light on the three Angolan movements. In 
presenting South Africa as an aggressive military power, the Angola adventure squandered the successes of 
detente. South Africa had displayed a total disregard for the realities of African politics, underestimating 
the emotional hostility to South Africa from within black Africa. Pretoria's intervention had a convulsive 
effect among African countries, overriding anxieties related to Soviet and Cuban intervention. Africans had 
more experience of racism than of communism and, in the eyes of many African states; South Africa's 
involvement legitimised the assistance given to the MPLA by the Soviets and Cubans. Support for the 
MPLA was galvanized and UNITA and the FNLA were discredited as legitimate claimants to power in 
Angola. Thus, in the diplomatic arena, Pretoria helped to bring about the very situation it had sought to 
prevent. 
The Angolan conflict thus underscored the extent of Pretoria's diplomatic and political vulnerabilities. A 
conservative American administration had abandoned South Africa when broader security and political 
interests were at stake. Furthermore the fear of being associated with apartheid had been a key factor in the 
cessation of American aid to the Angolan movements. In light of this, Pretoria's assertions that it 
represented the front line for the West against the encroachment of communism in Africa appeared 
threadbare. South Africa was not as important to the West as it had believed itself to be. With hindsight it 
seems almost impossible to believe that Pretoria imagined that the invasion of a sovereign state would 
enhance South Africa's standing in black Africa and restore South Africa to its position within the Western 
alliance. It was a futile search for friends and security in a hostile and increasingly threatening world. It was 
a gamble that left Pretoria still more isolated. In Parliament the Opposition stressed the loneliness of South 
Africa's Angolan intervention: 'The bitterest moment of all came in Angola, because when we waited for 
friends to turn up, no one responded; not a single White one and not one Black one. What greater evidence 
of isolation could there have been than that? When in a crucial situation you stand alone, that is isolation.' I 











Whereas the debate over South Mrica's entry into the First and Second World Wars exacerbated communal 
cleavages both between EngIish- and Mrikaans-speakers and within the Afrikaner community itself, with 
regard to the white electorate the government survived its Angolan intervention with surprisingly little 
public outcry and no evident political casualties. In contrast to the United States where the CIA's Angolan 
activities were the subject of congressional enquiries and debate, in South Africa the parliamentary 
challenge to the government was muted. The boundaries of political debate in the press and parliament lay 
well within the dominant white consensus. Criticism from both sources was based on the premise that the 
government's information strategy had a corrosive effect on public morale and consequently on national 
security. It was argued that the national interest would have been better served by allowing public debate 
on the issues involved. There remained a unity of purpose, a fundamental agreement and commitment to 
common goals, between the government and its opponents in the white opposition press and political 
establishment. It was accepted that black Marxist revolutionary movements in southern Africa and Angola 
endangered South Africa's interests and had to be resisted. 
'Operation Savannah' starkly revealed the true nature of official information practices and the concomitant 
impotence of the South Mrican press to inform their public about a matter as momentous as the invasion of 
a neighbouring country by South African forces. It also illustrated that the government felt little 
compulsion to be accountable to its constituents, to Parliament or to the public at large. That Vorster 
decided on and executed such a major policy initiative without consulting the full Cabinet or drawing on 
the full range of relevant government departments is also illustrative of the domestic configurations of 
power. If the basis for deciding to intervene in Angola was seriously flawed, so too was the process by 
which that and subsequent decisions were made. The Angolan intervention revealed profound deficiencies 
in South Mrica's top-level decision-making. The various interested parties within the executive branch of 
government had unequal opportunities for making their views known and there was no system of inter-
departmental checks and balances. 
A new mood, engendered by the triumph of FRELIMO and then the MPLA in a situation analogous to their 
own, gave encouragement and hope to the Nationalist government's internal opponents, helping to 
precipitate widespread black defiance. Within three months of the Defence Force's withdrawal from 
Angola, the country was struck by the first massive black protests since the 1960s. The government itself 
was forced to acknowledge that events in Angola, particularly the perceived defeat of the SADF by black 
Angolans, could have led to a hardening of black attitudes internally and provided an impetus to the revolt. 
The urban uprising provided a glimpse of the forces for change gradually gathering strength within South 
African society. 
South Africa's regional position was further weakened after the Angola debacle by an escalation of 











order to counter SW APO, South Africa's intervention in fact allowed SW APO to increase it') activity in 
northern Namibia. The border war began in earnest in the wake of Operation Savannah. Pretoria had failed 
to block the MPLA's ascension to power and that government now gave support and sanctuary to SW APO 
guerrillas. SW APO was now in a position to receive a much greater volume of support than ever before 
from both the Cubans and Soviets. South Africa's involvement in Angola also weakened its government's 
international stance on Namibia by buttressing accusations that it was illegally occupying Namibia and 
using it as a military base, contrary to international agreements. 
For Pretoria, Angola came to epitomise the perceived 'total onslaught'. However, South Africa's 
intervention, by removing the risk of united African opposition, had in fact opened the way to increased 
communist intervention in Angola and in turn provided an opportunity for greater Russian involvement in 
Namibia and Rhodesia. In this sense, for South Mrica, the total onslaught was a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The fact that South Africa's objectives were not achieved in Angola did not weaken the military's position 
in the ensuing debate about the future direction of regional strategy. Instead the decision to invade Angola 
marked the start of the military's ascendancy in foreign policy. 
Undertaken in order to achieve political goals, Pretoria's military operation in Angola had not possessed an 
advance masterplan. By contrast, the Defence Force was drawn into an incremental escalation with no 
clearly obtainable political objective or end-point. According to the subsequent Minister of Defence, 
Magnus Malan, South Africa's involvement in the Angolan conflict was a key factor influencing the 
subsequent development of the government's top-level decision-making structure, a structure in which the 
military was to assume increasing importance. The government's participation in the Angolan civil war 
induced a dramatic shift in the balance of power in southern Africa, marking a deterioration in both South 
Mrica's relations with the West and its external security situation. As the Cape Times commented on 31 
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